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ABSTRACT 
Engaging Neighbors:  
Housing Strategies and Political Mobilization in Moscow's Renovation 
by  
Anna Zhelnina 
Advisor: James M. Jasper 
 
In summer 2017, residents of thousands of socialist-era apartment buildings in Moscow 
were invited to vote and decide whether their building should be included in the demolition and 
relocation program proposed by the Mayor’s Office. Renovation is an ongoing urban renewal 
plan, first announced in Moscow in February 2017, to demolish whole neighborhoods of 
socialist-era, five-story buildings and replace them with high-rises. The vast project affected 
more than 5,000 buildings with approximately a million inhabitants.  
This dissertation addresses general questions of political agency and the possibility for 
diverse people in urban neighborhoods to produce change: to achieve desired policy outcomes, 
transform the rules of political interactions and the configuration of players in the urban political 
field. Inevitably, the interests, aspirations, and strategies of these people differ. In this thesis, I 
explore how these different aspirations and different life experiences clash, overlap, and develop 
into collective strategies, which can transform the relationships of the urban political field. To 
connect the experiences of Moscow residents facing urban renewal with the longstanding 
sociological debates, I synthesize theories of agency and strategy, theories of strategic interaction 
in social movement research, and urban scholarship on citizenship. 
Housing is a fundamental human goal, and ways of achieving and keeping a proper home 
shape a person’s housing strategy. Renovation soon turned into a housing struggle. The reason it 
sparked a high degree of mobilization in a relatively politically apathetic society is the thing it 
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targeted: housing is literally the issue closest to home, able to provoke even politically 
indifferent people to act. I seek to demonstrate that political action partly grows out of individual 
strategies, motivations, aspirations, and feelings. These personal strategies, too, result in turn 
from earlier social and cultural processes. 
Renovation pulled Muscovites into the urban political field, a configuration of interactive 
arenas where decisions about the city in general and its specific parts can be negotiated. Setting 
foot in one arena could also motivate citizens to further explore the outlines of the field, and 
engage in interactions in further linked arenas, such as municipal elections. Previously, not many 
Muscovites had used or even known about the different arenas of urban and local politics, but the 
shock of potentially losing their home in Renovation exposed those structures to more citizens 
than ever before. People learned and tried out individual arenas, learned about the connections 
between different political arenas, and created new arenas, for example, homeowners’ assemblies 




I grew up in an old apartment building in Saint Petersburg, where I was taught that good 
neighbors were quiet neighbors. Bad neighbors had loud parties throughout the night and invited 
crowds of people who abused alcohol or drugs; they smoked or left trash in the stairwell, parked 
their cars under someone’s window and left their engine running or blasted music, causing noise 
and odors to invade the flats facing the courtyard. All these sound and smell invasions were 
painful for “normal” families. My mom would sometimes count the “normal” flats versus the 
“abnormal” ones in our building. The balance started shifting in the late 2000s: problematic 
kommunalkas were gradually transformed into separate flats, and the new owners were people 
whose economic well-being allowed them to purchase a flat.  
I always enjoyed my mom’s recounting the trajectories of the apartments in our building; 
stories about neighbors “receiving” and exchanging flats, going to great lengths to improve their 
housing conditions, and about acquaintances whose spouses turned out to be propiska predators 
– they married to get the official registration in the city. All these stories were about 
accumulation or losses, about gaining an advantage or losing it. My family was lucky: in the 
1960s, my strategic and proactive grandmother made sure that her family received a room in a 
communal apartment in a good part of the city, in a decent building. This room became a 
foundation of our family’s housing well-being: before the USSR collapsed, my parents 
participated in the program aimed at eliminating communal apartments. As their neighbors 
moved out to new flats in other parts of the city, my parents’ status of life-long residents of Saint 
Petersburg entitled them to claim the emptying rooms for free. By the beginning of the 1990s, 
they had accumulated the whole flat. The timing worked well for us: after the country 
transitioned to market capitalism, the only way to acquire neighbors’ rooms in a communal 
apartment was to buy them. 
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My family benefitted from the socialist-era housing policies and achieved a separate 
apartment. In the 2000s, we privatized it. But throughout my childhood, I remember my parents 
discussing that someone could come and relocate us (nas rasselyat). Because of this uncertainty, 
my parents would not perform any expensive repairs in the apartment. “We’d spend money – and 
the next week they would relocate us.” First, they said it with hope, and since the past decade or 
so – with fear. Over time, the building received the much-needed repairs, a small but reliable 
community of active neighbors emerged, and we valued our current home more and more as the 
prospect of getting a better apartment after a possible relocation diminished.  
Having lived under the Damocles’ sword of a possible relocation, I took it personally 
when Renovation created this reality for so many Muscovites. Most of them still don’t know 
whether or when their relocations will take place. They have to live with this uncertainty, not 
knowing whether it’s worth it to invest in improving their homes. When I was preparing for my 
first fieldwork visit to Moscow, I asked a Muscovite friend for advice. She was happy to help but 
laughed: “I already have an answer for you! Those who renovated their flats oppose Renovation, 
those who did not – support it!” It sounded sensible, but I knew that the reasons for renovating or 
not renovating one’s apartment could vary. Some people did not have the money for renovations; 
others, like my parents, might have lived in anticipation of relocations for decades and were 
reluctant to invest in something that might be taken from them tomorrow.  
Coming from a different city, I could still recognize many sentiments of my interlocutors 
in Moscow. It was also clear to me that Moscow was a traditional experimental ground for 
policies and innovations, the good ones and the bad ones, that could eventually travel to other 
regions of the country. Muscovites get everything first. 
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Antisnosy, or antisnosniki, or protivosnosniki Opponents of Renovation 
Khalyava      Freebie, something achieved without effort  
Khrushchevka, pl. khrushchevki Buildings constructed during the Nikita 
Khrushchev era 
Kommunalka      Communal apartment 
Limitchiki      Work migrants of 1970s-1980s 
Microrayon Urban planning unit, a residential block with 
necessary social infrastructure 
Obsheye sobraniye sobstvennikov, OSS  Homeowners assembly 
Ochered’  Housing improvement program, the “queue” 
Ocheredniki Participants of the housing improvement 
program, waiting on the “queue”  
Okrug       Administrative district of Moscow 
Ponayekhavshiye Newcomers; a derogatory term to describe 
migrants to the city, people who weren’t 
born there 
Prefektura      Administrative district administration 
Propiska      Residential registration in the USSR 
Pyatietazhka, pl. pyatietazhki    Five-story buildings 
Rayon District, a subdivision of the administrative 
district 
Sotsial’nyy nayem Social rent, a term used for non-privatized 
apartments 
Stalinka, pl. stalinki Buildings constructed during the Joseph 
Stalin rule 
Tipovoy, pl. tipovyye     Prefabricated, typical buildings 
Uprava      Local level, rayon administration, 
Zasnosy, or zasnosniki    Supporters of Renovation 




On a dark February evening in 2018 I took a bus to Losevo to meet with Alena. She 
promised to take me for a walk in the neighborhood and to explain why the whole district had to 
go. It was a socialist-era neighborhood, mostly built up with five-story prefabricated apartment 
buildings, arrayed in carefully planned microrayons, or microdistricts. A big chunk of buildings 
in Alena’s district were included in “Renovation:” an urban renewal project that would demolish 
socialist-era housing across Moscow.  
I was on the bus during rush hour. Residents of Losevo returned from work on this 
packed bus, a mixed crowd: working class men, migrant workers, businesspeople with 
briefcases, hipsters. Like most socialist-era districts, Losevo is diverse: people of all incomes and 
lifestyles may live in the same area, and even in the same building. People in the same building 
can be homeowners, social renters or market renters.1 
 A woman next to me caught my eye: she was wearing an expensive-looking fur coat, 
very appropriate for cold February nights in Moscow, but still a marker of status and well-being. 
But she, too, probably lived in one of the condemned and non-prestigious socialist-era five-
stories. I wondered, did she think about the prospect of relocation? Did she welcome the 
opportunity to move into a modern apartment to match her middle-class lifestyle, or was she 
offended that the government had come for her property and allowed her neighbors to decide by 
a majority of votes whether she has to give up her beloved home? 
Alena, who met me by the entrance of her five-story building made of prefabricated 
panels, was adamant that all such buildings in her neighborhood were beyond repair. She told me 
 
1 Social rent (sotsial’nyy nayem) is a term used for non-privatized apartments. 
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in excruciating detail about pipes that burst and ceilings that leaked. During our walk, she 
pointed at the almost identical panel buildings and complained that their monotonous exteriors 
made her depressed. Her small family had no money to fix the engineering problems, and the 
maintenance company was reluctant and elusive. No money in the world could save these 
buildings, Alena was certain. However, in many of the condemned buildings there was at least 
someone who disagreed. Some people loved their low-rise homes, renovated their apartments, 
and enjoyed the greenery in the spacious courtyards. Maybe the stranger on the bus was one of 
these people. 
In summer 2017, residents of thousands of socialist-era apartment buildings in Moscow 
were invited to vote and decide whether their building should be included in the demolition and 
relocation program proposed by the Mayor’s Office. Renovation is an ongoing urban renewal 
plan, first announced in Moscow in February 2017, to demolish whole neighborhoods of 
socialist-era five-story buildings and replace them with high-rises. The criteria of eligibility are 
imprecise: in documents, speeches and conversations eligible buildings are described as 
“constructed in the first period of the industrial housing construction” (1957-1968), “five-
stories,” and “prefabricated housing,” but in reality, buildings from earlier and later time periods, 
with less and more stories were included in the demolition lists. Renovation was the first massive 
attempt to redistribute large tracts of valuable land in the capital filled with “inefficient,” low-
rise residential blocks. The vast project affected more than 5,000 buildings with approximately a 
million inhabitants.  
What happens when people with different ideas about home, property rights, and 
appropriate forms of civic engagement are locked in one apartment building, which the city 
administration decides to demolish? 
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This dissertation addresses the general question of political agency and the possibility for 
diverse people in urban neighborhoods to produce change by achieving desired policy outcomes 
and transforming the rules of political interactions and the configuration of players in the urban 
political field. Inevitably, the interests, aspirations, and strategies of these people are different. In 
this thesis, I explore how these different aspirations and different life experiences clash, overlap, 
and develop into collective strategies, which can transform relationships in the urban political 
field. 
Background 
Most of Moscow’s socially diverse population lives in a variety of socialist-era apartment 
buildings. The five-stories, pyatietazhki, can be found in nearly every city district, including the 
prestigious and desirable city center. In the residential areas outside the center, but still within 
the city boundary, whole districts are products of socialist urban planning: carefully designed 
microrayons with the necessary social infrastructure and greenery and identical, carefully lined 
up buildings. For some of these districts, Renovation meant demolition not only of individual 
buildings but of whole blocks of buildings and the living environment of the low-rise socialist 
microrayons. 
The program sparked a variety of responses: some residents of the eligible buildings 
rejoiced at the possibility of moving into new high-rises instead of what they believed was 
substandard housing, while others were terrified. Mobilization happened on both sides of the 
controversy; supporters and opponents of Renovation were often immediate neighbors who had 
to fight over the fate of their building, and over the minds of their undecided neighbors. 
Renovation affected 122 of Moscow’s 146 municipal districts and settlements. The list of 
homes considered for demolition was published in May 2017, and residents of these buildings 
were invited to “express their opinion” in the form of a vote (they could do it online, or offline in 
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“one-window service centers”).2 They were also allowed to hold a homeowners’ assembly to 
formalize their decision. Neighborhoods differed in their responses: in some, less than 1 percent 
of buildings voted against inclusion in June 2017, in others as many as half did. Both the 
differences in the average quality of the housing stock in the districts (different rayons have more 
and less decent series of prefabricated buildings) and the extent of resistance and organization 
among the opponents of Renovation in each district played a role. 
This situation amplified dormant tensions among the affected Muscovites. Their political 
and social differences came to the fore during the mobilization of opposing camps and the 
interactions that ensued. During the active phase of the controversy, between February and 
August 2017, Moscow offered several arenas for conflict and negotiation among neighbors, 
activists, politicians, and local bureaucrats.  
Research questions 
In this dissertation, I seek to demonstrate that political action partly grows out of 
individual strategies, motivations, aspirations, and feelings. These strategies, too, result from 
earlier social and cultural processes. I focus on the following specific questions: 
1) How do people’s personal strategies and life goals connect to strategic interaction in 
public arenas? What draws people into these arenas? 
2) How do social movements and other players in the urban political field tap into people’s 
personal strategies to convince them to follow a specific political course of action? 
3) How is change in the political fields (new players, arenas, and relationships) generated by 
the micro-level interactions?  
 
2 One-window service centers “My Documents” exist in every municipal district of the city and provide 
easy access to various public services (they accept passport applications, fee payments, issue health 




The theoretical framework of this dissertation builds on debates about agency and 
structure. To address this old sociological puzzle, I bring together three theoretical areas: the 
conceptualization of agency and strategy, theories of strategic interaction in social movement 
research, and urban scholarship on citizenship. 
Strategy and strategic action, structured ways of organizing action to achieve various 
goals, are manifestations of agency. The concept of life goals, or personal goals, is mostly absent 
from sociological discussions, limiting our understanding of agency and intentionality in social 
and political change, defined here as change in the composition and rules of political fields.  
Attention to people’s personal goals is useful for revealing the link between individual 
lives and political action. Personal goals can include both trivial and big aims, short-term and 
long-term life goals, which include a spectrum of aspirations, from buying food for a family to 
acting as a moral person or being happy.  
Goals can be trivial or far-reaching, but they are the foundation for organizing human 
action. This is not to say that all action is rationally organized and calculated; goals and 
strategies of achieving them can be implicit and non-articulated, a result of socializing into 
certain cultures of action. Bourdieu’s concept of habitus (Bourdieu 1977) highlights the role of 
past experiences and embodied knowledge in guiding human action, and Swidler (1986) suggests 
that culture is strategy, a source of tools for achieving life goals.  
I suggest distinguishing between habitual and intentional strategies to reflect the 
important difference between the more and less articulated ways of organizing action. Whether 
leaning toward the habitual and implicit or intentional and explicit pole of the continuum, 
personal strategies constitute a framework for the interpretation of the events, policies, and social 
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and political realities in general. Resonance or discrepancy between people’s strategies and 
public policies, for example, can motivate people to act in a certain way. 
Political projects can grow from these everyday foundations, including individual and 
collective political action. An important question is the role of political players, such as social 
movements, in mobilizing these pre-political personal dispositions. Thinking along those lines 
may also help to approach an elusive topic in social movement research: is there something 
special about the protesters (do their personal, pre-existing goals make some people more likely 
to mobilize?) or does mobilization come first, and after they mobilized for action, people develop 
ideas and ideologies?  
Housing is a fundamental human goal, and ways of achieving and keeping a proper home 
shape a person’s housing strategy. Moscow’s Renovation plan turned into a housing struggle. 
The reason it sparked such mobilization in a relatively politically apathetic society is the thing it 
targeted: housing is literally the issue closest to home, able to provoke even politically 
indifferent people to act. It is considered a private, personal matter, and therefore is linked to 
many strong, potentially mobilizing emotions. Many social movements have arisen, like this one, 
to contest the boundary of public and private (Evans 1980). 
Especially in cities, homes are deeply integrated with social and political structures and 
thus with collectivities and public policies: physically, residents of apartment buildings are 
connected by their buildings’ walls and engineering infrastructure, which need to be maintained, 
depend on budget allocation, the legal status of the land underneath them, and are subject to 
collective decisions by homeowners. These important links were mostly concealed from 
Muscovites before Renovation became apparent. Because of the dual private-public nature of 
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urban housing, housing conflicts became learning grounds for citizens and launched activists 
from this arena into other political domains.  
One concept that helps explain the diversity of responses to the Renovation program and 
expose this private-public link of housing issues is housing strategies. People have different 
ideas about what good, desirable housing is, and different ideas about appropriate ways of 
achieving it. This concept is derived from the more general understanding of strategy in 
sociology: a link between the restraints of “structures” and the creativity of “agency,” strategy 
carries an imprint of the players’ previous experiences, their socialization, as well as their 
analysis of the situation, estimation of the environment, and their place in it. 
In Moscow, the diversity of housing strategies is especially striking. If it is a capitalist 
and even “neoliberal” city, as some researchers label it (Büdenbender and Zupan 2017), Moscow 
has a long and still relevant history of socialist housing distribution and all the strategies and 
people’s experiences that sprang from it. Even the housing policies of contemporary capitalist 
Moscow carry some legacy of the socialist housing system, and not only in Muscovites’ 
memory. This legacy includes, for example, ochered’, the “queue,” the system of registering 
families in need of housing improvement. The remains of the centralized housing provision 
system and the perception of the state as responsible for housing matters of citizens live on 
today, as I will discuss in Chapter 2. Such strategies rely on the state as the main player in charge 
of improving people’s housing conditions; however, they also involve a very strong form of 
people’s agency, nonetheless. One can try and trick the state and get more than one is formally 
entitled to. It is not always a passive strategy of waiting for one’s turn but can have an active 
component of gaming the system. 
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State-oriented strategies coexist with the relatively recent, market-oriented strategies, 
where the main tool is to purchase homes. Adherents of such strategies rely on themselves, not 
the government, to get the housing they want. The usual toolkit of capitalist housing markets – 
mortgages and family assets – is included with this strategy (along with hiring real estate 
brokers, studying real-estate websites and databases, saving, renting out the unused properties, 
and so on). 
Housing strategies describe meaningful and active connections between people and their 
homes. People’s plans and ideas were shaken by Renovation, and their strategies were exposed 
and articulated in public debates and fights. To understand people’s actions, including the ways 
they sometimes changed their mind about Renovation, and how actively they got involved in 
collective action because of it, we need to understand their underlying and sometimes implicit 
housing strategies. 
Housing strategies, like all strategies, are not fixed; they can change over time, including 
under the influence of collective action and mobilization. Renovation was not a predictable or 
normal situation, in which Muscovites could implement their housing strategies in a routine way. 
It was a crisis that shook the normal, routine foundations of people’s strategies; they had to 
formulate publicly their goals, ideas, and appropriate means of achieving them. They also had to 
create new communities and defend their – now group – interests in a variety of arenas of urban 
politics. 
Muscovites had to learn what the system of arenas, or the field of urban politics looked 
like. I define the urban political field as a configuration of interactive arenas where decisions 
about the city in general and its specific parts can be negotiated. Different players, including city 
officials, developers, business owners, individual citizens, and collectives “vie for advantage” 
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(Fligstein and McAdam 2011) in the field by interacting in concrete arenas. The linked arenas 
(Jasper 2019) of Moscow’s urban political field during Renovation put different things at stake: 
knowledge, resources, acquaintances, voting results; the gains made or losses suffered in some of 
those arenas constrained outcomes in other interactive situations. Gradually, these gains and 
losses in a variety of arenas of the urban political field could accumulate, players could carry 
their achievements into adjacent arenas and establish a new configuration of players and arenas 
comprising the field, thus changing it. 
Renovation pulled Muscovites into the interactive arenas of the urban political field; 
setting foot in one arena could also motivate citizens to further explore the outlines of the field, 
and engage in interactions in further linked arenas, such as municipal elections. Previously, not 
many Muscovites used or even knew about the different arenas of urban and local politics, but 
the shock of Renovation exposed those structures to more citizens than ever before. People 
learned and tried out individual arenas, learned about the connections between different political 
arenas, and created new ones, for example, homeowners’ assemblies or meetings of the new 
activist communities.  
The engagement of mobilized Muscovites with the urban political field started at the 
micro-level, in concrete interactive arenas. How did those interactions transform the field itself? 
How sustainable were those changes? The discussion of social movement consequences, 
outcomes, gains, and losses is a tricky topic, but it is crucial for understanding social (and, 
specifically, urban) change in all its complexity (Jasper et al. forthcoming). In this dissertation, I 
focus on the micro-foundations of change in the incremental accumulation of gains and losses 
players make in various formal and informal arenas. Some of these outcomes are desired and 
foreseeable, others are less evident and planned, but nonetheless consequential.  
 10 
People’s exposure to and active engagement with the urban political field during the 
Renovation controversy influenced some people’s housing strategies. First, many mobilized 
Muscovites articulated and formulated what they expected from housing, from neighbors, and 
from the local and city authorities. Second, some residents in the affected buildings learned new 
tools for managing and protecting their homes, ranging from increased attention to building 
maintenance to protest voting in local and city elections. The very idea of home and its 
boundaries changed for some people, extending beyond the limits of one’s private apartment to 
include the neighborhood or the city.  
The transformation of personal strategies, but also the emergence of new communities of 
activists, new players in the field of urban politics, are important outcomes of the Renovation 
controversy. Only a minority remained active after the main phase of the controversy, but many 
people were transformed by this experience and became if nothing else an active audience for 
Moscow’s political battles, staying vigilant and attentive. 
Research design and methods 
This dissertation is based on a qualitative study combining observation, document 
analysis, interviews (some of them “go-along” interviews walking in the interviewee’s 
neighborhood (Kusenbach 2003)), and digital ethnography conducted between 2017 and 2019. 
The study began in the spring 2017, soon after the program made the headlines. I began 
monitoring the social media groups that mushroomed on Facebook and Vkontakte, the main 
Russian social media platform, and archiving the media reports on the program. I began 
collecting systematic data later, in August 2017, when the results of the voting became known 
and the program lists finalized. 
I selected four districts for in-depth study, based on the outcome of the voting procedure. 
The results ranged from as many as half of the buildings in the district voting against inclusion to 
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almost all of the buildings supporting it. Based on the voting percentages, I chose one district 
from the upper quartile (most opposed to Renovation), Losevo; one from the lowest quartile 
(least opposed to Renovation), Rakitino, and two from the middle of the distribution (Sokolovo 
and Oreshino). The names of the districts are pseudonyms to help protect the anonymity of my 
interviewees in the challenging Russian context. I focused on the social media communities of 
these districts, both their regular local groups and the Renovation-related communities. This 
allowed me to explore the local issues, activist groups, and relationships with authorities in more 
detail.  
I selected respondents for personal interviews from these four neighborhoods, based on 
the status of their building, so that I included buildings directly affected by Renovation and 
others nearby. I interviewed people supporting, opposing, and sometimes indifferent to 
Renovation. I asked general questions about the person’s biography, activist experiences, their 
reaction to Renovation, and specific actions they took after it was announced. The interviews 
also covered a broad spectrum of respondents’ political views, participation in elections, 
relations with neighbors before and after the controversy, the role of social media and offline 
interactive arenas, and relationships with local activist groups. I followed a flexible script, 
adjusted to the specific experiences of my interlocutors: whether they were opponents, 
supporters, or bystanders in the controversy, the specifics of the district where they lived (such as 
previous activist initiatives in the district, existing neighborhood groups, and the behavior of 
local authorities), and the developments in the apartment buildings where they lived (whether 
there was strong animosity between the two camps in the building). I analyzed the interview data 
using Atlas.ti software. 
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I visited Moscow to collect interview data and observation three times: in the summer of 
2017, spring 2018, and summer 2019. It allowed me to track changes in people’s perceptions of 
the program, their neighborhood and neighbors, as well as the activist careers of some of them.  
I also collected notes and recordings (audio and video) from various Renovation-related 
public events (homeowners’ assemblies and other formal and informal arenas, where neighbors 
faced each other with their houses’ fate at stake). I created transcripts and notes for each video 
and audio document, coded and analyzed them in Atlas.ti. 
Renovation-related social media, citywide and neighborhood-based, both pro- and anti-
Renovation, were my main recruitment platforms. Because my recruitment strategy focused on 
talking to people from different buildings and with different positions about Renovation in the 
four selected districts, I could only use limited snowball sampling. I collected 45 face-to-face 
interviews and ten conversations online via text messages. Only four of the interviewees to 
whom I spoke in person were directly recommended to me by other interviewees.  
Recommendations, however, were important not only for me to recruit interviewees, but 
for acquiring their consent to speak to me. Several interviewees, I have reason to believe, agreed 
to talk to me because I had previously spoken to other people from their neighborhood whom 
they trusted. I have no direct proof of that, but on several occasions, people ignored my interview 
requests until I spoke to a respectable local activist who could informally confirm that they had 
spoken to me and that I was a legitimate researcher. Lack of trust and a suspicion that I might be 
“working for the opposite side” posed a problem in the recruitment process; potential 
interviewees often ignored my requests or directly questioned my motives in private messages. 
More than half of the people I contacted directly declined or ignored my requests. 
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The social media platforms dedicated to Renovation were not only my recruitment site, 
but also a source of data. In these groups, people exchanged news and information, reported on 
their activities in their buildings, sought advice, and engaged in emotional fights. I have written 
fieldnotes and archived the important posts and conversations (referred to as “digital 
fieldnotes”). Visuals are a valuable source of material for the discussion of mobilization of 
emotions and character work (strategic efforts to shape reputations and public perception of 
players): images of the planned residential blocks and buildings, apartment layouts, and reports 
of the first relocated families were scrutinized and judged by social media users who commented 
on what they saw. Organizers also produced a lot of visual material: they photographed their 
apartments and courtyards, made “before and after” collages, and drew caricatures of city 
officials. These visuals were distributed online, and sometimes ended up in the printed materials, 
leaflets, and newspapers that activists disseminated among their neighbors. I maintain a digital 
archive of these materials, which I classified by source and theme. 
Chapter outline 
I summarize the theoretical framework and vocabulary in Chapter 2, in which I revisit the 
concepts of agency, strategic interaction, and theories of urban citizenship and political 
participation, and define the concepts of housing strategy and the urban political field. These 
concepts are useful to explore the fundamental continuity between personal strategies, life goals, 
ordinary life of urbanites and their political engagement. 
In Moscow, residents of the buildings affected by Renovation all had their different life 
strategies, and housing strategies specifically. For some, these strategies were habitual, not 
explicit patterns of action they followed to have a home; others had more articulated goals and 
plans of getting and keeping a home. Of those people with articulated strategies, only a small 
minority ever tried to participate in the urban political field: to improve the maintenance of their 
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building or the quality of the living environment in their neighborhood. Most people had vague 
ideas about the arenas and tools that were available to citizens to participate in local and city 
governance and politics. People’s views about Moscow, its geography, history, and the related 
housing strategies of Muscovites are subject of Chapter 3. 
When Renovation was announced, it interfered with many people’s strategies and plans, 
disrupting their sense of security and home. Powerful actors meddled with people’s sense of 
agency by rushing and delaying them at the same time, as I demonstrate in Chapter 4. It created 
an environment of uncertainty and unpredictability: people had to revise their plans for the future 
without reliable information about the present. Many of them had to revisit and articulate their 
housing strategies to decide which position to take regarding Renovation. Different housing 
strategies created a foundation for the emergence of two camps, supporters and opponents of 
Renovation, and for the formation of collective players who entered the public arenas of the 
urban political field. These processes are at the theme of Chapter 5. 
Frustration and anxiety from the disruption and invasion of Renovation in people’s 
strategies inspired affected residents to enter political arenas. They began exploring the urban 
political field, step by step, figuring out its configuration and rules. They did not just explore it; 
they also actively changed it by establishing new relationships, acquiring new skills, creating 
new arenas, and by merely being there. This transformation of the field and the interactions in 
the established and new arenas are the subjects of Chapters 6 and 7. In Chapter 6, I discuss the 
formation of collective players and their interactions in the formal political arenas. Chapter 7 
focuses on the politicization of familiar spaces and interactions of neighbors at the level of 
individual buildings. Familiar spaces of the courtyards, building entrances and staircases became 
political arenas, revealing the connection between private lives and political strategies. 
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These interactions changed the game in the field, and the field itself. New communities, 
activists, and institutions, such as house councils, remained after the active phase of the 
Renovation-related mobilization was over. Some mobilized residents began playing a more 
active role in the maintenance of their buildings and their local politics, and now the officials had 
to take them into account. Moreover, people used their new skills, knowledge, and relationships 
in municipal and city council elections, causing some uncertainty in the higher-level field of 
national politics. I discuss these developments in Chapter 8. 
These changes occurred because previously absent players flooded the arenas of the 
urban political field in Moscow, changed the usually sleepy interactions there, added new arenas 
to the field, and refused to leave after the initial mobilization declined. They did so because the 
announcement of Renovation struck a chord: it disrupted people’s articulated plans as well as 







Political strategies, housing strategies 
Why do people do what they do? The puzzle of human action is a key question driving 
social theory. In social movement literature and in political sociology this question takes a more 
concrete form: why do people mobilize and join collective action? And why don’t they, even 
when there are good reasons for it? 
For a long time, social theory has tried to balance the notion of structural constraints that 
society imposes on individual actors with the idea of individual agency and freedom. Today, few 
scholars see these options as mutually exclusive; most now assume that there is some degree of 
both in human decision-making and action. For example, in his discussion of agency and 
structure Sewell concludes, “agents are empowered to act with and against others by structures: 
they have knowledge of the schemas that inform social life and have access to some measure of 
human and nonhuman resources. (…) Agency is implied by the existence of structures” (Sewell 
1992:20). 
Some recent theoretical developments addressing the fundamental questions of structure 
and agency employ the concept of strategy to connect the personal and the political. Strategic 
action involves players who engage in action and interaction with other players “with some goal 
in mind” (Jasper 2015:10). Mostly, these approaches focus on players who are already engaged, 
who interact in political arenas, and leave out the question why they are drawn into these arenas, 
or strategic action fields, in the first place.  
This dissertation contributes to the literature on strategic action in social movements by 
exploring the continuity between personal, life strategies and political, collective action. This 
helps address fundamental questions of political sociology: what motivates people to act 
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individually or collectively, and how do these actions contribute to social, political, and 
institutional change?  
In this chapter, I revisit the concept of strategy, and suggest distinguishing between 
personal strategies, people’s general ways of organizing action to achieve certain life goals, and 
political strategies, purposive interaction with other players in public arenas. The two are 
fundamentally connected; I argue that people’s motivations to act collectively and engage in 
public politics grow from people’s private lives and life strategies. 
Another useful distinction to analyze human action is between habitual and intentional 
strategies. Personal strategies can be habitual, oriented toward the usual and routine ways of 
achieving life goals, or they can also be intentional and more articulated. People interpret the 
social and political developments in light of their life goals. Some events, such as policy 
proposals and other actions by powerholders and other players, may appear as threats to people’s 
life goals, while other may look like opportunities. As a result, people may be drawn into 
relevant “strategic action fields” or interactive arenas: places where players interact, generate 
decisions and other outcomes. These places have rules, expectations, and constraints. 
Personal strategies don’t usually include collective action as a tool to pursue life goals, 
quite strikingly so in Russian political culture (Zhelnina 2020). However, when certain policies 
or events either resonate with or threaten people’s personal goals, they can form collective 
players and engage in political interactions. In the dissertation, I explore these mechanisms in the 
framework of people’s housing strategies: the ways of imagining and pursuing a proper home. 
Threats – or perceived opportunities – to people’s housing plans draw them into arenas of 
political action, where decisions about their homes are at stake. These become entry points to the 
urban political field.  
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Collective action is one of the possible ways by which the dominant social norms, 
practices, and institutions can (supposedly) be changed (Amenta et al. 2010; Bosi, Giugni, and 
Uba 2016; Gupta 2009; Jasper et al. forthcoming). Definitions of social and political change 
usually include, along with concrete policy outcomes demanded by players, transformations in 
the configuration and relationships in the fields themselves. For example, Giugni suggests that, 
in addition to policy outcomes, social movements can produce social and political change by 
“altering the power relations between challengers and authorities” or “provoking broader and 
usually more durable systemic changes, on both the structural and cultural levels” (Giugni, 
McAdam, and Tilly 1999:xxiii). In this thesis, I explore how Muscovites changed the 
configuration of the urban political field, which includes forming more or less sustainable new 
players and community networks, entering the existing and adding new interactive arenas in the 
field. 
I will now revisit the main theoretical approaches to collective strategic action in public 
arenas and summarize the conceptual vocabulary for discussing political strategies.  
Theories of strategic interaction: political strategies 
Two approaches highlight strategic action to explain how collective action contributes to 
both change and stability. These approaches operate on different levels; relational concepts 
(fields) help explore the structure, while interactional concepts and attention to players are useful 
for exploring agency and origins of change (Jasper 2019:12). While different in level of analysis, 
these approaches share many similarities, and together help reveal important features of strategic 
collective action and subsequent social and political change.   
 The theory of strategic action fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012) aims at making 
sense of both change and stability by looking at the ways action is organized in meso-level social 
orders. Mostly mirroring Bourdieu’s vision of fields as structuring individuals in social space and 
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organizing their actions, Fligstein and McAdam apply a similar view to collective action and 
collective players, competing over advantage in the field. Strategic action fields (SAFs) “are the 
fundamental units of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a meso-level social 
order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with knowledge of one another 
under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the field, the relationships in the 
field (including who has power and why), and the field’s rules” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:3). 
The boundaries of fields are not fixed, and can shift “on a situational basis,” as actors involved 
change their minds about issues at stake and transition to a different dominant “frame of 
reference.” 
Despite otherwise being a structural theory, the theory of strategic action fields 
incorporates actors’ perspectives by emphasizing the cultural aspects. The actors engaging in 
competition in the field share an understanding of the rules of the field, and “understand what 
tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpretable for each of the roles in the field,” and “what 
moves make sense as interaction in the field plays out.” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:4). Actors 
in the field need to acquire “social skill,” a “highly developed cognitive capacity for reading 
people and environments, framing lines of action, and mobilizing people in the service of these 
action ‘frames’” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:7). 
 In contrast to structural theories, such as the theory of fields, cultural theories call for 
more attention to emotions, morality, and choices made by political actors, claiming that these 
help recognize and create political opportunities, thus allowing for more agency of strategic 
players (Goodwin and Jasper 1999; Kurzman 1996). The roots of the strategic interaction 
perspective lie in cultural theories of collective action, but this framework tries to reconcile the 
structural and cultural approaches “by giving equal and symmetric weight to protestors and to the 
 20 
other players whom they engage, and by focusing equally on players and the arenas in which 
they interact” (Jasper 2015:9).  
Like the theory of strategic action fields, the strategic interaction perspective aims at 
explaining both structural constraints and agency: “any theory of constraint and structure needs 
to be paired with a theory of players, intentions, psychology, culture, and action” (Jasper 
2019:2). Constraints are present in this framework through the players’ perception: they have to 
be aware of the constraints (even mistakenly) to take them into account when making their 
decisions. 
Players engage with one another in the course of pursuing specific strategic goals but 
they also set priorities, choose strategies, and deal with internal contradictions. Almost all 
political players (except individuals) are compound players who have to do some work to build 
solidarity and achieve the “necessary fiction” of unity. Therefore, “players are also arenas,” 
where these interactions and rituals take place. Fligstein and McAdam similarly note that “all 
collective actors (for example, organizations, extended families, clans, supply chains, social 
movements, and governmental systems) are themselves made up of SAFs” (Fligstein and 
McAdam 2011:3). 
Strategic interaction takes place in arenas, which are bundles “of rules and resources that 
allow and encourage certain kinds of interactions to proceed, with something at stake” (Jasper 
2015:14) or “assemblages of objects and individuals that together accomplish action” (Jasper 
2019:11). Arenas “capture most of what has gone under the banner of structure”: physical spaces 
and constraints associated with them, formal and informal rules; they reflect “past decisions, 
invested resources, and cultural meanings” (Jasper 2015:16–17).  
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Arenas are comparable to Fligstein and McAdams’s “fields.” They are spaces where 
competing players vie for advantage. However, this concept is bound to observable, physical 
places, where players are co-present. Arenas are less metaphorical than fields, which are not 
necessarily directly observable. Jasper’s arenas represent social structure and its constraints or 
opportunities. Arenas are places where players “do politics” and “generate decisions and other 
outcomes” (Jasper 2019:2) which can eventually accumulate (or not) to systemic changes.  
Both approaches pay attention to the interactions in the arenas or the fields, 
acknowledging that players (actors) pursue their own goals and bring their own cultural 
“baggage” in these interactions, while constantly adjusting their behavior in accordance with 
what they think others are doing. Two big questions remain: how are players drawn into the 
arenas (or the fields), and how does higher-level change accumulate from the micro-interactions 
in the arenas? Integration of the two approaches can help answer these questions. 
The strategic interaction perspective puts more emphasis (and sees as consequential) 
people’s intentions, emotions, and aspirations; they are not presumed to be motivated by default 
to strive for dominance in fields. People’s very presence in certain fields is seen as requiring 
explanation. What brings them to the field? Why do they start competing?  In “Linking arenas,” 
Jasper suggests that motivations, intentions, and emotions are characteristics of people, or 
players, and this is what makes them join the interactions in arenas (or fields) (Jasper 2019:7).  
Technically, people “join” a field by entering a particular interactive arena: participating 
in a tenants meeting, coming to the polling station to vote for a candidate promising to protect 
your local park, and so on. If players move across arenas, they carry their relationships and 
resources from one to another; “conflicts spill across arenas, and we need some way to view the 
entire range of arenas as well as to distinguish subsets within that range” (Jasper 2019:10). These 
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particular interactions assemble arenas into fields; to study this process, we need to look at 
chains of interactions and relationships among arenas, at the scope and impact of the decisions 
made in arenas, at the gradual accumulation of many small decisions and actions, networks, and 
flows of resources across arenas.  
It makes sense not only to go “up” and study the higher-level fields, but also to go “deep” 
and look at how individual lives are connected to collective and political arenas.  
Social movement scholars have come up with a variety of explanations and identified 
multiple pathways that lead people into politics. Some look for explanations “within” 
individuals, exploring their interests, personality traits, identities, and emotions. Discussing the 
role of personality in political behavior, McGraw (2006:136) contends that “how people perceive 
the political world depends upon their prior preconceptions and goals,” including their partisan 
orientations and other aspects of their “fluid” identities. Jasper argues that people can have their 
own motives, implicit and explicit, of which “some may be of our own making, while others are 
offered to us by the large organizations that dominate life in modern society” (Jasper 2006a:159). 
Emotions are the driving force of action because they make people aspire for things; they also 
permeate cognition and morality (Jasper 2006a:160), creating a link between moral orientations, 
practical interests, and willingness to act. Similarly, Pinard argues that “deprivations” and 
“grievances” lead to collective action when packaged within interpretative frames along with 
moral obligations, identities, and emotions (Pinard 2011). 
These “internal” explanations are not detached from “structural” or “external” factors, 
such as embeddedness in networks (Diani 2013; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; McAdam 1986; 
Viterna 2006). People immediately experience networks through peer pressure, feel ashamed 
when their significant others dedicate themselves to collective struggles, develop “participation 
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identities,” and thus feel motivated to join collective action. They can even rethink what is in 
their personal interest in interaction with others. Kim and Bearman suggest a sophisticated model 
explaining participation, which accounts for the fact that the actors are interdependent, and their 
interests are subject to collective influence: “once individuals participate in collective action, 
their interests are plastic” (Kim and Bearman 1997:74). 
The concept of “interest” requires some explanation. Scholars rarely see the narrow 
category of “self-interest” as the primary motivation for action, as it does not explain much 
political behavior (Ferree and Miller 1985; Klandermans 2004; McGraw 2006). But broader 
“interests” are still a factor in various models of public participation and collective action. Ferree 
and Miller (1985) criticize the narrow “incentive” based approach to motivation and add a social 
psychological dimension to the notion of “interest:” individual perception of social events can be 
influenced, or “socially structured,” by interactions with others. 
Hochschild positions interests “in the realm of recognized material and physical desires 
or drives (‘What must I do to get X?’)” (Hochschild 2006:285). This question is akin to the 
questions that strategic interaction theories ask in the context of collective action, and brings us 
back to the language of motivations, goals, and strategically organized action. Keeping in mind 
the interrelated, social character of individual interests, we need to acknowledge that personal 
lives are organized around life goals, which can be explicit or implicit, but they are foundational 
for human individual and collective action.  
People tend to have a variety of life goals, and they tend to take those goals with them to 
new arenas; indeed, they look for new arenas that will help them pursue those goals. The 
motivations to engage in collective action and interaction in public political arenas, as I will 
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show, usually grow from people’s private lives and life strategies, there is a continuity between 
personal and public political strategies. 
Agency, meaning, and emotions: Personal strategies 
Attention to players and their motivations, past experiences, and emotions can help 
explain why people are drawn to strategic action fields, or why they stay out of them, and why 
they choose a certain course of action over another. In sociology, the human side of the social 
processes is crystallized in the concept of agency. 
 Emirbayer and Mische define agency “as a temporally embedded process of social 
engagement, informed by the past (in its habitual aspect), but also oriented toward the future (as 
a capacity to imagine alternative possibilities) and toward the present (as a capacity to 
contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies of the moment)” 
(Emirbayer and Mische 1998:963). They identify three elements of agency: iterational, 
projective, and practical-evaluative (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:971), all of which correspond 
with certain temporalities.  
The iterational element, Emirbayer and Mische contend, involves “the selective 
reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical 
activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, 
interactions, and institutions over time” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:971). The practical-
evaluative element is situated in the present and “entails the capacity of actors to make practical 
and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the 
emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations” (ibid.). The 
projective aspect of agency involves imagining alternatives and setting new goals, which creates 
a potential for change: “the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of 
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action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in 
relation to actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:971). 
Where does the projective aspect come from? How do people imagine their personal and 
collective futures, how do they set goals and aspirations for their neighborhoods, cities, and 
countries? People have personal aspirations – vague ideas and more articulate goals for their 
lives. Sociology hasn’t shown much interest in personal goals, perhaps because of the 
discipline’s structural bias, its “relative privileging of patterned structural and cultural forces 
over individual volition in understanding human activity” (Hitlin and Long 2009:137).  
Personal goals have been mostly studied by psychologists, who ask why people adhere to 
certain life goals, how life goals affect their well-being, and how aspirations differ across 
cultures, classes, and genders  (Emmons 2003; Gountas et al. 2012; Magnuson 2008; Roberts 
and Robins 2000; Ryan et al. 1999). Personal goals, “internal representations of desired 
outcomes”, Emmons (2003:106) suggests, “determine the contents of consciousness. Most 
thoughts and accompanying emotional states are determined by goals.” People’s analysis of 
present situations, their feelings about events, are reflections of how they make sense of their 
life, determine “what is valuable, meaningful, and purposeful” (ibid., 106). Life goals can 
include moral orientations, such as doing the right thing, being happy, following religious values, 
but also practical things: being safe, having a home. Personal goals are not necessarily big life 
goals, which shape the meaning of life; they can also be “trivial or shallow and, although 
necessary for daily functioning, have little capacity to contribute to a sense that life is 
meaningful” (Emmons 2003:107).  
This psychological notion of personal goals allows us to link individuals life strategies 
and collective, political strategies and outcomes. People navigate social reality and decide how to 
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act upon it in light of their personal goals and aspirations, which can be more or less articulate, 
concrete or general, trivial or significant.  
Sociology, however, can also offer some insights into the question why people want 
certain things, and how they structure their action to pursue or keep them. Sociologists in their 
discussions of structure and agency have shown that even personal goals and wants are not 
random but determined by a person’s socialization, a process of “learning to act appropriately,” 
“based in part in a measure of understanding the type of situation one is in and what actions are 
appropriate” (Fine 1992:103–4). The interactionist perspective recognizes that “people act in 
situations on the basis of the meanings that previous contexts of behavior have provided,” and 
“these contexts are shaped by structural forces, and, as a consequence, structures are embedded 
in the meanings that contexts generate” (Fine 1992:101). Past situations form a context for 
decision-making in the present. 
People’s life goals, as well as means of achieving them, as Robert Merton argued in his 
classic article “Social structure and anomie,” are dictated by structural and cultural conditions. 
People want things that their culture values (wealth, for example, or spiritual enlightenment). 
Along with these “culturally defined goals, purposes, and interests” (Merton 1938:672), or the 
“frame of aspirational reference,” society defines “institutional norms” that regulate and control 
“the acceptable modes of achieving these goals” (Merton 1938:673). People can “adapt” to these 
socially defined goals and means in five different ways: conformity, innovation, ritualism, 
retreatism, and rebellion. 
 Merton is interested in structural influences that shape how people act: whether they 
violate rules to achieve the socially approved goals, try to achieve these goals with approved 
means, or reject the goals and means altogether, choosing retreatism or rebellion. He emphasized 
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the structural, pre-individual dimension of these mechanisms. While “persons may shift from one 
alternative to another as they engage in different social activities” (p.676), the “results will be 
determined by the particular personality and thus, the particular cultural background involved” 
(Merton 1938:678). The idea of culture shaping a “particular personality” sounds similar 
Bourdieu’s the concept of habitus; at least partly, a person’s reaction to a situation is determined 
by their socialization. Within these structures, Bourdieu (1977) argued, people can maneuver and 
be strategic. The logical development of this course of thought is to expect that, interacting in 
different strategic action fields, people with different social habits and dispositions would also 
prefer different strategies of action.  
Unconscious, embodied strategic choices are at the center of Bourdieu’s theory of 
practice and practical knowledge. Bourdieu also emphasizes the temporal dimension of action, 
pointing out that it can be oriented toward the future, but also is rooted in the past. He argues, 
“Even when they appear as the realization of the explicit, and explicitly stated, purposes of a 
project or plan, the practices produced by the habitus, as the strategy-generating principle 
enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and ever-changing situations, are only apparently 
determined by the future” (Bourdieu 1977:72). Practices are “determined by the past conditions 
which have produced the principle of their production,” and by the outcomes of “identical or 
interchangeable past practices” (Bourdieu 1977:73). Habitus, “the way of being, a habitual state” 
(Bourdieu 1977:214) is a source of inclinations to organize action in a particular way. 
 In contrast to Merton and in line with Bourdieu’s vision, Swidler argues that the 
importance of culture for action is not in providing values and goals for people to follow; culture, 
she explained, is a strategy, it provides tools and ways of doing things, living a life. Strategy is 
not merely “a plan consciously devised to attain a goal,” but a more “general way of organizing 
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action (depending upon a network of kin and friends, for example, or relying on selling one’s 
skills in the market) that might allow one to reach several different life goals” (Swidler 
1986:277). What people want, their values, she argues, does not always predict how they will 
act. People act the way they do because they have learned to do so, they have acquired a “‘tool 
kit’ of symbols, stories, rituals, and world-views, which people may use in varying 
configurations to solve different kinds of problems” (Swidler 1986:273).  
Merton and Swidler are, perhaps, foregrounding two different kinds of life strategy. In 
Swidler’s definition, culture as strategy is not oriented toward definite ends, and is not 
necessarily intentional; it is a meaningful but habitual engagement with the world, unless 
“ideologies” interfere in “unsettled times,” moments of “cultural retooling” (Swidler 1986:277). 
In Merton’s interpretation, people may choose to pursue (or reject) culturally approved goals, 
consciously adjusting their courses of action to achieve them.  
The implicit strategies work well for simple players, individuals, because they “need not 
justify their actions to a team” (Jasper 2006b:5). When forming a collective player or entering 
public arenas, players need to articulate (some of) their goals and strategies to persuade others. 
Political action, too, can include an implicit component, for example, in players’ preference for 
particular tactics, or “tastes in tactics:” players can “develop not only skills but also a fondness 
for certain ways of acting” (Jasper 2006b:117) and become part of one’s identity. 
Habitual and intentional strategies 
I suggest distinguishing between habitual and intentional strategies of action, which 
differ in the level of articulation of goals and ways of achieving them. People’s strategies may be 
positioned somewhere on this spectrum, tending toward one of the poles. Habitual strategies 
make use of the routine and usual tools people have at their disposal to achieve their personal 
goals. The intentional strategies are more articulated and can involve innovation and challenge 
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the status quo. Not only personal strategies take these two forms: political strategies, too, can 
follow routine practices, without articulating the goals of each course of action in public arenas, 
or they can elaborate on goals and means.  
This distinction is in line with the three-dimensional definition of agency I quoted above. 
People’s personal strategies may be more habitually oriented and based on their implicit 
aspirations, when people don’t give much thought to planning their future and stick to the usual 
practices. Strategies can also revolve around more pronounced goals and involve some 
articulated calculation and planning. In any case, strategies have an “iterational” component, 
building on people’s past experiences and learning, they can be adjusted to the needs of the 
moment (“practical-evaluative component”), and, importantly, they involve a projective aspect. 
The disruption of implicit, habitual strategies can be one motivation to join collective 
action. If basic assumptions of a strategy are violated, people can experience a shock that draws 
them into action. Jasper (1997:140) summarizes six moral aspirations and expectations which, 
when violated, can cause moral shock and lead to protest. Along with professional ethics, 
religious beliefs, and political ideologies this list includes basic assumptions that the 
environment is safe (ontological security), that one can support and protect one’s family 
(economic security), and that other members of a community are law-abiding and do not threaten 
their neighbors. These are not just static assumptions but elements of people’s life strategies, 
foundations for everyday action. In my empirical case, the announcement of Renovation 
undermined some of these foundations, and “shock” became the most frequent word that 
opponents of Renovation used to describe their feelings.  
Table 1 classifies types of strategy and gives some examples of personal and political, 
intentional and habitual strategies that appeared during the Renovation controversy. Each person 
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can combine intentional and habitual, personal and political strategies simultaneously to achieve 
a variety of life goals. Political strategies are distinguished from personal by the fact that they 
shape action (or inaction) in public arenas. 
Strategies Personal Political 
Habitual Staying in parents’ flat; hoping 
for relocations; expecting the 
government to respect property 
rights; not trusting governmental 
initiatives 
 
Homeowners, tenants: seeing the 
local clerks as people in position of 
power; political fatalism – inaction in 
response to unjust actions of the 
authorities 
Authorities: Holding regular 
meetings in upravas; not questioning 
the decisions of the Mayor’s office 
Intentional Purchase/ exchange of 
apartment; mortgage; building a 
house; renovating the apartment; 
pressing the authorities to fix 
leaking roofs 
Homeowners, tenants: Participating 
in electoral observation; participating 
in collective movement to demand 
cancellation of a policy 
Authorities: starting a policy to 
increase revenue from urban land; 
staging “public demand and 
approval” for the program 
Table 1. Strategies in the urban political field in Moscow with some possible examples. 
In the literature on political action and social movements, the dominant definition of 
strategy and strategic action involves planning and moving toward an explicit goal. These are 
intentional, goal-oriented sequences of action. Theories of agency and strategy assume that, 
despite following some habitual patterns of action, people can imagine alternative futures, but 
also modify their actions and even aspirations in line with the changing situations in the present 
(Bourdieu 1977; Emirbayer and Mische 1998).  
Because social movements are collective endeavors, made at least partly in public arenas, 
participants must elaborate, justify, and package their goals and strategies in order to persuade 
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others. The dominant approach to exploring the interpretative work that social movement players 
perform is the framing perspective (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 2005). It centers 
on the “meaning work— the struggle over the production of mobilizing and countermobilizing 
ideas and meanings” (Benford and Snow 2000:613). Social movements, in this perspective, are 
active players who try to recruit supporters and allies by creating meaning, generating new 
interpretative frames, ways of seeing and acting upon reality, that can challenge the existing 
interpretative frames.  
Discussing the role of beliefs and views as motivations to join collective action, Munson 
(2010) notes that existing research tends to see the relationship between beliefs and actions as 
unidirectional: people mobilize because they share certain views. In line with the notion of the 
plasticity of interests discussed above, Munson concludes that joining collective action can 
transform or reinforce people’s views. Participants’ views can develop or change in the process 
of becoming active, in interaction with others who participate in an individual’s articulation of 
what is right and wrong.  
Emotions are an important element in these meaning-making activities, and can also be 
mobilized strategically (Gould 2009; Jasper 2011; Robnett 2004). Feelings are also involved in 
strategic interaction, they “are intimately tied to means and to ends” (Jasper 2011:296), although 
they also can “blur the very distinction of means and ends,” by making people continue 
participating in collective action for the sake of excitement they feel while doing so, pride, and 
love for others. Emotions, too, have a habitual dimension. Gould introduced the concept of 
“emotional habitus:” “socially constituted, prevailing ways of feeling and emoting, as well as the 
embodied, axiomatic understandings and norms about feelings and their expression” (Gould 
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2009:10). Emotional habitus entails an “implicit pedagogy about what to feel and how to express 
one’s feelings about self and society” (Gould 2009:63). 
Emotions are involved in strategic action and in all three temporal dimensions of agency. 
Emirbayer and Mische (Emirbayer and Mische 1998:971) explicitly mention emotions in their 
“projective” aspect of agency: “hopes, fears, and desires for the future.” Indeed, imagining the 
desirable and unwanted alternatives depends on emotional valuation of them. But emotions are 
present in all dimensions: as part of sustainable identities, evaluations of one’s own past 
experiences, as well as in the evaluation of the present moment, its challenges and risks. From 
the vast literature on emotions and social movements, we also know how important they are for 
sparking and sustaining collective action (Barbalet 2002; Flam and King 2007; Goodwin and 
Jasper 2006; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2001; Jasper 2018). Emotions can also impede 
people’s capacity to act (Norgaard 2011; Zhelnina 2020). 
For this dissertation, the role of emotions in the formulation of goals and the selection of 
means is central. To start or join collective action, and to participate in purposive interactions in 
public arenas, people need to articulate and explicate their personal goals. The interpretative 
process involves analyzing social and political reality in light of one’s personal life goals and 
strategies, identifying the cracks, cleavages, and discomforts between the two. Seeing the 
resonance or discrepancy between the intentional, already articulated strategies and current 
events and situations is more straightforward; in the case of habitual strategies, it may require 
some work. People can do this work autonomously, or social movements and other players can 
intervene in this process, “helping” a person to see the right way.  
The key to action, including collective action, is this meaning-making activity which 
foregrounds the connections between people’s personal strategies and social and political 
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developments. Surprising, shocking events and other moments of uncertainty can motivate 
people to reconsider and reimagine these connections, but this is an ongoing process, not 
contained within “episodes” or moments of conflict and contestation. People can decide to get 
involved in political interactive arenas, or join collective action when there is some change in the 
social and political realities with a potential to hinder or boost their life strategies, or because of 
recruitment efforts by the existing players.  
Linking these discussions to the notions of plasticity and the interactive nature of 
“personal interests,” we can address the role of strategic interaction in making people rethink and 
redefine events and their own interests. The interactionist perspective asks: why do people with 
similar backgrounds and past experiences interpret the same realities differently? The answer is 
the process of interaction itself, including the strategic interactions and organized efforts of 
collective political players. Social movements and collective action contexts provide a fruitful 
ground for people to change their minds about appropriate action: “When together and needing 
to coordinate their actions, they may try to negotiate their separate perspectives” (Fine 
1992:103).  
I will discuss how these theoretical suggestions play out in one particular domain: urban 
politics, and specifically, its housing segment. Having and keeping a home is a fundamental 
personal strategy. Implicitly or explicitly, housing is part of almost everyone’s concerns, and in 
this field the continuity between the personal and the political is clear. In their pursuit of their 
housing strategies, people may get involved in the interactions in various arenas of urban 
politics, which comprise the urban political field. Like most fields, this one is not fixed, as new 
players constantly emerge, reshape the configurations within the field, and engage in interactions 
in the “old” and new arenas they create. 
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Home and agency: Ordinary people in the urban political field  
Above I have identified two different forms of strategic action: habitual and intentional. 
Distinguishing between these two forms can help us understand the continuity between everyday 
life (personal strategies) and politics and collective action. Specifically, I will be looking at 
housing strategies to explore how people engage with the urban political field.  
Housing is one of the foundations of well-being, a cornerstone of security and self-worth, 
and a fundamental life goal. People employ various cultural skills in pursuit of the housing they 
want. This specific segment of life-strategizing I call a housing strategy, a way of organizing 
action to achieve the desirable housing based on people’s worldviews, feelings, and experiences. 
It includes ideas of what good (and achievable) housing is, how to attain it, and what 
competencies and resources are necessary, appropriate, and available for that. People’s housing 
strategies are shaped by their housing biographies, the individual or family histories of 
relationships with the state, available resources for housing improvement, and the amount of 
resources already invested in the existing housing.  
Housing strategies can be more habitual or more intentional. In the next chapters, I will 
explore how Muscovites’ housing strategies shaped their responses to Renovation and their 
mobilization in favor or against Renovation. People’s positions regarding housing varied: some 
had drawn from the common cultural “toolkit,” and followed the available housing practices and 
skills without specific planning. Others had explicit housing goals and proactive approaches for 
reaching these goals; these people were the most affected by the announcement of the policy 
(both positively, those whose housing strategies the program advanced, and negatively, those 
whose strategy and plans it disrupted). The announcement of the controversial relocation policy 
helped many residents become more aware of and articulate their housing strategies. 
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The concept of housing strategy links individual and the higher-level political and social 
orders; in this case, the urban political field. The urban political field is a configuration of 
interactive arenas where various players, including citizens, city officials, developers, and 
elected officials pursue their interests in urban development and try to define the present and the 
future of particular urban territories. These arenas can be formal (local elections, city council 
sessions) or informal (elite meetings behind closed doors or neighbors’ discussions in their 
building’s courtyard), but they all have some decisions about the future of the city at stake. 
Urban political processes are a popular research subject. One popular framework is the 
“right-to-the city” approach, which focuses on how citizens make demands and “claim their 
right” to have a say in urban development. However, this focus is bound to the city level, and if 
scholars want to explore “how cities connect to and play a powerful role in social movements 
that extend beyond the political, geographical, and ideological spaces of cities” (Uitermark, 
Nicholls, and Loopmans 2012:2548), the right-to-the city framework does not provide many 
insights and creates an analytical “local trap.” 
Theories of strategic interaction can help us avoid this trap. Fligstein and McAdam 
maintain that fields are positioned within a complex web of other fields, some of which are 
higher-level, “larger political, social, or economic” fields. Like Jasper’s notion of “linked arenas” 
(Jasper 2019), Fligstein and McAdam suggest that fields are connected, and developments in an 
adjacent field can influence what goes on in neighboring fields. “While fields can devolve into 
conflict as a result of internal processes, it is far more common for a crisis to develop as a result 
of an exogenous shock emanating from a proximate field” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011:8). The 
strategic interaction perspective, looking at the micro-level processes driving social change, can 
explain how this happens, how new developments can “travel” between arenas or fields.  
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If we can push upward and thus avoid the “local trap,” it is also important to go in the 
opposite direction and theorize the relationship between the “meso-level order,” or the urban 
political field, and the consequential micro-processes, such as individual decision-making about 
important urban issues (housing) and collective processes of strategic interaction, which can also 
generate “shocks” and trigger important shifts in the “meso-level” orders. Urban redevelopment 
projects and resistance to them are enacted in micro-level orders (interactive arenas, such as 
public hearings, homeowners’ assemblies, and street protests), which make up the meso-level 
fields (the field of urban politics in a given city), which in turn comprise macro-level social 
orders (financial and macro-economic policies, for example). 
People’s homes and life plans are frequently threatened by development projects, 
gentrification, neoliberal policies, and other causes of displacement (Porteous and Smith 2001). 
Cities around the world become arenas for urbanites to claim their rights to stay put – or to move 
on to better homes. Critical urban research interprets these struggles as attempts by ordinary 
urbanites to reclaim their right to the city, which is “far more than a right of individual or group 
access to the resources that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the city more 
after our hearts’ desire” (Harvey 2012:4). Housing is one of the key domains where the claims 
for the right to the city take a concrete form (Aalbers and Gibb 2014; Mayer, Thörn, and Thörn 
2016). The right-to-the-city framework has a strong social-justice component and calls for “cities 
for people, not for profit” (Brenner et al. 2012).  
This body of literature has produced valuable insights into what urbanites do to reclaim 
their right to the city and to transform the social and political realities of their cities. Cities are 
arenas where the powerless must fight the powerful to assert their rights. The powerful are 
coalitions of urban political and financial elites (Logan and Molotch 2007; Molotch 1993). 
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However, the configurations of interests, goals, and strategies are usually more complex in 
socially diverse cities, where urbanites have different life experiences, feelings of belonging, 
housing strategies, ideas about the future and their private and common good. Often these forces 
clash in urban conflicts, and the urban powerless are not always on the same side of a 
controversy. 
Despite these insights, the right-to-the city approach has its limitations. It may impose the 
same logic on different movements: “Many of the movements organizing within cities do not call 
for a ‘right to the city’ or an ‘urban revolution’” (Uitermark et al. 2012:2547–48). Urban political 
struggles take many forms, and do not necessarily look like antagonistic social movements. As 
Mayer and Boudreau observe, the diversity of urban practices, urban everydayness, and 
informality, fall below the radar of the urban social movement literature. Still, they can have 
substantial political implications (Mayer and Boudreau 2012).  
Urban citizenship research has improved our understanding of the embeddedness of 
political life in everyday life, especially by demonstrating how political subjectivities emerge 
from everyday urban challenges and demands for better urban infrastructure and housing (Earle 
2012; Holston 2008; Murphy 2015; do Rio Caldeira 2000). Demanding a proper standing in 
society often revolves around more concrete housing-related demands: “demands for a new 
formulation of citizenship get conceived in terms of housing, property, plumbing, daycare, 
security, and other aspects of residential life” (Holston 2008:246). These urban struggles, 
housing-related mobilizations specifically, are one of the spheres where the link between the 
individual and political is especially explicit. 
Home and citizenship are deeply connected, through people’s worldviews, emotions, and 
practices. Duyvendak (2011) explores how discussions about “feeling at home” became central 
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to political debates in Western Europe and in the US, revealing the identity-based inclusion-
exclusion dynamic which makes some groups feel at home at the expense of other groups. 
Murphy foregrounds the role of the home in connecting political processes and subjectivity: “the 
making of home and property is also a crucial element in the formation of the state, the dynamics 
of citizenship, and the building of subjectivity” (Murphy 2015:8). Personal dignity and standing 
in the social and political system are built around acquiring a proper home. People are drawn into 
the interactive arenas of the urban political field to demand this general sense of dignity and 
security, the right to strategize and be agents in their own lives.  
A threat to homes often leads to displacement, both a physical and a symbolic loss of 
home, most notably explored by scholars of gentrification. Their studies have demonstrated that 
the driving forces behind displacement of low-income communities in attractive urban 
neighborhoods are economic (generating profit) or political (producing social order) interests of 
growth coalitions, cultural entrepreneurs and creative classes, and governments (Lees 2014; 
Smith 2002; Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Kleinhans 2007; Zukin 1987, 2009).  
The pro-growth orientation of city governments can threaten home in different ways, 
which may include not only the literal loss of housing, but also the loss of a sense of belonging 
and “symbolic and emotional loss of neighborhood meaning” (Pasotti 2020:10). Moscow’s 
Renovation can lead to this alternative form of loss of home; although people will supposedly 
remain in the same districts after moving from their apartments, the built and social 
environments of the affected neighborhoods will change, and the new apartment buildings will 
look and feel different. 
In addition to the potential loss of home and homes, the prospect of relocations and urban 
renewal brings the topic of property to the forefront. Property “is not merely a legal arrangement 
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among people and things and/or land. It is, rather, an unfolding set of shifting social and spatial 
relationships among these elements, in which the values and meanings assigned to each is 
paramount” (Murphy 2015:26). One could add that owning a “proper home” not only positions 
someone in the web of social and political relations (and puts them into a relevant strategic 
interaction field) and gives them a social and moral standing; it helps sustain their agency by 
allowing them to control the present situation, strategize, and make plans for the future. While 
homeownership is usually at the heart of discussions about urban citizenship, other forms of 
residential stability are also sometimes cited as factors behind civic engagement. Stability, 
whether it is homeownership or stable rent, allows people to exercise their agency by providing a 
temporal regime of being, which lets them plan their futures but also relate to the present in 
meaningful ways.  
Multiple studies discuss, for example, why homeowners are more likely to engage in 
civic activism (Chen and Webster 2005; McCabe 2013; Pfeiffer and Morris 2017; Syunyaev 
2016; Zhang 2012). Some argue that homeownership, in itself, is an act of civic engagement 
(Mireles 2017). Homeowners, researchers observe, are more invested in their place of residence, 
financially (McCabe 2013) and emotionally (Becher 2014); moreover, the increased residential 
stability that comes with homeownership helps people establish stronger local social ties and join 
local groups (Manturuk, Lindblad, and Quercia 2012; McCabe 2013). The temporal dimensions 
of agency discussed above also help explain why homeowners are supposed to be “better 
citizens.” Robert Putnam hypothesized that residential stability and homeownership are 
associated with greater civic engagement because “[m]obility, like frequent re-potting of plants, 
tends to disrupt root systems, and it takes time for an uprooted individual to put down new roots” 
 40 
(Putnam 1995:75). Inability to have “roots” translates into people’s perception of the current 
moment, the past, and the future. 
The relationship between homeownership and civic engagement is also an example of 
how people’s housing strategies can lead to transformations in political strategic interactions and 
citizenship practices. Moreover, it can be linked to social structural changes. For example, Zhang 
has analyzed the homeownership aspirations of the Chinese middle class  (Zhang 2012) to show 
that people’s pursuit of good life and ideal living place crystallizes in their orientation toward 
homeownership. It plays a transformative role and contributes to “class-making in a formerly 
socialist society” (Zhang 2012:3). A new “regime of urban living” emerges, which is “built on a 
radical remaking of the spatial, social, and moral order and encompasses several key aspects of 
the way life is reorganized and made meaningful in post-socialist China - the spatial and 
architectural form of residence, domestic configuration, the cultural milieu of community, forms 
of sociality, and the management of these privatized spaces” (Zhang 2012:2–3). For post-
socialist cities, one can add that these are the moments when Swidler’s “cultural retooling” takes 
place; it shows the centrality of housing to these processes. 
An important question is how the personal strategies, both habitual and intentional, are 
related to strategic action and engagement in political arenas? 
Several studies have focused on the continuity between everyday life and politics 
(Auyero 2004; Boudreau, Boucher, and Liguori 2009; Murphy 2015). Most of them have 
emphasized the importance of the routine, unarticulated aspects of everyday life. In her 
theorization of urban informality and politics, Julie Anne Boudreau (Boudreau 2016) opposes 
strategic political action and everyday connection with one’s inhabited world. She argues that 
everyday urban experiences and relationships can have political implications but people’s lives 
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don’t necessarily follow the logic of the state, which involves strategizing, calculating, and 
organized action. Boudreau et al. (Boudreau et al. 2009) focus on the everyday experiences and 
biographies of domestic workers in Los Angeles to explain their political mobilization, providing 
another piece of evidence for the habitual element of agency. They observe that “non-strategic 
and uncoordinated acts often have great impact on the political process” and “that urban political 
struggles are intimately related to everyday life” (Boudreau et al. 2009:338). The authors go on 
to emphasize the centrality of emotions and emotional experiences in establishing the continuity 
between the protesters’ lives and political action. 
These observations are in line with the vast literature on the role of emotions in social 
movements, and especially Jasper’s argument that emotions are an essential mechanism that 
draws people into political arenas (Jasper 2018, 2019). Pasotti demonstrates that urban 
experiences can be strategically mobilized to fight urban redevelopment: in one of the cases she 
analyzes, the neighborhood organization “primed neighbors for action by making the protection 
of their neighborhood a defining personal moment” (Pasotti 2020:4) through “experiential tools” 
of mobilization: communal meals, storytelling, and other collective events. Activists can employ 
feelings and urban experiences strategically. 
In light of this literature, there is no contradiction between rational and emotional 
motivations driving human action, or between the “political” and the “ordinary.” The “pre-
political,” personal experiences and considerations draw people into the political field and 




Past experiences predispose people to prefer some kinds of action (or inaction) over 
others. But their life goals, implicit or explicit, trivial or far-reaching, help them maneuver and 
innovate within structures, limitations, and habits.   
Home is a foundational life goal, and disruptions in this sphere shake people’s 
ontological security. The threat of physical displacement or transformations of built and lived 
environments beyond recognition interferes with people’s personal strategies, their ways of 
living a life and having a home. These strategies may be habitual and unarticulated as long as the 
events of life don’t explicitly contradict them. When the need to protect or advance one’s 
habitual life strategies emerges, players need to articulate and coordinate their actions with 
others. This is especially important when individuals are forming a compound, collective player 
– a movement, neighborhood group, and so on. In turn, participation in such collective players 
can transform people, their goals, dispositions, and strategies. People’s interests and strategies 
are “plastic,” and they change in interactions with others. 
Personal strategies motivate people to enter interactive arenas, which make up a strategic 
interaction field, for example the urban political field, where decisions about a city’s future are 
negotiated, and various players compete and promote their visions of this future. By entering the 
fields where they were previously absent or underrepresented, players transform the field’s 
configuration of players and arenas, its rules and relationships.  
Ways of pursuing and keeping a proper home, in other words housing strategies, are 
intertwined with people’s ideas of citizenship, justice, and self-worth. When these principles are 
threatened, people are motivated to enter the arenas of the field where decisions about their 
homes can be made. Their mastery of knowledge, skills, and resources may differ depending on 
their past experiences and social standing, but they can also learn as they interact in the arenas. 
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Renovation shocked many Muscovites because it threw their life strategies off balance. 
For some, the threat of physical or symbolic displacement was the motivation to enter the 
interactive arenas of urban politics. For others, it was the desire to benefit from the program that 
seemed to align with their habitual housing strategies perfectly. In the next chapter, I introduce 
Moscow’s urban context, policies, and Muscovites’ past experiences that affected people’s 
habitual and intentional housing strategies during Renovation as well as today.  
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CHAPTER 3 
Living in a changing Moscow 
When most people hear the name “Moscow,” they imagine the Kremlin, Saint Basil’s 
Cathedral, the famous soviet skyscrapers – the “Seven Sisters,” and, perhaps, the impressive 
embankments along the Moscow River. They are less likely to imagine the vast residential areas 
beyond the Central Administrative District. But more than 90 percent of Moscow’s 12 million 
people live in the 11 administrative districts (okrugs) outside of and surrounding the city center 
(Rosstat 2017, see Figure 1).  
These “peripheries” emerged as Moscow grew in the 20th century, gradually absorbing 
towns and villages that gave their names to the new mass-produced and carefully planned 
housing districts. In the Soviet era, the state was the only housing developer and provider, 
controlling both the construction and the distribution of housing. Despite the stepped-up pace of 
residential construction in the post-war USSR, the housing question was never completely 
solved. Getting a desired separate flat with “all the modern amenities” (“so vsemi udobstvami”) 
was not a simple task for Soviet citizens, who had to learn to be strategic, navigate the 
bureaucratic system of housing distribution, and still wait years to “receive” an apartment from 
municipal authorities or employers.  
Despite popular perceptions, access to housing was not equal for different strata of the 
declared “classless” Soviet society: nomenklatura, employees of powerful enterprises, and other 
Soviet elites could get apartments faster, and in better located and better-quality buildings, which 
created a “geography of privilege” (Colton 1995:502) that still affects Muscovites’ perceptions 
of different parts of the city. With the collapse of the Soviet system and post-1991 privatization, 
Soviet-style inequality of housing conditions and chances to improve them became more 
pronounced. The emergence of the real estate market made it easier for Muscovites who could 
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afford it to purchase the housing they desired, while for others, the dream of decent housing 
became unattainable. The two “inequalities” are related: those Muscovite families who managed 
to accumulate housing in Soviet Moscow could benefit from this capital in post-Soviet Moscow 
as well. 
The announcement of Renovation stirred these histories and perceived injustices among 
many Muscovites. In this chapter, I explore the continuities and cleavages in Moscow’s 
residential system and link Soviet housing histories to the contemporary living situations of 
Muscovites and to their responses to Renovation. 
 
Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Moscow and population per administrative okrug (AO).  
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East and West: Mental geography of Moscow and housing inequalities 
Since the nineteenth century, Moscow has been a destination for internal migration: 
people have come here for higher wages, big-city lifestyle, and the best services (healthcare, 
education, food supply) available in the country (Vendina 1997). This influx of population and 
the city’s industrial growth pushed the boundaries of Moscow into the surrounding territories, 
going beyond its circular city limits to create a succession of new ones: the “Boulevard Ring” 
running along the line of the old fortress walls, then the Sadovoye Ring, then the Third Transport 
Ring, and, finally, the Moscow Ringway (MKAD: Moskovskaya Koltsevaya Avtodoroga). These 
ringway boundaries of the city were constructed in 1961, but they continue to define the 
Muscovites’ perception of the city limits. Despite the recent southwestern expansion of Moscow 
in 2012, which added two more okrugs (known as New Moscow) cutting them off from the 
surrounding Moscow region and distorting Moscow’s original circular shape, MKAD remains an 
important mental boundary of the city. For some people, staying in place within the limits of 
MKAD means remaining a true Muscovite. 
Since the 1950s, the new microrayons, carefully planned residential areas equipped with 
an appropriate social infrastructure for the number of residents, were built up in the vast areas 
outside the city center to house the increasing urban population. The prefabricated apartment 
buildings rose on top of the displaced and destroyed villages and townships. Once considered 
remote, the areas of the industrial housing construction of the 1950s and 1960s in Moscow are 
now relatively well located: they are dispersed between MKAD and the city center, in areas with 
developed transportation and social infrastructure, and are much more accessible and better 
equipped than the new residential areas mushrooming beyond MKAD. This makes the 
“socialist” residential blocks attractive: for both current living and further development.  
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Apart from the distinction between the “Old” and New Moscow within and beyond 
MKAD, there are important distinctions between more and less desirable residential areas within 
the “old” city boundaries. These distinctions haven’t changed much since the Soviet era, and 
reproduce the geography of privilege of the socialist capital. This geography is based on the 
locations of “elite” housing, the areas where Soviet nomenklatura (Communist Party and 
government officials and high-ranking appointees) lived.  
The most prestigious and expensive part of Moscow is the city center, roughly within the 
boundaries of the Central administrative okrug (Kashnitsky and Gunko 2016). The center has 
been gentrified and changed its social and demographic profile significantly since the 1990s 
(Trushchenko 1995). The central rayons were little affected by Renovation, except for some 
areas on the fringes of the okrug. In these areas, exceptionally, most of the buildings eventually 
included in the demolition lists were added at homeowners’ own initiative (after they held a 
homeowners’ assembly to petition for inclusion). 
The mental geography of Moscow is mostly organized by cardinal directions from the 
city center. The formal administrative divisions (the 12 Administrative Districts, or okrugs) are 
also named according to their relative position to the center (with the exception of the three 
districts beyond MKAD). The okrugs are large entities subdivided into smaller districts, rayons, 
which may have historic names they inherited from the villages and towns which were razed for 
the new housing construction. The four rayons where I conducted fieldwork are in four different 
administrative okrugs, West (Sokolovo), East (Losevo), North (Oreshino) and North-East 
(Rakitino)3. These rayons vary in their reputations, with some more prominent on the “mental 
map” and others more obscure. 
 
3 I have changed the names of the districts to maintain anonymity. 
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The districts outside the city center also have several “islands of prestige,” most of them 
tracing their history back to the Soviet elite’s housing locations. Not whole districts, but 
individual buildings were “elite:” next to the “nomenklatura” dwellings, ordinary people could 
be living in their regular five-stories, in small-sized flats; sometimes, the privileged lived in the 
same buildings as everybody else (Vendina 1997). Most districts with prestigious housing also 
have parcels of land filled with “ordinary” buildings: real estate developers hoped to put their 
hands on these parcels before and during Renovation. Regardless of a district’s reputation, if it 
was developed in the 1950s and 1960s, it has a good share of buildings eligible for Renovation.  
For example, the district Kuntsevo on the western fringe of Moscow has long been a 
desired residential area because of its proximity to elite summerhouses in the adjacent part of the 
Moscow region and direct access to greenery and two rivers cutting through the district (Colton 
1995:510). The same suburban area still houses contemporary Russian elites, and Kuntsevo’s 
reputation as a desirable residential area lives on, attracting developers eager to benefit from 
building on these valuable lands. This district has a significant share of five-story housing, which 
was targeted by Renovation; in addition, other development projects are trying to set foot in 
Kuntsevo, sparking bitter resistance by residents facing displacement.  
In August 2017, a real estate website enthusiastically advertised Kuntsevo as a desirable 
residential destination, stressing both its prestigious population history and the “reclaiming” of 
the territories built up with five-stories. In the quote below, a real estate company representative 
mentions the factors that make Moscow districts attractive: environment (“prevailing winds” or 
Rose of the Winds is one reason the West is considered better than the East) and prestige: 
Kuntsevo is a relatively old Moscow rayon, which was attractive for living from the very 
start. At first, it was due to the make-up of the residents: employees of the Kremlin 
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apparatus working, but not in the highest positions, were massively housed there. Plus, it 
is the westernmost part of the city; therefore, from the point of view of the prevailing 
winds (roza vetrov), Kuntsevo is one of the most environmentally advantageous districts 
of Moscow. Over the years, Kuntsevo’s attractiveness only increased. In the first wave of 
the demolition of five-stories, the old panel khrushchevki were removed from the area, 
and new modern housing was built in their place. (Pogorelskiy 2017). 
Renovation, real estate professionals claimed, would increase the attractiveness even 
more: the remaining aesthetically unpleasant five-stories would be replaced with modern 
housing. 
Other desirable housing areas include districts where the Soviet intelligentsia settled: the 
intellectual elites were “rewarded” with smoother access to better housing instead of better pay 
(Kalinina 1992:202), and the areas near the Moscow University and the Academy of Sciences in 
the South-West of Moscow became a favorite residence for employees of these intellectual 
enterprises. In the North-West, the districts Sokol, Aeroport, and Dinamo generals, writers and 
artists were allowed to build their cooperative housing. All these areas remain desirable today.  
The mental geography of “bad” areas also hasn’t changed much since Soviet times. Some 
areas are perceived as more “proletarian,” poor, or generally bad. Figure 2 shows a popular 
internet meme that first appeared in summer 2019 (Pauper’s Diary 2019). A blogger under the 
nickname “A pauper’s diary” published a post “Why I don’t recommend that anyone live in the 
South-East of Moscow” accompanied by a map that went viral. The boundaries on this map 
don’t exactly follow the boundaries of the administrative okrugs but correspond roughly with 
them. The center is designated as the location of the elite, the West and South-West is where the 
middle classes and posh people are supposed to live, and the East, which includes not only the 
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Eastern Okrug but also the urbanized nearby regions beyond MKAD (the commuter area with 
active housing development), are seen as the “branch office of hell.” The East is plagued by 
ecological issues, specifically foul smells sometimes coming from the “aeration fields” and huge 
dumping sites that were located just outside the city. They are now closed but still affect air 
quality.  
     
Figure 2. Mental mapping of Moscow’s okrugs (Russian, source: “Pauper’s Diary” blog 
(Pauper’s Diary 2019) and translated version). 
Studies of the real estate market and settlement patterns in Moscow generally confirm 
these popular perceptions (Kashnitsky and Gunko 2016; Nozdrina 2006). At least since the 
1970s, the East and the South-East of Moscow have been seen as “undesirable” living locations 
(Colton 1995:516). While statistical data are not easily available for the rayon level, some 
published research shows that these “mental” boundaries are correlated with some data-based 
analytical boundaries. For example, the consulting company RRG calculated the distribution of 
spending per person across Moscow and found that, while the city center is better off than the 
rest of Moscow, the western areas seem to do better than the eastern ones (Kaminskiy 2019). 
Real estate prices also differ between the more affordable East and more expensive and 
prestigious West (Nozdrina 2006). 
Wealth and real estate prices are not the only basis for the mental distinctions among 
Moscow’s districts. Different districts also have political reputations: Muscovites have ideas on 
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how politically aware and engaged people in different districts may be, how likely they are to 
support or oppose the existing political regime, namely the political party United Russia, Mayor 
Sobyanin, and President Putin. One of the districts I studied, in the Eastern Administrative 
Okrug, was relatively successful in fighting off Renovation, and generally had a vibrant activist 
life. However, its reputation was different: when I mentioned my research site in 2017 to a friend 
from Moscow, a social scientist and a political media commentator, he was certain that people in 
the East supported Renovation and Sobyanin overwhelmingly. He was surprised when I told him 
about my observations; the East’s reputation as an apathetic and ignorant area was still strong in 
2017. It has changed since then: Renovation, but also the election of independent candidates in 
municipal and Moscow City Council elections in 2017 and 2019 respectively, have demonstrated 
that the East is not homogeneous and apathetic. 
The voting pattern across Moscow’s neighborhoods shows that, indeed, some rayons are 
more supportive of city officials than others. The best pre-Renovation indication of the political 
profiles of the neighborhoods is the Mayoral election in 2013 when opposition candidate Alexey 
Navalny ran against the incumbent Sergey Sobyanin. The central areas, the districts in the South-
West (Gagarinskiy on the top of the list), and the prestigious districts in the North-West 
(Aeroport and Sokol) showed the strongest support for Navalny (Volkova, Napalkova, and 
Rustamova 2018). In Aeroport, Sokol and Gagarinskiy there were no buildings included in the 
initial Renovation voting lists in May 2017. It is worth noting that these are the districts that I 
listed above among the traditionally prestigious residential areas. 
Several rayons in the West have activist reputations, elected independent municipal 
deputies earlier than others, and were famous for fighting against urban development projects 
(districts Ramenki, Gagarinskiy, and Akademicheskiy). These districts have been affected by 
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Renovation the least. I have no information from decision-makers or officials to confirm this, but 
I’ve heard from the Muscovites an interpretation that these areas were “protected” by their 
oppositional reputation. The Moscow government did not want to provoke them by Renovation. 
In the Gagarinskiy district, where the famous oppositionist Elena Rusakova was a municipal 
deputy, only six buildings were included in the Renovation lists – all of them after they 
mobilized to hold a homeowner assembly and petition for inclusion; none of the buildings in this 
district were suggested for voting initially in May 2017.  
The glorious origins and inglorious decay of the five-stories  
Many “elite” Soviet housing projects were constructed as “individual architectural 
projects,” unlike the ordinary housing based on replication, or typical (“tipovoy,” pl. “tipovyye”) 
projects. Most of the buildings affected by Renovation (and earlier relocation projects) are 
tipovyye. In the Renovation lists, there are five-story buildings (“pyatietazhki”) of two types: 
constructed in the Joseph Stalin era, thus called “stalinki,” or in the Nikita Khrushchev era, 
“khrushchevki.” 4 Officially, all these different buildings are described in Renovation-related 
documents, speeches and conversations as “five-stories,” “khrushchevki,” “buildings constructed 
in the first period of the industrial housing construction” (1957-1968), and “prefabricated 
housing.5” Most of these typical projects were constructed as groups of buildings and arranged in 
planned microrayons with the necessary infrastructure. 
“Prefabricated housing” was a response to the housing crisis and the growing urban 
population in the post-war USSR. The volume of residential construction continued to grow 
 
4 Apart from khrushchevki and stalinki, there are also brezhnevki. Renovation affected mostly the 
khrushchevki, but many stalinki and even some pre-revolutionary buildings and newer brezhnevki got on 
the demolition lists. 
5 The Renovation rosters also include earlier and more recent buildings, buildings based on unique 
architectural projects, buildings with more and fewer than five stories, and other deviations from the 
criteria. 
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through the late 1980s  (Gorlov 2005; Kazakova 2008), thanks to the method based on the 
prefabricated elements, concrete slabs, which was adopted in the late 1950s. Known as 
“Plattenbauten” in Germany, and “large panel system-building” in England, these buildings are a 
quick and cost-efficient way to produce affordable mass housing.  
Soviet housing authorities experimented with industrial housing construction and 
replication housing: the same architectural projects would be used over and over again in 
different cities and neighborhoods. The famous popular culture representation of this uniformity 
of socialist housing is the 1975 movie “The Irony of Fate,” mocking the identical buildings and 
apartments so that even residents can get confused and walk into a stranger’s home as if it were 
their own.  
The first replication projects were used in the 1950s, in buildings now known as stalinki. 
While some of these buildings were based on individual architectural projects, there were also 
“series” of stalinki. These were mostly made of brick, often had some external decorations, 
unlike later prefabricated housing types, and had roomy apartments. Today, they are often 
viewed as decent but still affordable housing. Some stalinki were built to house communal 
apartments and dormitories, where families occupy rooms and share facilities (in the “dorm-like” 




Figure 3. Stalinki included in Renovation. Photo by author. 
Khrushchevki were the first type of housing built following the model of quick and 
cheap, “optimized” construction in 1957-1968 (see Figure 4). The new housing production 
approach allowed the pace of construction to increase significantly, and in 1960 an all-time 
record amount of dwelling space was constructed in the USSR. 
Khrushchev’s housing projects allowed Soviet citizens to move into much-desired 
separate flats (Harris 2013). The flats in khrushchevki are usually smaller than in other types of 
housing, but in the 1950s and 1960s, moving into a separate flat from a communal apartment or a 
dorm was seen as a significant improvement despite the flats’ small size. These prefabricated 
buildings changed over time, and there are different “series” of khrushchevki, some of which are 
considered better than others, built with improved materials and apartment layouts.  
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Figure 4. Khrushchevka with walls made of prefabricated blocks, series 1-515. Photo by author. 
The first khrushchevka was built in 1957 in Moscow and was a representative of the “K-
7” series. The series of the buildings became a quick way to describe the building’s quality and 
layout for years to come; some of them were seen as good, others as less “successful.” The series 
varied in the materials used for construction and the method of prefabrication (panel, block, or 
brick construction), and the layout and other characteristics of the apartments (important criteria 
to this day are the size of the kitchens, the height of the ceilings, hallway space, separate or 
combined toilets and bathrooms). Regardless of the series, most of the five-stories are not 
equipped with elevators. 
The architects did not have much freedom in what they could do with the prefabricated 
buildings, but they invested their skill in the planning of the environment. The infrastructure 
(schools, sports facilities, retail) was calculated for the expected number of residents; the green 
areas, quiet yards with plants and lawns, and convenient road layouts surrounded the plain 
monotonous buildings. The quality of the environment is what current residents value most, even 
when they admit the quality of the apartments and buildings might have been better.  
Real estate prices in stalinki are higher than in any of the khrushchevki; the apartment 
prices in the latter also vary, depending on the series and the wall material of the building (see 
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Table 2). Over time, khrushchevki developed a reputation as the worst and, therefore, cheapest 
type of housing. Residents often criticize the buildings for their low quality and small 
apartments; to describe them, people came up with the nickname khrushcheby6 (“Khrushchev 
slums”). Some residents refuse to use the word “khrushchevki,” not to mention “khrushcheby,” 
as a negative stigma, and prefer the neutral “pyatietazhka,” five-story, to talk about their homes. 
 Stalinki  Khrushchevki 
Constructed Late 1930s-mid 1950s Late 1950s – late 1960s (in 
Moscow, until 1980s in other 
cities) 
Stories 3-8 5-9 
Average price per sq m 2017, 
rubles, irn.ru 
190 000 140 000 (Panel houses) 
160 000 (Brick houses) 
Table 2. Characteristics of different types of buildings affected by Renovation 
With the emergence of better housing, the old five-stories lost their appeal. The physical 
decay of these buildings was accompanied by social transformations: as the original population 
grew older and died, their heirs rented out many of the apartments in the five-story areas. Being 
relatively affordable, the khrushchevki areas became popular for rental housing among labor 
migrants to Moscow (Demintseva 2017).  
On the other hand, many stalinki are still considered good housing. They look good and 
have roomy apartments: gradually, many residents of the communal apartments in stalinki 
managed to sell their rooms to a single buyer, who renovated and converted the flats into single-
family apartments. Many of the flats in stalinki are such converted communal apartments, but 
many kommunalki still remain in these buildings. Many lucky owners of separate flats in stalinki 
 
6 A play of words, a combination of khrushchevka and trushcheby, slums. 
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were shocked when they learned that there were still people living in communal apartments in 
their buildings: until Renovation and the need to collectively decide on their building’s inclusion 
in the relocation program, they had no idea how different some of their neighbors’ situations 
were. Their shock did not usually generate a feeling of solidarity with the neighbors living in 
cramped housing conditions or a desire to act in their interest. Still, it was an example of a 
“moral shock:” a moment of learning that “that the world is not what one had expected” (Jasper 
2011:289). Learning about their neighbors’ situation, people would often sympathize but 
nonetheless disapprove of their inability to get out of it. 
Housing strategies in Soviet Moscow: Becoming a Resident of a five-story 
These differences among neighbors can be explained partly by differences in their 
housing trajectories. The pathways to becoming a resident of a five-story reveal important 
characteristics of these buildings and their residents, a subtle but persistent legacy of the Soviet 
housing distribution system, which shaped residents’ attitudes toward one another and their 
housing during the Renovation controversy. The history of the construction and the ways 
residents were selected to live in the building affects its social composition, sometimes creating a 
more socially homogenous population and/or stronger identification with the building’s history 
among the residents. People referred to these histories and characteristics when they explained to 
me why their building and its inhabitants were special, and why they supported a certain position 
on Renovation.  
These stories and narratives revolve around housing strategies, ways of organizing action 
in pursuit of proper housing that are shaped by people’s experiences, worldviews, and visions of 
the future. Socialist housing strategies are still relevant today, alive in both policies and people’s 
habits. 
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Socialist-era housing strategies were shaped by one’s relationship with the state. Access 
to housing was not equal in the “classless” Soviet society; stratification ran along occupational 
lines rather than levels of wealth (Yanowitch 2017). A person’s position in this social hierarchy 
was crucial to their access to housing. The quality and size of what one could get from the state 
were regulated by a set of housing norms: the square space per person, but also the quality of 
housing (overall condition, available amenities, and the amount of sun reaching a given area, or 
“insolyatsiya”). In this highly regulated world, there was still room for manipulations and 
creative solutions to get better (larger) apartments and get to them faster: by marrying or 
divorcing, adopting or conceiving a child, registering additional relatives in the apartment 
(Colton 1995:495). 
While most of the housing constructed in the USSR was municipal, enterprises or 
governmental bodies could build housing for their employees: some people received lodgings in 
departmental housing, constructed by large enterprises and distributed among its employees. In 
big cities, Moscow included, whole neighborhoods were built up with departmental housing and 
populated with employees of a particular factory or organization (Gorlov 2013). Today, it still 
matters: when describing their homes to me, Muscovites often mentioned their “departmental” 
origins and the specific groups of employees for whom they were built. 
For some migrant workers from USSR’s less resourceful regions coming to large cities to 
work in undesirable occupations (the only way to move within the country under the severe 
limitations imposed by the registration, propiska, system that attached people to their place), 
departmental housing in Moscow was a strong motivation to endure hard work. Later known as 
“quota workers” (limitchiki), these employees could receive separate flats faster than most 
Muscovites (Gorlov 2018), which created some resentment among the latter. Limitchik, or 
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limitá, became a derogatory term associated with a particular life trajectory (migration to the 
capital on “quota”) and lifestyle (uncultured, rural). Even today, Muscovites know and use the 
term. 
To receive the desired one-family flat from the state or the employer, one had to register 
on the waiting list known as “the queue” (ochered’). There were separate municipal and 
departmental waiting lists, and the latter often ran faster; people sometimes registered on both 
(Colton 1995:495). To be eligible for state-sponsored relocation, to get on the “queue,” people 
needed to meet certain criteria: be Muscovites (with the Moscow propiska, the official 
registration) for a set number of years and live in substandard housing (dormitories, temporary 
housing for workers arriving to Moscow, communal apartments, and apartments of smaller size 
than the state regulations of square space per person prescribed.)  
In communal apartments, different families occupy rooms but share facilities and public 
zones, the kitchens and the bathrooms. When a lucky family moved out from a room in a 
communal apartment into their new separate flat, new resident(s) would occupy the room: 
sometimes a newcomer to the city, graduating from a factory dorm.  
For those unwilling to wait forever in the municipal “queue,” another option to get a 
separate flat was to join a housing cooperative. Although the socialist state prioritized housing 
construction to satisfy the increasing demand for decent housing, it could not keep up with it. It 
allowed citizens to take the initiative and pool their resources to build housing on their own. 
Cooperative members (often employees of the same enterprise or otherwise socially close 
people) pooled money and sometimes contributed their physical labor to the construction. Many 
current residents of cooperative apartments mean it literally when they say that their fathers (or 
grandfathers) built their home. Due to high construction costs, only relatively well-off soviet 
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citizens could afford to participate in cooperative building societies, which became popular 
mostly in Moscow and Leningrad (Vlasov 2010:142). Cooperatives also had their waiting lists, 
and joining one often required not only money for the down payment but also social connections: 
therefore, cooperative housing gained a more upscale reputation, available to well-connected and 
relatively wealthy Muscovites. 
In 1970, 20 percent of the housing construction in Moscow was cooperative, and by the 
late 1980s, almost 10 percent of all housing in the city was still in cooperative buildings (Colton 
1995:487). Housing cooperatives often used the same typical architectural plans as were used for 
the state-funded construction and had to comply with the centralized urban planning. On the 
outside, they often look the same as the state-funded stalinki and khrushchevki. Inside, they may 
have better apartment layouts and other individual features. 
Many current residents of the condemned five-stories have experienced the socialist 
housing distribution system first-hand. Some of these people are now in their 60s, like Irina, a 
woman from Oreshino I met in the summer of 2017. Irina’s story illustrates the path to separate 
housing for a newcomer to Moscow in the 1970s and shows how the socialist era strategies were 
disrupted by the massive changes the country experienced with the collapse of the socialist 
system.  
Irina arrived in Moscow in the 1970s, after graduating from a university in a regional 
town. From her first days in the Moscow region, she had a clear plan to become a Muscovite, get 
a propiska, and, eventually, procure her own flat. She was a good enough student at her 
university to be assigned work at an enterprise in a satellite town near Moscow. 7 This allowed 
 
7 Raspredeleniye, or distribution, was a system of a centralized obligatory work placement of college 
graduates; the employers announced their job postings which then went out to the specialized institutions 
across the USSR. The best students had a chance to choose first from the list of offers, and others were 
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her to get a temporary registration in the Moscow region and a room in a dormitory near her 
work. She spent her free time in the city, exploring its cultural scene, and already feeling a 
Muscovite. Later, she changed her job to a governmental agency in Moscow, which provided her 
with a room in a shared flat with another employee of the same organization. It was an upgrade 
compared to the dorm room, but still not the permanent housing either of them desired. Together, 
they began working toward a permanent Moscow registration and a separate apartment for each 
of them. The first step was exchanging their shares in the two-room flat for separate rooms in a 
communal apartment. This would give them the opportunity to get the permanent Moscow 
registration (propiska), and after a few years, to register on the queue and get separate 
apartments. The process of exchange took years, and was “full of obstacles,” as she told me with 
a mixture of pride and nostalgia; she was proud of being able to navigate the complex 
bureaucratic maze, and frustrated when her carefully crafted plan was interrupted by the collapse 
of socialism: 
We looked for options. It was very difficult. In those years – it was simply unreal. […] 
There were so many difficulties in those times! And then in the 1980s, Perestroika began, 
and we were already living here. […] I never thought I would be living here! I only 
needed the propiska – that’s it! and look for how many years I got stuck here. 
Irina got “stuck in a kommunalka,” and all her skills and preparations became useless in 
the new capitalist housing market: “If back in those days there were different options, when the 
1990s came, there were no more options left. Only buying. But you know about buying – where 
to get the money? Especially in those years.” 
 
required to take what was left. The new specialists had to spend at least 3 years at the job posts they were 
assigned, which could be anywhere in the USSR.  
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Despite the complexities of the Soviet housing distribution system, many Muscovites feel 
the same way as Irina: the old system provided people with more “options” and alternatives to 
capitalism’s main way of acquiring housing, buying it. With a bit of luck and persistence, one 
could try and “game” the system. With the capitalist real estate market, this space for strategic 
creativity almost disappeared. 
“Almost,” because “ochered” still exists in the post-socialist Moscow as a strange 
leftover from the socialist past: it hardly moves, but the Moscow government still keeps the 
rosters of “ocheredninki,” people eligible for housing improvement. In some five-story buildings 
eligible for Renovation, there are people still on those waiting lists: residents of rooms in 
communal apartments, and people in separate flats counting on government support in acquiring 
a larger apartment. Some people not on the “queue” still hoped to improve their housing 
conditions in this very familiar, “socialist” way. Like Irina, some of them celebrated the return of 
the “options” of getting a better housing as an alternative to buying it. The strategies from the 
past seemed to return – and to compensate for the perceived injustices and frustrations of 
housing privatization.  
Privatization and its Discontents 
The process that transformed Russia’s housing system the most was privatization, the 
transfer of property from the state to individuals that began in 1991, after the collapse of state 
socialism.  
In 1991, new national legislation permitted the tenants of municipal and departmental 
housing to become owners of their residential quarters for a small fee (they could only privatize 
the homes they legally occupied and could use this right only once). The goal of privatization 
was to transfer most housing stock into private hands, allowing a housing market to emerge. 
Proponents of privatization also assumed that with ownership rights, tenants would take over 
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maintenance responsibilities that the state had previously covered: it was a way to cut public 
expenditure. Early on, experts expressed concerns that privatization was not happening fast 
enough (Kosareva and Struyk 1993), endangering the prospects of a housing market operating 
without strong state interference. Privatization was voluntary: tenants did not have to privatize, 
and not all used their right to become homeowners.  
For some, the decision not to privatize was a result of a strategic calculation and the wish 
to avoid responsibility for property that was often in poor condition. Verdery (2004) notes that 
not only “goods” but also “bads” were distributed during privatization in post-socialist countries. 
The quality of the distributed housing was not equal, and some people received liabilities along 
with their property rights (some privatized spacious apartments in solid buildings, while others 
were left with small flats in crumbling, non-prestigious khrushchevki). Regardless of the 
condition of the “inherited” housing, maintenance of the buildings became the residents’ 
responsibility. Another risky aspect of becoming a homeowner was taxation: while at the 
beginning of privatization the property taxes on housing were kept low, there was no guarantee 
that future taxes would not increase to reflect the market value of the apartments (Pickvance 
1994). 
Others decided not to privatize their homes, hoping to take advantage of the 
government’s housing improvement policies, a legacy of state socialism that still survives in 
housing legislation. In Moscow, this strategy was especially popular among people in lower 
quality housing: rooms in communal apartments, small flats, or dilapidated buildings. For them, 
the hope of qualifying for the government relocation program was more important than 
homeownership. In most buildings affected by Renovation, there were people who had decided 
 64 
not to privatize and stay on the “queue,” hoping to benefit from the remaining governmental 
housing improvement programs.  
Despite these concerns, most of Russia’s housing stock was privatized. According to the 
State committee of statistics, the current homeownership rate in Russia is 87.3 percent, and in 
Moscow, 79.7 percent8. As a result of uneven privatization, every pre-1991 apartment building is 
now a mix of tenure types: homeowners (both those who privatized or inherited and those who 
bought an apartment on the market), social renters (sotsial’nyy nayem), and market renters 
(renting apartments from the homeowners) live next door to each other. 
Those who privatized their apartments were also entitled to a share of the land under their 
apartment building; in some cases, where the homeowners were organized enough to request a 
measurement and cadastral registration of the land plot, they could also ensure that the adjacent 
common territory (such as a courtyard) was included as the shared property of the homeowners.9  
Every pre-1991 building in Moscow is a unique configuration of tenure and apartment 
types;10 often, the residents of the buildings are not aware of their building’s configuration. 
Depending on the type of tenure, however, the residents have different responsibilities and rights 
in relation to the state, which became important during the Renovation controversy and related 
mobilization. Table 3 summarizes the types of tenure in pre-1991 buildings.  
 
8 Russia is among the top countries in homeownership rates – compare to the EU average of 69.2 percent 
and the US average 64.2 percent. 
9 Rights to land under and around the apartment buildings became a serious issue during Renovation. 
10 Most of the flats in the post-1991 buildings were sold at market prices, although even today developers 
are required to donate some of the apartments to the state, which then uses them to house relocated 
tenants, orphanage graduates, and other citizens entitled to housing. 
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Tenure type Description 
Social rent Non-privatized housing provided by the state; de-
facto ownership (the lease term is indefinite) 
Market rent Apartments rented out by homeowners or social 
renters to tenants in the private rental market 
Private property Privatized, purchased, inherited/gifted housing 
Table 3. Tenure types in pre-1991 apartment buildings 
The differences in tenure type among neighbors were unimportant before the Renovation 
controversy, but in the heat of the Renovation Summer they became a subject of discussion, and 
some Muscovites used them as explanation for different choices their neighbors made. 
My interviewees differed in their interpretations of privatization and its consequences. 
When this theme came up in the interviews, some of them concentrated on the promise of 
homeownership and the self-reliance that it entailed, others spoke about the inequalities it 
produced.  
For example, Irina, a resident of a kommunalka quoted above, saw privatization as unfair, 
because people got housing of very different quality. She referred to a similar sentiment 
expressed by President Putin in his justification of relocation programs: “the President once said, 
it is not the people’s fault that they received such an inheritance – I mean, like an inheritance 
from the state, these apartments they privatized.” For people like herself, stranded in substandard 
housing without “options” to improve it, Renovation was a chance to compensate for the 
injustice. 
On the other side of the controversy, Leonid, in his late 20s, owner of a two-room in a 
stalinka in Sokolovo, told me: 
There was privatization, and people were told – you are the owners now. Of course, some 
people can’t be owners of their own fate even after 20 years. But some people listened, 
and they became owners of their own fate. They are ready to buy real estate; they are 
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ready to keep it clean, renovated. And now they are being told: we will [do whatever we 
want with] your real estate… we despise your property rights. 
For Leonid, as for many other opponents of Renovation, the program betrayed the 
promise of ownership and self-reliance that privatization and the capitalist market offered. 
Property rights and the dignity of ownership became key arguments in the public campaign 
against Renovation, repeatedly coming up in social media posts, campaign materials, and my 
interviews with Muscovites. While acknowledging the varying quality of housing, which people 
were able to privatize, some of the opponents of Renovation emphasized that becoming a de jure 
homeowner was not enough; homeownership entailed responsibilities and attitudes, such as 
paying maintenance fees and taking care of the building’s condition. 
Marianna, in her late 50s, who owns not one but two apartments in different stalinki in 
Oreshino, emphasized that being a homeowner means taking the initiative and taking care of 
your property on your own, not counting on any help from the government. However, she 
lamented, many people still do not express the proper attitude: 
You know, it really depends on the people. Privatization took place, and it was a strong 
message. You privatized [the apartment]? Now you are responsible for it! But many 
people kept this enduring [attitude]: privatized? It’s mine now! But you should still 
renovate my building! How come you are not renovating my apartment? But you are the 
owner! If you can't stand the heat get out of the kitchen (vzyalsya za guzh – ne govori, 
chto ne dyuzh). There is a misunderstanding of the process that took place. 
Both Leonid and Marianna expressed the same underlying idea: with privatization, and 
with homeownership, people received the right to take their lives – and their homes – into their 
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own hands. This freedom involved responsibility: one was supposed to take over the “bads” as 
well as the “goods” that came with privatized housing.  
With privatization and the emergence of the real estate market, acquiring a home became, 
on the one hand, simpler, and on the other hand, more frustrating. The homebuyers did not need 
the sophisticated bureaucratic knowledge and skills so crucial under the socialist housing 
distribution system. All they needed was enough money: and that was and is a problem for most 
of the population. 
A system of housing mortgages was introduced in the late 1990s, but mortgage rates are 
astronomical compared to other countries: as high as 15 percent in recent years but reduced by 
Presidential “order” to just below 10 percent in summer 2018 (the US average fluctuates around 
3-4 percent, and Germany is below 2 percent). It is a real burden for people who decide to take 
on a mortgage to solve their housing problems (Zavisca 2012).  
Among the residents of the socialist five-story apartment buildings I spoke to, there were 
many who had purchased their apartments – either using existing family real estate to pay for 
them, or taking out mortgages, or both. Some of my interviewees had moved from other cities 
and sold their apartments there to afford down payments in Moscow; others were Muscovites 
who could use existing family properties (selling an existing apartment and using the money as a 
down payment for new ones, for example).This is a popular strategy that reveals the continuity in 
families’ housing histories: those families who were successful in accumulating housing capital 
in the Soviet era had a better chance at acquiring real estate in the post-socialist Moscow. The 
family apartments could be sold or exchanged for smaller ones to allow growing families to 
move into separate apartments; having such a nest egg is a great help.  
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Inheritance is another popular path to post-socialist apartment acquisition. Several of my 
younger interviewees inherited their apartments from older relatives, which allowed them to 
move out of their parents’ homes. This is mostly a privilege of long-term Muscovite families, 
who manage to accumulate several properties between close relatives. For example, I heard a 
typical biography of an apartment in a five-story from Vera, a young mother in her 20s, who 
moved in an apartment in Rakitino after getting married six years before our interview: 
Actually, it is my father’s apartment. I mean, at some point, he lived with his parents in a 
communal apartment in [one of the central districts], and they were relocated from there 
in the late 1960s to Rakitino. He lived here with his parents, brothers, and sister. Then, 
his brother lived there because dad got married and moved out. And his sister and brother 
lived there. Then dad inherited it. We lived in [one of the newer socialist-era districts] 
with my parents, and this apartment was rented out. And then when I got married, we 
moved in here with my husband. 
The mortgage holders, the inheritors, the older apartment “recipients” from the socialist 
era, some of whom privatized them while others remained under social rent conditions, and 
people renting apartments from their owners, all live side by side. Some housing experts see this 
as a problem: they argue that it is difficult to organize efficient self-governance in buildings 
where neighbors have different relationship with their housing (Glazunov and Samoshin 2006).  
Maxim Trudolyubov in his book on property in Russia identifies some important features 
of housing strategies. In the socialist city, urbanites, many of whom were migrants from rural 
areas, strived for separate apartments in climbing a “ladder” of personal goals: “survive, get 
enough food, find a roof over your head, find a room, get a residence permit, get a separate 
apartment and, if you were lucky, the acme of success, get a dacha and a car” (Trudolyubov 
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2018:16). Housing strategies, as this quote shows, are an integral part of life strategies more 
generally, a definitive element of one’s success in life. All these achievements depended on the 
state and on each person’s position in the social hierarchy and their service to the society.  
Soviet people, Trudolyubov notes, longed for privacy, which was so difficult to achieve 
in the conditions of a “housing famine” and controlling and omnipresent state. Therefore, post-
soviet people embraced the opportunity offered by private life; “the changing regimes have 
rather fuelled the human propensity to hide behind fences”, and caused what Trudolyubov calls 
“a subconscious attempt to barricade oneself in” (Trudolyubov 2018:27): construction of fences, 
installation of metal doors, and other visible demarcations of the desire to keep the society and 
the state out of people’s private lives.  
In line with this longing for privacy, post-socialist urbanites were not at all enthusiastic 
about most collective and public efforts, including local and neighbors’ organizations. Most of 
them retreated to the private spaces of their apartments, ignoring what was going on beyond their 
walls. Cooperation with neighbors to take care of the shared home did not become a habitual 
strategy, despite the new incentives in post-socialist legislation aimed at boosting residents’ 
responsibility for their apartment buildings.  
Taking care of the post-socialist home 
Except for market renters, all legal residents of “multi-apartment buildings” (MKD: 
mnogokvartirniy dom) have similar rights and tools to participate in the maintenance of their 
homes, as regulated by the Housing Code. There are three ways an apartment building can be 
governed and maintained, all of which require a degree of participation and collective action on 
the part of the residents. The least demanding is the delegation of all decisions and activities to a 
maintenance company (public or private), which requires the homeowners to assemble, create a 
house council and elect its president, and then officially vote for the selection of the maintenance 
 70 
company. Alternatively, they can vote to create a homeowners’ association (TSZh, 
tovarishchestvo sobstvennikov zhilya), a non-profit organization comprised of the homeowners in 
a building or several adjacent buildings who collect the maintenance fees and make decisions 
about all aspects of their building maintenance autonomously. The third form is direct 
management by homeowners. 11 
Even having the initial meeting to create a house council that would delegate all 
responsibilities to maintenance companies proved difficult for most Muscovites, not to mention 
the creation of homeowners’ associations, which requires more routine engagement with 
maintenance issues.  
In most apartment buildings in Moscow, maintenance is still performed by the heir of the 
Soviet housing maintenance system, “Zhlishchnik.”12 This is the direct descendant of the Soviet 
housing bureaus (zhilkontora) that were the only option in Soviet times. Many private firms 
compete with Zhlishchnik, but as of 2017 they served only about 30 percent of apartment 
buildings in Moscow, while public companies, different incarnations of Zhlishchnik (every 
district has its own Zhlishchnik) control about 70 percent. The dominance of Zhlishchnik can be 
mostly explained by the fact that they are the default choice, and if residents take no action, they 
are left with Zhlishchnik. Moreover, in some cases, when residents try to change companies, they 
meet with resistance from their current service provider. 
Most residents are focused on improving their apartments and pay little attention to the 
public areas of the building or the shared amenities and equipment. Even in buildings which look 
 
11 This form is currently only available to homeowners in smaller buildings. This form doesn’t require to 
create a formal house council, and the most active residents can make decisions by a majority of votes at 
personal meetings, without formalizing the council. This format was practically cancelled in the 2014 
amendments to the Code, which allowed only small apartment buildings, with less than 16 apartments, to 
self-govern without electing a formal representative council. 
12 “Zhilishnik” can be approximately translated as “someone responsible for housing.” 
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dilapidated on the outside, with crumbling roofs and walls, one can notice some new window 
frames: a sign that someone renovated their apartment not so long ago. The condition of the 
window frames is an indication of how much effort and money the residents have invested in the 
apartment: some windows still have the original wooden frames with flaked paint; in others, the 
window frames have been replaced. When strolling through the Renovation-affected residential 
blocks, I often entertained myself by counting the new steklopakety, double-glazed window 
units, in panel and block prefabricated buildings: there rarely was a building without at least a 
couple of apartments with such windows.  
Inside, many flats are renovated and designed with love, and a lot of investment, both 
financial and emotional. Ekaterina, a woman in her 30s, an owner of a cozy apartment on the 
fifth floor of a five-story, who took out a mortgage, bought and renovated her apartment only 
five years before we spoke, described her renovation process to me: 
I specifically chose a flat on the fifth floor, so that no neighbors walk on my head. I have 
a wonderful view; a big birch tree knocks it branches against my window. In the winter, it 
is covered with beautiful snow, just like now. And in the summer, it is green, and no one 
at all sees me. I live in my own world. I bought this apartment 5 years ago, we renovated 
it, with our own hands. We chose what to do, which materials to use. It is a hard fought 
(vystradannyi) renovation; it is very nice, it completely changed the appearance of this 
apartment. Everybody who comes in – no one believes that it is a khrushchevka. 
Although I hate it when people call our homes so. I did everything for myself, with love. 
Ekaterina pushed the reluctant Zhlishchnik to fix her roof to stop the leaking, a usual 
complaint of the residents of the top floors of old buildings. All such efforts, in most cases, fix 
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only individual apartments; the neighbors who share roofs, walls, and staircases, which also 
often need repair, rarely come together to address these issues. 
The unwillingness of residents to participate in building maintenance issues together 
became a problem when a new Housing Code was passed in 2005. It requires the residents’ 
collective voice, at least when choosing the way their home would be maintained. Without the 
creation of a house council, no contracts with maintenance companies can be made. This 
requirement created a problem for “dormant” buildings with no active residents willing to form 
house councils to deal with building maintenance issues. For the maintenance processes to 
continue and the maintenance companies to receive their fees, the decision and a contract by a 
council were necessary. In Moscow, as in many other cities, the public maintenance companies 
had to stimulate house council creation in the apartment buildings in their territories. At that 
time, formal house councils were created on paper, and presidents were elected just to sign 
papers authorizing Zhlishchnik to continue their maintenance work. During Renovation, many 
newly mobilized residents were surprised to find out that they had a house council of this kind.  
For example, Inna, owner of an apartment in a stalinka in Oreshino, only learned about 
the procedures of building management when she became an anti-Renovation activist. Having 
organized a homeowner assembly to ensure that votes were properly recorded and an official 
document about the neighbors’ decision existed (the protocol of the assembly), Inna browsed the 
website of the Moscow’s Housing department where all such protocols should be uploaded. She 
found only one protocol from her building, uploaded in 2007: a document stating that a 
homeowner assembly in her building took place and decided to select Zhlishchnik as their 
maintenance company. She had never heard about this decision or the assembly, but admitted 
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that this was due to the residents’ lack of participation, not the maintenance companies’ 
malevolence: 
People had no idea; they never encountered this before. Well, how was it before, how 
were the residents’ assemblies organized? For example, in 2007, when all the 
maintenance rights were transferred to Zhlishchnik which was created back then.  I see it 
for our buildings, my building and the one next to us. I saw these documents; it was the 
only protocol uploaded online. And there were no more assemblies […] But in this case 
they [Zhlishchnik] had to [have a document]. But it is often the case that even these 
protocols state that there was no quorum at the assembly. And there is no head of the 
house council nor an initiative group of the building to sign these protocols. So, the 
employees of the GUIS [District Engineering Service13] sign those documents. Simply 
because no one participates in these assemblies. 
Before Renovation, many residents of the five-stories (and other apartment buildings in 
Moscow) had no idea and did not really care about how their buildings were maintained, or who 
was responsible for it. They cared even less what was going on at the district level, or in Moscow 
as a whole. However, city-wide and neighborhood-level activism had been gradually developing, 
and some activist networks and organizations were in place when Renovation was announced. 
Taking care of the city: Urban activism before Renovation 
Local activism and grassroots mobilization have been part of politics in Russian cities for 
a long time; although in general politically frustrated and apathetic, Russian urbanites are more 
likely to participate in collective action about “close to home” urban issues than about more 
 
13 The “Engineering services” in each district are responsible for calculating the maintenance fees to be 
collected from the owners and residents of the district, and the conduct maintenance and control over the 
engineering equipment and infrastructures. 
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abstract and ideological causes (Semenov 2018). In Moscow, people have famously protested 
against the construction of a highway through Khimki forest in 2007-2012 (Clément, Miryasova, 
and Demidov 2010; Evans Jr 2012), the destruction of other green zones in the city, against in-
fill construction destroying public space in residential blocks (Ivanou 2016), and development 
destroying the historic buildings (Argenbright 2016). Most recently, a spectrum of housing 
issues, such as the quality of building maintenance, taxation for “capital repairs,” and the 
redevelopment of residential areas with the relocation of residents became the focus of 
Muscovites’ outrage and mobilization. 
An alternative source of increased attention to local issues was protest politics at the 
national level: the large mobilization against electoral fraud in 2011-12. It caused an influx of 
fresh faces into local politics and activism, including municipal level elections. Zhuravlev, 
Savelyeva and Erpyleva  (2014) have identified new activist groups that developed from the 
national-level political protests into local activist initiatives in several Moscow’s neighborhoods: 
researchers observed that activists began to monitor the activities of the municipal councils, 
produced leaflets and newspapers with important local information, and engaged directly with 
local projects (protesting the destruction of parks, road extensions, and other local issues). 
Municipal elections also became an arena for opposition activists in 2012: in several municipal 
districts, activists participated as candidates, and sometimes they won. In 2012, in three districts, 
the opposition and independent candidates received the majority of the votes (Gazeta.ru 2012). 
Local organizing had been gradually developing in Moscow in the period between the 
2012 and 2017 mobilizations, creating important foundations for the anti-Renovation activities 
that attracted new attention and new participants.  
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Social media had become a platform for neighborhood-level communication and activism 
long before Renovation was announced. Online communities existed for every Moscow 
neighborhood, on various platforms, and the number of such communities varied from 6 to 32 
per neighborhood  (Davydov and Logunova 2018). Some of these groups acted as platforms for 
local activist groups; others were dedicated to more mundane local news, events, and 
communication. 
There were offline efforts to bring people together to address housing and environment 
issues. For example, in 2014, Yuliya Galyamina, a professor from the Higher School of 
Economics, and Natalya Shavshukova founded an independent “School of local self-
governance.” The project held lectures and workshops for local activists to help them organize 
for local issues, but the primary goal was to prepare them as candidates for the municipal 
elections. Galyamina was elected as a municipal deputy in the Timiryazevskiy municipal district, 
and worked on the promotion of local self-governance across Moscow’s neighborhoods: apart 
from the School, she is an enthusiast of local print media, and is the founder and editor-in-chief 
of the independent newspaper Nash Sever (“Our North”) focusing on the Northern 
Administrative District of Moscow14. When Renovation was announced, Galyamina became an 
important activist in this issue: she started the “Headquarters of the Defense of Muscovites” 
(“Shtab Zashity Moskvichey”) and announced the “School of Defense of the Muscovites,” to 
address the problems created by Renovation. The Headquarters became a hub of information, 
legal support, and guidance for Muscovites who wanted to get their houses off the demolition 
lists. These efforts were important because they resulted in the creation of new arenas for people 
 
14 Independent municipal deputies were central to Moscow-wide resistance to Renovation: as 
Gorokhovskaia (2018) notes, they used their official status to apply for rally permits and demand 
amendments to the Renovation bill. 
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to exchange information, learn about the capital’s governance structures, and support new 
activists both emotionally and technically.  
Some interviewees with activist experience mentioned to me that they had some 
experience with “schools” for activists, including Galyamina’s organization; they had attended 
seminars and workshops organized for activists by various politicians and city-wide activist 
networks. Such efforts were taking place in many neighborhoods: local activists had organized to 
educate their neighbors about housing maintenance, their housing rights, Moscow’s governance 
structures, legislation. In many districts, people organized in the years preceding Renovation to 
fight off other urban development projects, often related highway construction and reduction of 
green space. 
The districts I studied differed in their access to these activist networks and their previous 
experiences of activism. When I asked Diana, a woman in her 50s who was proud that her five-
story mobilized against Renovation (and even became more active in building maintenance, 
starting an active house council after this experience) why her district fared relatively well in 
opting out from Renovation, she had several explanations, one of which was the districts history 
of resistance to previous urban development projects: 
I think Losevo was always a bit more energetic (passionarniy) than the surrounding 
districts in the Eastern okrug. When something happened about the greenery – everybody 
rose up. […] When they told us that they would [build a highway and cut us off from the 
park] everybody ran and signed something, to say that they don’t want it. […] Maybe, 
that’s what brings us somewhat together. I know that people go to make barbecues (na 
shashlyki) and discuss [all this]. Now the spring will come – they will go again. I 
wouldn’t say it’s a tightly knit (druzhniy) rayon, but we have many structures. We have 
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in our okrug [several well-known activists] living here. Also N, though she is formally 
not in our district [but near]. She founded the school of building maintenance. And 
people go there for several years now, they take notes. This is some kind of education in 
this sense. People watch, listen. Maybe, that’s why. 
 Local activism in Moscow is embedded in the higher-level field of national politics, and 
changes in either field can have consequences for the other. National upheavals and protest 
politics of 2011 gave a boost to local politics: new mobilized activists turned to local issues and 
municipal elections, developed new networks, and created arenas for citizen education and 
learning. In turn, these new players and arenas played their role in the Renovation controversy, 
supporting newly mobilized residents. 
Conclusion 
Mental geographies, a history of privatization, shifts in responsibility for housing 
maintenance, changes in the “tool kit” of techniques of acquiring a home, all influence the 
diverse housing strategies of contemporary Muscovites.  
Some still adhere to socialist-era ideas, such as the perception of the state as a provider of 
housing. This legacy affects both habitual and intentional housing strategies. In Moscow, 
housing policies replicated some of the socialist norms and relocations practices (maintained “the 
queue,” complied with the “norms per person,” and so on) for decades after the collapse of the 
socialist housing distribution system, and some Muscovites counted on these policies in their 
housing plans. Others did not explicitly plan to make use of these state-sponsored advantages but 
took it as a default condition that the government (loosely defined) should be responsible for 
housing maintenance and overall care for the living environment in the city. Even if people 
privatized their apartments, they did not necessarily change their habitual housing strategies and 
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relied on the usual forms of housing maintenance (the default maintenance companies, for 
example). 
Some Muscovites, however, took the post-privatization declarations of the value of 
homeownership and self-sufficiency seriously, and embraced the new instruments: mortgages, 
use of family assets, and other market tools. Despite the active engagement with the world that 
these steps required, homeownership did not necessarily come with more civic engagement; 
people pursued their goals individually, and not everyone saw any use in joining collective 
efforts to improve the conditions in their building or neighborhood, or participating in local 
elections and other political events.  
Gradually, local activism developed in Moscow, creating an alternative to the strategies 
above. New civic initiatives maintained the importance of the rights of homeowners and 
residents more generally, while demanding that government of all levels fulfill its duties. Some 
of these initiatives emerged from the national opposition movement, demonstrating how the 
urban political field is related to the higher-level political orders. Other initiatives grew from 
earlier grassroots protests against the destruction of urban green zones, construction projects, and 
other local issues. 
When Renovation was announced, it revealed and disrupted the habitual housing 
strategies, and intervened (or aligned) with the intentional strategies. In the next chapter, I 





Several decades have passed since Moscow was formally a socialist city. In these 
decades, two Mayors have significantly shaped on the city’s policies and landscape: Yuri 
Luzhkov and the “Renovation” Mayor Sergey Sobyanin. Both of them, though to a different 
extent, have worked to erase the “socialist” imprint from Moscow’s appearance. Researchers 
often use the term “neoliberal” to characterize the city’s development (Büdenbender and Zupan 
2017; Pavlovskaya 2013). Specifically, Moscow has reimagined itself as an internationally 
competitive city attractive for investment and business, where urban space and lifestyles are 
transformed to maximize commercial profit. 
However, the socialist legacy is difficult to remove from the city’s physical space: most 
of Moscow’s housing stock comes from different periods of socialist housing construction 
(1917-1991). Yuri Luzhkov’s administration (1992-2010) made the first attempts to get rid of the 
socialist apartment buildings of the poorest quality. Luhzkov’s programs framed what 
Muscovites expect from relocation programs, an element in their housing strategies. These 
relocations expressed the strange co-existence of socialist housing policy leftovers with the 
capitalist housing market. The Sobyanin’s administration tried to make it clear that these norms 
were in the past. The promotion of Renovation over other housing programs reveals the priorities 
of the new urban governance style. Instead of solving the problems of individual residents of the 
crumbling buildings, the city adopted an approach focusing on beautification and renewal of the 
urban environment as a whole. 
Two Mayors and their relocation projects 
As Moscow’s Mayor, Yuri Luzhkov defined Moscow’s life in the formative post-soviet 
years and even gave his name to an architectural style. The term “Luzhkov’s architecture” refers 
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to the eclectic buildings that mushroomed in Moscow in the 1990s and early 2000s, often 
adorned with small towers and motley decorative details. Luzhkov’s rule is also known for his 
lack of respect for the city’s historic heritage (Cecil 2011), and reckless redevelopment in the 
city center (Argenbright 2016). These construction practices were seen as evidence of Luzhkov’s 
corruption and desire to maximize profit from urban redevelopment which led to his removal 
from office in 2010 by special presidential order for “loss of trust.” 
Nevertheless, most ordinary Muscovites positively associated Luzhkov with the first 
relocation program that moved people out of the early khrushchevki into new dwellings and 
generously improved their housing conditions and living space. Luzhkov’s program is the reason 
for some Muscovites’ positive and hopeful response to Renovation.  
Luzhkov’s program was less ambitious than Renovation would be: it would demolish 
“only” 1,772 five-story panel buildings. The program had clear criteria: it only targeted buildings 
representing the “disposable” series, those classified by experts as very poor quality and not 
eligible for repairs (К-7, II-32, II-35, 1605-АМ, 1МГ-300). The program was launched in 1999, 
and in 2010, when Luzhkov was removed from office, it was still not complete. In 2008, the 
economic crisis slowed the pace of demolitions and relocations, leading to the program extension 
until 2012. Some of the condemned buildings were still standing even in 2017 when the even 
more ambitious Renovation project was announced by Luzhkov’s successor, Sergey Sobyanin.  
Initially, many people expected Renovation to follow the same relocation principles as 
Luzhkov’s program and anticipated the same benefits. And Luzhkov’s program had been 
generous, indeed. First, the program used the “socialist” norms of housing provision from the 
Soviet period to allocate space, taking into account the number of people registered in each 
apartment in old buildings, with the size (and number) of new apartments based on the norm of 
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space allocation per person, 18 m2. Moreover, if more than one nuclear family was registered in 
the flat, each was entitled to its own apartment in the new building.  
Rita, whose building was included in the demolitions lists in 2017 against her will, told 
me how great Luzhkov’s conditions were compared to Sobyanin’s Renovation, and how happy 
everyone she knew had been to move on these conditions: “They have very good accounts of 
[Luzhkov’s] program. For example, they had a small apartment, 43 square meters, and they got 
65 square meters. And the families, for example, two families in one flat, they got two 
apartments. (…) And they are all hunky-dory (v shokolade), they’re all happy, they only have 
good reviews, and they don’t understand us.” 
These “socialist” conditions were familiar, and the strategies allowing people to 
maximize their benefits from relocations were familiar, too. Some residents successfully 
manipulated their family size and composition: couples would get a divorce to get two 
apartments, multiple family members would be registered in the apartment without living there, 
and other tactics similar to the ways people used in Soviet times to get their desired housing (see 
Chapter 3). 
Second, relocated families received apartments in new buildings constructed for this 
purpose in the same block where their old building had been, in a system known as “wave-like” 
relocation. The first new building would be erected right next to the old one, on a playground or 
a green area. After the residents moved to the new building, the old one would be demolished, 
making space for the next new construction (without restoring the green areas). 
Finally, Luzhkov’s program included favorable conditions for the purchase of additional 
space in case relocated families wanted to receive larger apartments than they were entitled to. 
They could purchase additional square meters for a price significantly below market rates. 
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According to the information from the non-profit organization “Moscow Resettlers” 
(Moskovskiye Pereselency), in 2007, the price for every extra square meter for the resettled was 
25 thousand rubles (1000 dollars), compared to the market rate of 100 thousand per square meter 
(5000 dollars).  
Luzhkov’s relocations were lucrative, and even those Muscovites who ardently opposed 
Renovation in 2017 mentioned they would have accepted the old conditions of relocation gladly. 
For example, Nina, a 40-something resident of a residential block in Oreshino affected by 
Renovation, told me that she would’ve liked to be relocated under the old conditions, but quickly 
realized that the new program was very different: 
When it was Luzhkov’s program, maybe, it wouldn’t be a bad option. But when it 
became clear that there will be no khalyava, and it’s not clear at all how it all is going to 
turn out, we knew that we don’t need that. Absolutely. It’s my property, and I do with it 
what I please. […] I understood that Luzhkov relocated in fat years. It was a different 
story. He did that at the developers’ expense; they paid, really, those people, who bought 
apartments in the new buildings in the market, paid for the relocations. It was all included 
in the market price. It was ok with the condition of the real estate market back then. Now 
the times have changed. 
Nina uses the word khalyava (“freebie”): this popular Russian concept is used to describe 
easy achievements related to good luck or ingenuity. Khalyava is both a rational aim to minimize 
one’s costs of achieving the desirable and an emotional thrill from being fortunate 
(Tysyachniouk and Tulayeva 2012). Luzhkov’s program was a great environment for khalyava 
lovers (lyubiteli khalyavy): they could apply their ingenuity to maximize their housing benefits, 
outsmart the system, and feel good about it.  
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Luzhkov’s successor, Sergei Sobaynin, had a difficult relationship with relocations from 
the beginning. Before he decided to move forward with Renovation, he had to deal with the 
residents of buildings included in Luzhkov’s project but still not relocated when Sobyanin took 
office. The residents of the remaining buildings immediately felt the new Mayor’s different 
approach; new legislation was passed to change the conditions of the relocations. One housing 
advocate and lawyer described this shift to me: 
What were the rules with Yuriy Mikhailovitch [Luzhkov]? Social renters, people on the 
queue (ocheredniki), homeowners – everybody received at least 18 meters per person 
when relocated. Homeowners, all people who had two and more apartments, they moved 
into this new housing. Communal apartments were relocated, and so on. Yes, there was 
some scheming on the side of the relocated. They got divorced [so that each partner got 
one apartment], or they split apartments to turn them into communal flats. The legislation 
was changing. And this new legislation aimed at limiting this abuse of rights. And in 
2011, everything changed radically: no matter who you are, ocheredniki or not, 
homeowners or not, you get exactly the square space you had. 
From the very start of his tenure as Mayor, Sobyanin aimed at reducing the size of the 
floor area people could receive in the new buildings to reflect exactly what they had in the old 
ones. His amendments to Luzhkov’s program also entailed relocating people to different 
districts, and not within their residential block, as was the rule before. It sparked protests, people 
refused to move out of their apartments, sometimes staying there with electricity already cut off, 
and the courts “were overwhelmed with lawsuits,” as the housing advocate told me. After long 
litigation and negotiation, the Mayor’s Office agreed to continue relocating the residents in 
buildings from Luzhkov’s program under the old conditions, and the project could continue. 
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However, the program was still not completed when Renovation was announced in 2017. 
The inhabitants of dozens of those buildings planned for demolition by the previous program are 
one group of Muscovites who experienced the Renovation as an injustice. For example, Sara, a 
woman from Sokolovo, wrote many bitter comments on the anti-Renovation social media 
platforms. When I asked her if she were willing to talk to me about the program, she replied with 
a sad message: 
My building does not belong to the Renovation program. Our five-story is a disposable 
series 1605-АМ. As per schedule, my building was supposed to be demolished in 2017. 
But for unknown reasons, the demolition and relocation of our building have been 
postponed. The residents of our building are very disappointed. I can’t tell you anything 
about Renovation, only that there is the opinion that we have been abandoned because 
they switched to the new Renovation program. And our first program was not completed, 
and they forgot about us. And our buildings are indeed really bad; they were constructed 
only for a 20-year period. And they are already standing for 60 years. We are, of course, 
really upset (obidelis’) with Sobyanin. 
Sobyanin’s approach to relocations made it clear: it is not the city’s intention to use the 
“socialist” relocation standards anymore. No more norms of space per person, multiple 
apartments for separate families living together, and other housing improvement ideas from the 
past.  
The key difference between Luzhkov’s program and Renovation was that the latter 
offered fewer free improvements and involved more risks and insecurities (such as the time of 
the relocation and the exact place where the new building would be). Some people still saw some 
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khalyava in Renovation’s promise, others did not. For the opponents, many of whom would be 
happy to accept the old program’s conditions, there was little incentive to give up what they had.  
Moscow’s beautification  
Having inherited Luzhkov’s program, Mayor Sobyanin and his team started exploring the 
possibilities for a project of their own as early as 2011(Golunov 2017; Sardzhveladze, Galimova, 
and Pastushin 2018). The Mayor first used the word “renovation” regarding the five-story 
buildings in Moscow in a conversation with a journalist Sergey Minayev in August  2016 
(#VKLIVE 2016). Despite evidence of such early preparations, the Mayor and his team 
presented the program as a response to public demand. On February 7-21, 2017, a campaign of 
public demand and approval evolved in several arenas: the municipal councils, the Moscow City 
Council, and the Public Chamber of Moscow. The program was rapidly announced and approved 
in 2 weeks: between February 7 and 21, the machinery of decorative public approval was put 
into action, and the deal was sealed at the Mayor’s meeting with the President, Vladimir Putin, 
on February 21, 2017 (President Rossii 2017).  Although authorities used the word “renovation,” 
the intention was to demolish a large number of old buildings; they did not specify where tenants 
would be relocated. 
Nonetheless, the campaign insisted that the people of Moscow were demanding 
demolitions. On February 7, 2017, the Mayor participated in the assembly of the representatives 
of all municipal districts of Moscow. Two delegates raised the issue of the five-story housing of 
the “early industrial housing construction era” and asked whether it would be possible to 
demolish them (Council of the Municipalities 2017). In response to these requests from the 
municipal deputies, the members of the Public Chamber of the City of Moscow prepared their 
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recommendations for the city government. 15 At a meeting of the Public Chamber’s Commission 
on Housing Services and Utilities on February 16, some “concerned residents” were also present 
and repeated the pleas of the municipal deputies almost verbatim. The Commission decided to 
recommend demolitions instead of repairs (Interfax 2017). 
The Moscow City Council joined the wave of “recommendations” to the Mayor to 
demolish the “deteriorating” five-stories, on February 13, at the joint session of the Council’s 
Commission on City Services and Housing Policy and the Commission on Urban Planning, State 
Property, and Land Use. The head of the Commission, Stepan Orlov, stated that capital repairs in 
the five-story houses were “not efficient enough” and “there is no other way out but to demolish 
them” (Moscow City Council 2017). Eventually, the main official representative bodies of the 
city – the legislature, the municipal deputies, and “civil society” in the form of the Public 
Chamber – pleaded for demolitions, framing the need in the same way: the capital repairs in 
“some buildings” were futile, it would be better to build new housing.  
While the demands for demolitions were pouring in, the Moscow government seemed 
reluctant to take on this task, emphasizing its huge size. A key concern kept coming up in 
speeches by the Mayor and his aides: the existing legislation gave the homeowners too much 
power to block relocations. For example, when the question first came up at the assembly of the 
municipal districts on February 7, the Mayor redirected the question to Marat Khusnullin, 
Deputy Mayor for Urban Development and Construction, who explained that the project would 
 
15 The Public Chamber is a form of institutionalization of civil society representation: there are national 
and regional Public Chambers. These deliberative, consultative bodies are supposed to be the institutions 
allowing for public control of the governmental activities, and for “participation of the most prepared 
citizens in the governance of the state”  (Chebotarev 2015). These “most prepared” citizens are appointed 
to the Public Chambers on the recommendation of the state and regional governments (Lobanov 2015), 
and some researchers have criticized this institution as a “fictitious” arena of civil society participation in 
state affairs (Tarasenko 2010). 
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be impossible under current conditions: there was no land for new construction, and the residents 
don’t want to leave – 20 percent of the program “goes to court” (amommosru 2017). This way, 
they tried to prepare and legitimize changes in legislation that would ease the relocation, limiting 
the opportunities for individual residents to challenge it.  
During the wave of “recommendations” to demolish the socialist five-story housing, 
another idea kept coming up: that it was good for the city as a whole, not only for the individual 
residents of the allegedly crumbling buildings. For example, at one session of the Public 
Chamber, the President of the Foundation “Urban Economics Institute” Nadezhda Kosareva 
framed the need for the program in a broader context than just capital repairs and problems of the 
individual buildings: 
We have to view the problem of five-stories in a broader context. The possibility of 
Renovation will help improve the urban space, will increase housing construction and 
housing affordability. Today the housing construction is mostly done in the periphery. 
Moscow is surrounded by a stockade of high-rise houses, and this urban structure doesn’t 
have a transportation solution, it is irrational from the urban planning point of view 
(Moscow Public Chamber 2017). 
She used the argument of the greater good of improving housing affordability in the 
capital to validate the need to get rid of the socialist housing legacy. The low-rise residential 
blocks took too much of Moscow’s valuable land; taller buildings would house more people and 
maximize the profit from every square meter of land. Mayor Sobyanin also emphasized that 
Renovation was supposed to start the systemic improvement of Moscow: “The tasks that this 
program must complete in the first place, this is, of course, providing those citizens who live in 
dilapidated buildings with solid housing, creation of a new high-quality urban environment, 
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solving the transportation issues, environmental issues, overall improvement [blagoustroystvo]” 
(Mos.ru 2017). Sobyanin’s orientation to urban “improvement” is a notable feature of his 
governance style. Before Renovation, his urban policies were mostly oriented toward affluent 
people and the city center, “focused mostly on developing the infrastructure in the city center to 
make sure that this functions as a showcase of the Mayor's efficacy and helps to win the hearts of 
the electorate”  (Trubina 2020:2). Renovation extended his “improvement” to residential areas of 
the middle and the lower-middle classes, but it maintained the overall rhetoric of “improving” 
and beatifying the city as a whole. 
Prioritizing the “public good” for the whole city over the individual rights of residents 
became central to the discourse of the authorities. The ideas of the public good intertwined with 
aesthetic arguments, similar to what Ghertner described in his analysis of Delhi officials aspiring 
for the “world city” image (Ghertner 2015); Ren (2011) also analyzed the role of aesthetics in 
producing a global city in China. The “ugly” and outdated socialist residential blocks did not fit 
the image of the grand metropolis that Sobyanin’s administration strived for. The city 
administration and the media it controlled reproduced pictures of dilapidated housing not fit for 
humans, seeking the worst examples to perpetuate an image of the five-stories as hopeless; they 
also tried to mobilize negative feelings about these areas in general, depicting them as dangerous, 
esthetically disgusting, and a waste of space. 
The officials not only blamed the socialist legacy for looking bad, they also 
misrepresented it as a cause of social problems. For example, Sergey Kuznetsov, Moscow’s 
Chief Architect, blamed the spatial form and architecture of the socialist housing areas for 
creating social disorder and messing up Moscow’s well-being statistics: he hoped to “fix the 
city’s health and the social situation” by razing the old areas and building new ones on top of 
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them (Ruzmanova 2017a). Apart from “fixing” the social situation, Renovation would allow the 
city to reclaim the land under the long and low five-stories for redevelopment and profit. 
Representatives of the Mayor’s office promoted false information on crime levels in five-
story areas, misrepresenting them as epicenters of crime and deviance, and even labeling their 
residents as people “of low social status.” 16  Investigators of the RBK media group cite an 
anonymous official: “If there are 300 flats in the building, and in 200 of them there are residents 
with low social status, they suppress everyone else. And if there are 3,000 inhabitants in a 
building, and 200 are of lower social status, they start acting somewhat differently” 
(Sardzhveladze et al. 2018). 
While the gains from the program for individual residents were lower than in the previous 
relocation programs, authorities stressed the public gains instead of the individual ones. Their 
mobilization of fear and disgust toward the socialist residential blocks was a justification for the 
“urban revanchism, neoliberal redevelopment, and gentrification” that are supposed to “reclaim” 
the city “from the grips of disorder and perceptions of fear” (England and Simon 2010:204). 
These discourses aimed at convincing Muscovites to accept the bulldozing of whole 
neighborhoods. In this program, the authorities could not play on khalyava-related feelings and 
calculations: they could not offer a substantial improvement in housing quality for individuals or 
families like the previous relocation program did. Renovation was supposed to update Moscow’s 
housing stock in general, not the living conditions of individuals. Deputy Mayor Anastasia 
Rakova made this clear at a meeting with the heads of local district administrations, upravas, in 
April 2017, where officials gathered to discuss strategies of dealing with the brewing 
Renovation-related discontent. According to the notes leaked to the press, Rakova explained to 
 
16 “Meduza” news portal factchecked and found no evidence of it (Zelenskiy 2018) 
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the heads of upravas that, “[t]his is not a housing quality improvement program; this is a 
program of reducing dilapidated housing stock. Housing quality improvement is only for 
ocheredniki, no matter if ten families live in the flat, or people sick with tuberculosis.17 
Otherwise the whole program will flop” (Vinokurova 2017). 
To enable Renovation, the Moscow government amended its budget to allocate funds for 
the program’s preparation and implementation.18 Shifting the priorities of the budget allocation 
meant shifting the priorities of urban governance; instead of solving the problems of individual 
residents of the crumbling buildings, the city adopted an approach prioritizing beautification and 
renewal of the urban environment.  
Some official bodies noted and criticized this shift; for example, the President’s Council 
on Human Rights published a statement denouncing the plan of Renovation and the bill in June 
2017. The Council described the plan as “socially irresponsible”: 
The main objection of the Council to the bill on Renovation of Moscow housing is its 
apparent social irresponsibility (“socialnaya bezotvetstvennost’”), which entails using the 
budget funds for Renovation, improvement of territories and overall renewal of the 
inhabited environment of the citizens in a situation when there are long-standing 
unfulfilled social responsibilities of the city of Moscow to ocheredniki and residents of 
uninhabitable buildings (Sovet po Pravam Cheloveka 2017). 
The main concern expressed in the Council’s statement is the replacement of social 
programs with a beautification approach. It emphasizes that the city would spend its budget 
funds for an unnecessary program, sidestepping the interests of those in urgent need of housing 
 
17 The old housing norms entitled people with tuberculosis to separate flats. 
18 In late April 2017, the Mayor amended the city budget for 2018-19 to include 96 billion rubles (almost 
1.5 billion US dollars) for the needs of Renovation; in November of the same year, the city budget 
allocated 400 billion (over 6 billion US dollars) until 2020 for the program. 
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improvement: people from the previous relocation program still residing in objectively worse-off 
buildings than many of those considered for inclusion in the new program, and ocheredniki, 
people officially registered with the city as needing better housing.19 
There were other concerns about the program: on April 3, 2017, over 30 municipal 
deputies signed and sent an open letter to the authors of the Renovation bill in which they 
included a detailed analysis of the bill and a request to withdraw it. The deputies claimed that the 
conditions of relocations outlined in the proposal contradicted the constitutional rights of 
homeowners and other norms of the Constitution (Municipal Deputies 2017). The election of 
these independent municipal deputies was the gain made in 2014 when the people who mobilized 
on the wave of anti-Kremlin protests joined forces with the local activist communities to put 
independent members on some of the United Russia-controlled municipal councils. When 
Renovation was announced, these deputies actively engaged with the controversy on behalf of 
the residents of the affected districts. 
Despite the objections, the city government moved forward with the new legislation that 
would make the grand project possible. 
Temporality of Renovation  
The first months of Renovation were emotional for everyone: for residents of the eligible 
buildings, for residents of the buildings nearby worrying about the transformation of their living 
environment, and for local officials, who had to communicate unclear plans to the “population” 
of their districts without having a good idea about these plans themselves. Most of the players 
were put in a very uncertain and insecure position of waiting: for the clarification of plans, for 
the legal guarantees, for the list of buildings recommended for demolition. The state, in this case 
 
19 “Vetkhie” (dilapidated) or “avariynye” (at risk) buildings are designations for housing stock based on 
their physical condition estimated by engineers. 
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in its Moscow city administration incarnation, performed an act of temporal violence on its 
subjects (Auyero 2014), making them, on the one hand, to wait and feel powerless, and, on the 
other hand, rushing through the poorly prepared project. 
The experience and perception of time are connected to power and agency. In Chapter 2, 
I noted that human action has a strong temporal dimension. Social movement scholars suggest 
that uncertainty can have stimulating effects, pushing people to continue (inter)acting: in 
“Dynamics of Contention,” the authors see uncertainty as the driving force of contention, and as 
an opening for innovation (Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam 2001). Uncertainty and unpredictability 
can have “creative potential; it can be a premium drive for action in a condition of urbanity” 
(Boudreau et al. 2009:339). In Chapter 6, I will demonstrate that the temporal uncertainty does 
not only suppress and disempower: players can use it as openings and spaces for their agency.  
Scholars have also argued that temporality itself is shaped by social inequalities and can 
become a tool in strategic interactions. Javier Auyero has shown that uncertainty and waiting are 
unequally distributed in society and generally correspond with power hierarchies: “Waiting is 
stratified, and there are variations in waiting time that are socially patterned and that respond to 
power differentials. The unequal distribution of waiting time tends to correspond with that 
power” (Auyero 2014:241). Auyero interprets “adjourning, deferring, delaying, raising false 
hopes, or conversely, rushing, taking by surprise” (Bourdieu 2000:237 cited in Auyero 2014) as 
the exercise of power over other people’s time.  
Uncertainty can have dampening and disempowering effects: “Both waiting and politics 
are lived as profoundly disempowering processes. These two lived experiences tend to reinforce 
each other, generating the shared perception that the motor of the initiative of transformative 
action lies elsewhere” (Auyero 2014:242). Meddling with people’s ability to make use of their 
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past experiences, imagine plausible futures, and adjust their actions according to the challenges 
of the present situation is a mechanism that disrupts or blocks human agency.  
The announcement of Renovation is an example of temporal violence by the 
powerholders. The mounting of the program took only six months, from the first signs in early 
February, when the campaign imitating public demand for demolitions took place, until August 
1, when the program was officially signed into law with a list of included buildings (see Figure 5 
for a timeline of the events). During this period, mobilizations against and in favor of the project 
took place; Muscovites agitated, rallied, voted, and held homeowners’ assemblies against the 
background of the constantly changing legislation and rules of the program. This put many 
people off-balance, forced to wait and rushed at the same time. 
The legislation necessary for Renovation was introduced to the State Duma on March 10, 
2017, only a couple weeks after Renovation was approved at the meeting of the President and the 
Mayor (Zakonoproyekt 120505-7 2017). The bill entailed significant changes to the Russian 
Federal Law “On the status of the capital of the Russian Federation” and several other statutes. It 
had three readings in the State Duma (April 20, June 9, and June 14), where it was modified, but 
eventually approved with only two deputies voting against it, 399 in favor, and one abstention. 
The Federal Council approved the bill on June 28 (147 in favor and four abstentions). The 
President signed it into law on July 1, 2017. The amendments to the Federal Law “On the status 
of the capital of the Russian Federation” defined Renovation as a  
“collection of actions undertaken in compliance with the program of renovation of the 
housing stock in the city of Moscow, directed at the renewal of the living environment 
[sredy zhiznedeyatel’nosti] and creation of favorable living conditions for the citizens, 
[and] of public space with a goal of preventing the growth of [the amount of] the 
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dilapidated housing stock in the city of Moscow, [and of] enduring the development of 
the residential territories and their improvement [blagoustroystva]. The Renovation 
program established the order of demolition of the apartment buildings included in the 
Renovation program. The order of demolition of the above-mentioned apartment 
buildings is determined with consideration of their technical condition” (141-FZ 2017). 
 The promised “order of demolitions,” a timetable of relocations for each included 
building, was not established by any of the mentioned statutes, and it has not been published at 
the moment of writing of this thesis in late 2020.   
 
Figure 5. Timeline of the events in February – August 2017. 
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Unlike previous relocations, this project allowed residents of each eligible building to 
vote whether they wanted it included in the program. The procedure was regulated by the special 
Moscow government’s decree “On taking into account the views of the population on the project 
of renovation of the housing stock in the city of Moscow” (245-PP 2017) published on May 2, 
2017. Along with voting, this decree stated that homeowners could hold a homeowner assembly 
on the issue, and the assembly’s decisions had priority over the voting outcomes. The voting 
process was not regulated by any legislation aside from this decree of Moscow’s government. 20 
The Mayor’s Office was very proud of this process and kept emphasizing its 
unprecedented “democracy.” The voting could take place online, on the digital platform “Active 
Citizen,” or offline in the governmental one-window service centers which exist in every 
Moscow district and assist citizens in getting official paperwork done (applying for passports, 
permissions, register property, etc.). If two-thirds of the building’s residents agreed to move out, 
the building would be included in the demolition lists, and when the time came, everyone in the 
building would be required to comply with the same rules and conditions of relocation. This 
measure also helped the administration to shift any possible blame from itself to the opposing 
residents of the eligible buildings, who were now pitted against each other.  
The uncertainty and powerlessness of residents of the affected buildings were 
exacerbated by the fact that they were invited to decide and vote “yes” or “no” on the inclusion 
of their buildings in the program between May 15 and June 15, 2017, before the legislation was 
finalized and passed. While the invitation to vote may seem democratic, Muscovites had to make 
 
20 In all the official documents, bylaws, and speeches, “voting” is classified as “the procedure of 
accounting for public opinion” (“procedura ucheta mneniya naseleniya”). This process was supposed to 
help the city administration finalize the demolition lists, in case there were any mistakes in compiling the 
list of condemned buildings (Mayor of Moscow Official Website 2017).  
 96 
their decision before the rules of relocations were finalized; they could not be entirely certain 
what they were approving or rejecting with their vote. 
To compensate for the uncertainty and pacify the outraged Muscovites, the Mayor 
quickly pushed through the Moscow City Council a list of “guarantees” to the potential 
participants of the relocation program. It promised that the number of rooms in the new flat 
could not be less than in the old one, and, importantly, that the residents could hold a homeowner 
assembly and demand exclusion from the program at any stage. This happened three days after 
the “voting” process began. The authorities rushed to clarify the program and make promises 
because they felt pressured by Muscovites’ outrage and confusion, a response they had not 
expected (Filipov 2017). 
While for many Muscovites the Mayor’s assurance was enough, others were still 
concerned that they had to sign up for the program without knowing its rules. Irina from 
Oreshino, who voted in favor of Renovation to escape from a communal apartment and, as she 
told me, had nothing to lose, admitted that the rules of the program were uncertain when people 
were required to make a decision. She understood why her better-off neighbors were worried:  
There was no law at the time. When the lists were published, and the voting was already 
open. People began to rage: the law is not yet passed, what would we be voting for? 
Without knowing our rights. I sign it now – and then they kick me out. People did not 
know how [the apartments] would be estimated: price-equivalent, use-equivalent, all that. 
There was no clarity about compensations because, in the first version, there was no 
provision of compensations. 
In addition to confusion about the conditions of relocation, the Moscow government 
fiddled with the procedures allowing residents of the eligible buildings to petition for either the 
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inclusion or the exclusion of their building. Alongside the “voting” process, residents were 
allowed to hold homeowners’ assemblies  to petition for inclusion (in case their building did not 
get on the lists published on May 2), or they could hold an assembly to confirm their decision to 
opt-out, to make it “more legal.” Moreover, the results of a homeowner assembly had priority 
over the voting: unlike the vote, homeowners’ assemblies  are regulated by the Housing Code, 
and their decisions are legally binding. The results of the assemblies and voting were also 
calculated differently, which may have caused slightly different results. At the assemblies, the 
weight of each homeowner’s voice depends on the size of her property. Not so in the voting 
procedure, in which every vote had the same weight. This created a confusing and stressful 
situation, where the temporal power of the state became especially pronounced. 
Given that the decisions of the assemblies had priority, some supporters of Renovation 
tried to use it to overturn the results of the “voting.” The city made it easier for them to do this: 
after the voting was over, the city government extended the period for the homeowners’ 
assemblies  for an additional month, using its power to regulate time for everyone else affected 
by the program by shifting important deadlines. They first allowed residents to hold 
homeowners’ assemblies  in the same timeframe as the “voting” (May 15 – June 15), then they 
extended it for an additional month (until July 15), but with a clause that if the law is signed 
before this deadline, the assemblies petitioning for inclusion could not take place anymore. The 
law was signed and went into effect on July 1, voiding all the assemblies planned for after this 
date. I have no reliable data on how many assemblies were prevented. Reports on social media 
and the litigation challenging such assemblies suggest that dozens of such assemblies had been 
planned. 
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Alla, an active opponent of Renovation from Sokolovo, described the situation in her 
building, where the residents successfully voted out of the program, but then some supporters of 
Renovation decided to take their chance with a homeowner assembly: 
And the bill was changing constantly, like every week. (…) They [the supporters of 
Renovation] decided to hold a homeowner assembly. And I told every resident – we 
won’t recognize it. They decided to have it on July 13. And we were lucky: they [the city 
government] extended the period for these assemblies until July 15, but the bill was 
signed on July 1. And it was clearly stated there: the period for assemblies is extended for 
a month, but only until the law goes into effect. It meant that after July 1 they could not 
have this assembly! And I understand why they included this clause: they did not want 
really bad buildings, like barracks, to make it on time. It was all done for this reason. And 
there you go – no one knew! They [the supporters of Renovation] planned everything 
correctly. But no one knew that this law was signed already, and that was it! 
Some people, like Alla above, celebrated this temporal insecurity, feeling lucky that their 
mobilized adversaries lost their chance to challenge the results of the online vote in a new arena. 
Those who were less lucky and could not go through with the homeowners’ assemblies  were 
exhausted, like Zhanna from Oreshino, who tried but failed to organize an assembly to petition 
against inclusion. She felt lost and delayed in the face of the constantly changing rules: 
They confused us, confused us, confused us. And as a result, many of our elderly people 
got sick. I got sick, too. I feel that until today because all my chronic illnesses intensified. 
And I’m young, I’m in my 40s, and those grannies in their 60s and 70s, many of them 
can’t even leave the apartment anymore! 
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 Zhanna and her neighbors experienced the effects of the temporal violence 
psychologically and bodily, as it affected her health. They were victimized by the changing rules 
and shifting deadlines, like many other Muscovites. But Muscovites could also use the 
unpredictability, the periods of waiting, and feelings of being rushed to their advantage, as I will 
demonstrate in Chapter 6. Temporality is not necessarily a tool of oppression working 
exclusively to the advantage of the powerholders. 
Conclusion 
Renovation was not the first program in Moscow to relocate people from substandard 
housing, nor the first to target the socialist five-story buildings. Although the program’s 
architects made it clear that their project did not follow the “socialist” norms of relocation as the 
previous projects had, some Muscovites still interpreted the program as a familiar situation and 
counted on the same benefits. Many Muscovites in eligible buildings understood that this 
program was different, but they were ready to sign up for it because it aligned with their habitual 
housing strategy. This housing strategy made them interpret the involvement of the government 
in citizens’ housing affairs as appropriate and even desirable. The government also saw this 
situation as appropriate: the government should be beneficent to its subjects, although with 
Renovation it abandoned the socialist-era orientation toward significant improvements of 
housing conditions for individual families.  
Renovation appalled those Muscovites who felt it contradicted their habitual and, in some 
cases, intentional housing strategies, which did not rely on the government involvement. Some of 
these people mobilized to protect their right to stay put. Apart from being exhausting, the process 
of voting, organizing homeowners’ assemblies  and agitating had important consequences for the 
social and political life of the city. The new program reframed relations between residents of the 
Renovation-eligible buildings and the city government, and among each other. Instead of having 
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to negotiate with each resident individually, the city administration pitted neighbors against one 
another by inviting them to “collectively” decide the fate of their buildings. This move created 
two collectivities that did not exist before and drew a new social dividing line between the 
“zasnosy,” or “zasnosniki,” supporters of demolitions, and “antisnosniki,” or “protivosnosy,” 
opponents of demolitions21. These cleavages were created by the new legislation that the 
Moscow administration pushed through to make relocations easier. In the next chapter, I analyze 
the emergence of players and their pathways to protesting or accepting Renovation. 
  
 
21 “Zasnosy” (or “zasnosniki”) is a composite of two words “za” (“in favor”) and “snos” (“demolition”). 




The emergence of players 
Before the announcement of Renovation, many neighbors had no relationships with each 
other, they were random people living in prefabricated buildings and apartments with a similar 
layout. Their apartments differed in the resources and effort they had put into renovating and 
upgrading them, but these differences were mostly invisible to neighbors who never visited each 
other’s apartments. The prospect of relocations and the need to arrive at a common decision 
regarding each apartment building’s fate changed the status quo: gradually, Muscovites turned 
into “zasnosy” and “antisnosniki,” two camps that engaged in often bitter and aggressive 
interactions with each other. The new collective players and identities became part of Moscow’s 
public discourse, stirring the sensitivities and idiosyncrasies of the city’s social and political life.  
The announcement of Renovation motivated Muscovites to revisit their housing 
strategies. To take a position on this issue, some people needed to articulate their habitual 
strategies. They needed to decide whether the promises of the policy aligned or contradicted their 
plans, and whether the program resonated with their ideas about the role of the government and 
the citizens in housing issues.  
Becoming zasnosy and antisnosniki 
Numerous studies of public opinion, both public and private, were performed after the 
announcement of Renovation for the developers and the city administration. All publicly 
available studies showed overwhelming support for Renovation. The professional community 
expressed concerns about the quality and political biases of some of these studies (Kasimova and 
Polikashina 2018), but different studies conducted between March and June 2017 showed 
support for the program between 60 and 80 percent of the respondents. Not surprisingly, the 
state-owned and -controlled All-Russian Center for the Study of Public Opinion (WCIOM) 
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showed 80 percent, the highest level of support for the program among Muscovites (WCIOM 
2017), while the polling department of the Anti-Corruption Foundation, the organization of the 
opposition politician Alexey Navalny, measured support at 60 percent. Announcing his survey 
results in June 2017, Navalny added: “we publish it [the study report] as it is, this is honest 
sociology, although it would make the Mayor’s Office happy, rather than the protesters” 
(Navalny 2017).22 All pollsters, including the independent Levada Center (Levada Center 2017), 
found that, on average, 10 percent of the respondents in the affected buildings did not care or did 
not know much about the program.  
The question of who supported and who opposed Renovation became central both to the 
public discussion of the program and to academic accounts (Smyth, McCann, and Hitchcock 
forthcoming). I find that social, demographic and political explanations don’t always work to 
explain people’s responses to Renovation; instead, I find that people’s housing strategies and 
other strategic choices, along with the interactions during the controversy and the impact of 
activists matter more. But these popular hypotheses are still worth exploring because they 
offered a foundation for the zasnosy vs. antisnosniki divide that Renovation created. 
When the list of would-be demolished buildings was published, many Muscovites 
reached out to their neighbors but were shocked to find that not everyone shared their point of 
view on the project. Those who liked their cozy homes in low-rise buildings and green 
neighborhoods were stunned that other people in their buildings looked forward to trading these 
homes for ugly high-rises; those who were happy to move into contemporary homes instead of 
outdated buildings in constant need of repairs were surprised that some of their neighbors 
 
22 This level of support for the program made Renovation a tricky topic for opposition politicians: they 
had to navigate it carefully with their supporters, something that would later come up in the municipal 
elections of September 2017. 
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renounced the chance for a free upgrade. Everybody needed an explanation for this split and 
looked for it in the social background of the supporters and opponents. 
Not only public opinion polls, but also all my interviewees performed “sociological” 
work to explain why people either celebrated or feared the prospect of relocations. Sometimes, 
people would explicitly “break it down” for me into economic, demographic, and political 
categories of people. Both the polls and my interviewees had similar hypotheses in mind.  
The two main hypotheses that circulated in popular opinion and public polls are tested in 
the Levada poll (Levada Center 2017). The first was that poorer people, unhappy with their 
housing conditions but for some reason (lack of resources or wrong attitude) incapable of 
renovating their own apartments, supported Renovation, while better-off people who had already 
invested a lot in their homes, were against it. The second explanation was political: those 
supportive of the regime and the Mayor’s policies trusted the promises of the program, while 
critics of the regime did not. 
Poor (or “marginal”) people in dilapidated apartments often became a character to blame 
when opponents of Renovation crafted explanations and narratives. To test the “well-being” 
hypothesis, the Levada poll measured the “consumer status” of their respondents and compared 
the buildings included in Renovation with people from nearby, newer buildings that were not 
eligible (Figure 6). The residents of the “newer” buildings seem to report more economic 
stability than the inhabitants of the buildings affected by Renovation.  
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Figure 6. “Consumer status” of the inhabitants of Renovation areas. Levada Center, June 2017. N 
= 1000. (Levada Center 2017) 
Levada does not provide information on support for the program among these “consumer 
status” groups, but shows that the residents of the five-stories included in the program generally 
estimate the quality of their housing as lower than the residents of the nearby (newer) buildings 
(36 percent said their housing was in “good” condition compared to 60 percent in the nearby 
buildings). Predictably, people who reported having lower incomes also estimated the quality of 
repairs in their own apartments lower; the estimation of housing quality correlated with the 
voting on the program. The question is, however, what came first: the estimation of one’s 
housing as poor, or the prospect of participating in the program? The Levada poll was conducted 
in June, after months of heated discussions about the quality of housing in five-stories, which 
made some people change their minds about the state of their housing. 
Another hypothesis about why people supported or opposed Renovation was their 
political affiliation: Levada found that opponents of Renovation are more likely to support 
opposition candidates in elections. Fewer of them, 55 percent among opponents versus 71 
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Opponents are also more likely to have supported the opposition parties in the State Duma 
elections in 2016: 38 percent of them voted for United Russia (47 percent of the supporters did), 
and 18 percent voted for the Communist party (versus only 7 percent among the supporters). The 
publication only provides descriptive charts and lacks information on the statistical significance 
of its findings, so it is difficult to estimate the validity of this claim.  
The polls also asked why people supported or opposed the program. Figure 7 
demonstrates the results from the WCIOM study: while this is a highly controversial poll, it is 
interesting to compare the detailed list of reasons to support Renovation versus the brief list of 
reasons to oppose it (this may, indeed, be a confirmation of the partisan character of the poll). 
WCIOM asked open-ended questions about reasons to support or oppose the program. The top 
reason (named by 23 percent of supporters) was that the buildings were “built a long time ago” 
(davno postroyeny). The language of these responses echoes official speeches advocating for 
demolitions. Still, it is difficult to establish what came first: the government’s framing of five-
stories as a problem, or the residents’ desire to join the relocation program.    
Among the reasons for opposing the program, “I like my home” was at the top. 18 
percent of the surveyed opponents rented their apartments from the owners – and had no right to 
participate in the decisions made about their homes. These market renters would lose everything 
if the relocation took place: they would not be relocated. They were mostly excluded from the 
discussions and decision-making processes at the building level, and some of my respondents 
even mentioned the high numbers of renters in some buildings as a complication for their 
campaign. Even if these renters were not indifferent, they could not do anything, and everything 




Figure 7. WCIOM poll, March 23-30, 2017. N=600 (WCIOM 2017). 
These responses reveal nothing about the decision-making process behind “against” or 
“in favor” positions, or about the pathways that led to these decisions for different people. All 
my respondents went through a bumpy process – both before, in their housing biographies, and 
after the announcement of Renovation – that led to the “yes” or “no” outcome. It is also 
important to remember that these polls were conducted in a situation of an open conflict between 
opponents and supporters which evolved in many of the building at the time; the constantly 
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changing rules and conditions of the program described earlier also contributed to the anxiety-
filled background of these polls. 
Pathways to opposition or support 
In his book on the making of pro-life activists, Ziad Munson argues that people join the 
same movement for a variety of reasons and following different pathways. Individual 
characteristics, he contends, are not enough to explain people’s participation or lack thereof: 
“We may identify a whole set of characteristics we attribute to pro-life activists, but not all 
activists will ever share all of those characteristics. Moreover, many nonactivists will have these 
same attributes. The causal connection between individual attributes and activism will therefore 
always be weak, no matter how many individual characteristics we identify or how many people 
we include” (Munson 2010:4).  
This is also the problem with the analyses of the origins of pro- and anti-Renovation 
views cited above. They look for explanations of people’s opinions in their individual 
characteristics: education, economic well-being, and political views. These attributes fail to fully 
explain the diversity of opinions: among Renovation’s supporters, one could find poor and 
middle-class people, newcomers and old-timers, more and less educated people. To solve this 
analytical problem, Munson suggests a process-centric approach to individual mobilization: 
“Becoming an activist is a dynamic, multistage process, not a singular event or discrete decision” 
(Munson 2010:4).  
Some Muscovites immediately opposed or supported Renovation, but there also followed 
several additional waves of “joining” each camp: people learned about Renovation and how it 
could affect them at different stages of the program’s development. Some were on alert right 
after the President and the Mayor agreed to start the program in late February 2017, others 
 108 
remained clueless until they saw their building on the lists published in May, right before the 
“voting” began.  
Despite the diversity of situations and processes that led each person to take a position, I 
identified several types of these pathways to becoming a zasnosnik or antisnosnik:  
(1) Skeptical rejection: some people immediately responded with suspicion, 
expecting nothing good from the government. 
(2) Hopeful consent: other people who had counted on relocations and anticipated 
them, sometimes for many years, and were on board despite the reduction of benefits 
compared to the old program. 
(3) Learning to mistrust: uninformed residents of the affected buildings, some of 
whom hoped for the old conditions of relocation and did not mind an improvement, 
learned to mistrust the program as it evolved, sometimes persuaded by the skeptical 
citizens. 
(4) Seeing an opportunity: people who had no desire to move out but learned to see 
an opportunity in Renovation. 
(5) Pragmatic conformism: people who voted for the program because they feared 
being penalized by either their neighbors or authorities. 
From this list, only the first two kinds of response to Renovation were immediate. The 
other three required (more or less) time and interaction with others; I’ll return to these 
interactions in the next chapters.  
The following two vignettes about people who knew right away what they thought about 
Renovation illustrate what motivated the quick responses; apart from different perceptions of 
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home and neighborhood (place attachment), people’s housing biographies, plans, and resources 
they dedicated to their home improvement all mattered. 
Kirill: the skeptic  
Kirill was born and raised in Rakitino. When we spoke in March 2018, he lived in the 
same flat where he had grown up: his family privatized it in the 1990s. He was in his early 40s 
and lived with his wife and a young child in a typical five-story with walls made of large bricks. 
Buildings like his are considered one of the decent series of khrushchevki, built with relatively 
good materials but with notoriously small kitchens. Kitchen sizes in khrushchevki range between 
4,5 and 6,2 square meters (50-60 square feet). They all have windows, and residents manage to 
squeeze in even a dining table, which leaves almost no space to move around.  
Kirill’s family had moved into this building from the city center soon after it was built in 
1965. Back then, moving into this separate flat was an improvement. Now, the building was 
getting old and needed more care, he told me; in 2017, Kirill expected his building to receive 
capital repairs, which were officially scheduled for that year. 
I waited for capital repairs; I think my building is absolutely repairable. But capital 
repairs can’t solve the problem of a 5-square-meter kitchen. My family is not very big, 
and for me this 5-meter kitchen, well, I’m used to it. I lived there all my life; I’m not 
scared of it. I almost finished the repairs [when the Renovation was announced], and I’ve 
been thinking about maybe combining the kitchen and one of the rooms, to have like a 
large living room. 
Kirill had a good office job and could afford to renovate and repair his apartment. He also 
cared about the condition of the building, and, unlike many, he knew that the money for the 
capital repairs in his building was allocated in the city budget for 2017. Because he followed 
local news regularly, Kirill was one of those Muscovites who noticed the announcement of 
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Renovation earlier than many, when the President instructed the Mayor to move forward with the 
demolitions in February. 
And then suddenly Vladimir Vladimirovitch [Putin] announces to Sobyanin that he 
knows the Muscovites’ wants and needs, and these wants and needs are that their homes 
be demolished and the new ones built in their place. Of course, it made me tense 
(napryaglo), and I began to follow it all very carefully. All the chronicle of Renovation, 
how it was being implemented, all the news, all the bills, all the movements of the 
authorities, all the editions of the bill – I studied it very carefully. Because, of course, it 
affected me. 
Kirill’s reaction was skeptical and alarmed because he immediately saw how the 
government’s plans interfered with his own. He also felt that they were breaking a promise (of 
capital repairs) and trying to conceal corruption and inappropriate spending of the budget money. 
His first thought when he heard the news, as he told me, was: “Aha! You ran out of money for 
capital repairs. There won’t be any capital repairs, as expected!” Kirill was not a typical 
oppositionist who criticized every move of the authorities. He had voted for Sobyanin in the 
Mayoral election in 2013 and approved of some of his policies, especially the ones that made his 
life in Moscow more comfortable: highway construction and improvement of the public transit 
system. In this case, however, he meticulously followed every move of the city administration 
and detected lies, deception, and false promises: he felt that the way the program was developing 
was disrespectful to him, as a citizen. “I don’t like it that my neighbors and I are being made 
fools (delayut durakov).” 
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Alena: the hopeful 
Alena and Victor are a young married couple from Losevo; when we met in spring 2018, 
they were expecting their first child. Alena had inherited the apartment in a panel khrushchevka 
from her grandmother; when the couple got married, they moved in here.  
Neither of them had any positive feelings about the neighborhood or the building. The 
grandmother moved into the building a couple of decades before she died, after a long bitter fight 
with the authorities over the housing for which she and her husband had waited for years in the 
ochered’. The grandmother saw this apartment as a compromise and was never really happy with 
the outcome: when they moved in, khrushchevki were already out of vogue and falling into 
disrepair. 
By Moscow standards, the young couple was happy to have an apartment of their own 
when they got married. They did not have to take out a mortgage or rent an apartment at an 
astronomical rate. However, Alena did not feel happy, either. She told me in excruciating detail 
about the troubles she had experienced over the two years they occupied the flat: the leaking 
roof, the crumbling ceiling, bursting pipes, and the nearly collapsed balcony.  
In her residential block, people had hoped to get relocated within the framework of the 
Luzhkov program, but their building series was not classified as disposable:  
However, some people were relocated, on the other side [of the road]. And we were not 
lucky, unfortunately. There were rumors, but no, nothing. [The rumors were that the 
relocation would take place] in 5 years, then in 3 years, and then – nothing. We thought 
we would live here until we die. 
The rumors of relocations are especially exhausting. They make people hope and wait, 
and not invest too much in substantial repairs in their flats, limiting them to “cosmetic” 
renovations at best. Feeling stuck in the decaying building, Alena spent all her effort on forcing 
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the authorities to perform their duties: she called them, went to office hours, and, in a desperate 
move, she even called a city TV channel to complain about the state of the electric wires in her 
flat. The journalists arrived, and the Zhlishchnik rushed to fix the issue immediately. Based on 
this experience, Alena had no illusion about the efficiency of the governmental institutions, and 
both she and her husband were not the strongest supporters of Sobyanin’s urban policies – they 
thought some of them were a waste of budget resources, especially the ones directed at 
beautification rather than “real” issues. 
Renovation was a spark of hope in the chain of rumors and false promises for Alena and 
Victor. However, they tried not to get their hopes too high: they could be bypassed again. At the 
time, the uprava had Alena’s active complaint about the collapsing balcony, and they tried to 
convince her to withdraw it: 
The talk of Renovation started, and no one knew how it would turn out. And the uprava 
called me, they said: can you wait? Maybe, you’ll get on the Renovation program! You 
may be demolished! And I say: ok, demolished, but who is going to fix my balcony? 
How many years must we wait? 
Intentional and habitual housing strategies in decision-making 
An individual’s decision-making process involves a cost-benefit analysis, and as Kristin 
Luker put it in her book on abortion and women’s decisions not to use contraception, “costs and 
utilities in a decision can be a very personal matter” (Luker 1978:35). The residents of the 
eligible buildings had to calculate those costs and utilities under conditions of uncertainty; they 
had to decide whether to take this risk. Every potential participant of the program had to evaluate 
their own housing conditions, the potential gains and losses of participating, and to estimate 
whether to trust other parties involved: the city government and their neighbors.  
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It is important to remember that people performed this analysis in the context of their 
housing strategies, both habitual and intentional, as well as in dialog with neighbors, family 
members, activists, and city officials. 
Making the decision about Renovation motivated people to think about and articulate 
their housing strategies. For some, this work took less time: they had already thought about their 
housing situations before, had evaluated their chances of getting a proper home, and expected (or 
hoped for) certain things in the future. Although Kirill inherited his apartment, he had an 
articulate housing strategy. He formulated to me why he was happy with his current housing and 
described what he expected from the local administration and maintenance companies as players 
in the housing sphere of the urban political field: accountability and responsibility which came 
with what he saw as a contract between the homeowners and the government.  
Alena did not value her housing much either sentimentally or pragmatically. She also had 
an articulate housing strategy: she actively sought the authorities’ help with her crumbling home, 
and was ready to be persistent in forcing them to do the right thing. For years she had hoped for 
relocation, based on rumors and the general perspective of her neighbors. Despite her mild 
skepticism about the city administration, her decision was driven by her conviction that nothing 
could be worse than her current housing. Any replacement would be a win. Not so for Kirill: he 
had invested a lot in his apartment, both material resources and his feelings. In addition, he did 
not trust the city government to really protect his and his neighbors’ interests. There were two 
main factors in the decision-making processes for both of them: perceived property values (of the 
current housing and the potential new flat), and trust in the procedure (based on trust in 
authorities and the neighbors). The first process of value estimation was the basis of their 
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analysis, while the expectations about the government’s and neighbors’ actions helped people 
estimate the likelihood of getting those gains or suffering losses.  
Victoria from Sokolovo, a medical professional in her late 40s, was among those who did 
not immediately have a negative response to Renovation. She told me that before her building 
was included in the voting list, she received calls from the Mayor’s Office surveying the 
residents about whether they would support such a program if it included them. She told them 
that “it depends on the conditions,” but really did not give it much thought. She then met a 
neighbor in her building, who was collecting signatures on a petition for inclusion, but 
disregarded it, confident that her building was in good condition and could not be eligible for 
demolition. Moreover, she generally tried to stay away from anything public and political: “I 
never got into politics, I never tried to understand it. Honestly, I was rather indifferent – I don’t 
understand it, so I’m not getting into it. But when it happened, I understood that, if they take 
what’s mine, if they decide for me, where [I should live], how, why, and what for, without 
asking me? That’s when I mobilized.” 
Victoria’s habitual, implicit strategy was to rely only on herself, paying taxes and, in 
return, receiving protection from the state. When we spoke in 2018, she clearly formulated this 
“old” strategy that she had since modified: it included working, paying taxes, taking care of her 
own needs, being a “good citizen,” which meant not breaking any laws and not getting into 
politics that you “don’t understand.” She took out two mortgages to purchase two apartments in 
Sokolovo, despite being a single mother and a caregiver to older relatives, and never asked the 
government for any assistance. Renovation and the expropriation of property, as Victoria saw it, 
contradicted her habitual strategy, and she felt frustrated. Still, the threat of displacement helped 
 115 
her articulate the right and wrong ways of doing things, mainly, that it was not the state’s 
business to intervene in homeowners’ plans. 
In Victoria’s strategy, ideas about “good citizenship” and homeownership were 
intertwined. State intervention in her housing strategy violated something bigger that just her 
ideas about housing; she mobilized to protect her home and general civic dignity. Those who 
mobilized against Renovation often told me that it was more than just a housing issue for them: 
“I wouldn’t be able to respect myself,” said Alla, explaining why she became an activist against 
Renovation in Sokolovo. Kirill also emphasized the violation of homeowners’ autonomy. For 
example, explaining his decision not to hold a homeowner assembly in his building, he expressed 
this very articulate view on property and the rights of the owner: 
If people participate in the assembly, they kind of agree that their neighbors have a right 
to decide about their private life. And two-thirds are enough to strip you of your property. 
It doesn’t even matter what they offer in return. Today, roughly speaking, I have this 
chair, it’s mine, and I don’t care what you offer instead of it – a stool or a high-end 
couch. The chair is mine! And the same applies to the apartment. 
 Dignity and autonomy are more general concerns than concrete housing troubles, and 
they are deeply connected to notions of property and home. Defending their right to keep their 
property, Muscovites like Kirill, Alla, and Victoria stood their ground more generally, defending 
their agency and their ability to make their own decisions about their life. 
 For others making a decision about Renovation and defending it was only a matter of 
housing: the use and exchange value of the current and promised apartments, the financial and 
emotional investment in this housing and the neighborhood, and the availability of other means 
of pursuing a proper home. Even in the context of these considerations, people evaluated similar 
 116 
properties very differently. I often heard people in the same building and in almost identical 
apartments speaking about their housing very differently. They also often engaged in value-
debates with each other (more on that in the next chapters).  
For example, Galina, a supporter of Renovation from Sokolovo in her 40s, tried hard to 
get her building included in the program and organized her neighbors – only to lose to the 
counter-organizing of the opponents of Renovation. She reproduced her conversation with her 
adversaries for me, invoking the argument of the price difference between the old and the 
potential new apartment: 
You [the opponents] are harming me personally. You are violating my rights. Because I 
lost the opportunity to improve my housing conditions (…). Plus, the apartment, the loss 
of profit is more than 6 million! I always told them: no problem, this shithole is here for 
you, you can get the new apartment, sell it, give the difference to me, and buy a shithole 
again for the difference! I’m not going to stop you if you don’t need the money! 
Galina’s approach to value estimation is based on the calculation and comparison of the 
market prices of her existing apartment and the potential apartment. She spoke about those prices 
as if both apartments were real and used the difference as an argument in her quarrels with her 
adversaries. For her, opting in to Renovation was not a risk, but a certain win, which her 
neighbors prevented her from achieving. Apart from that, Galina’s trust in the program was at 
least partially related to her broader political views: she ardently supported Vladimir Putin’s 
regime, always had the TV on, and hated the “opposition,” who tried to prevent the government 
from implementing its policies that would benefit Moscow and its residents. Her perceived 
personal gain, however, was her key motivation, and it is possible that she used the political 
argument only to strengthen her position in her bitter fight with Renovation’s opponents. 
 117 
Not all Renovation supporters were as ardent as Galina or Alena. For some, it took time 
to decide and vote “yes.” Some took time to figure out what kind of housing they preferred, what 
means were realistically available to achieve it, and how reliable were the government’s 
promises. Many supporters of Renovation expressed this habitual mistrust in government, 
something that made them think twice whether the whole relocation program was worth it. This 
process was critical, and while people were articulating their housing strategies, other players 
could intervene and “help” them see the right way. In the Renovation-related decision-making 
processes, people could see the costs and benefits differently over time based on their neighbors’ 
actions or persuasion. Above, I identified two processes that fall under this broad category: 
seeing an opportunity and pragmatic conformism. 
“Seeing an opportunity” describes people who started seeing more benefits than costs in 
Renovation. For example, Ruslan, the owner of a two-room in a solid stalinka in Rakitino, 
changed his mind and vote after his neighbor Danil, a resident of a communal apartment and a 
Renovation hopeful, convinced him. Ruslan liked his apartment; he thought it was “interesting” 
and had the “character” of an old Moscow apartment. He bought it several years ago and liked 
that the previous owners were “intelligent Muscovites.” His first reaction to Renovation was 
rejection and anxiety: he went to an anti-Renovation rally in May 2017, the first public protest he 
attended in his life. Ruslan was also very critical of the government and its failing policies, 
which he experienced first-hand as a healthcare professional. His habitual response was to reject 
yet another suspicious governmental initiative. When Danil organized a homeowner assembly, 
Ruslan voted “no” on the inclusion. Eventually, however, he changed his mind, asked Danil to 
destroy his old ballot, and voted “yes.” 
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I started noting that some amenities are lacking. Then I met with Danil again (…), he 
emailed me the bill with the 33 amendments (…), and I read it all carefully. And I 
realized that they would relocate us within our Rakitino district, that new, modern 
buildings would be constructed, and that it was probably not very forward-looking [to 
vote no]. Our building is from 1959, it is getting older. And I decided to take the risk and 
changed my mind. (…) Now that I think about it, looking at the situation retrospectively, 
I changed my mind mostly based on the information that I would have the opportunity to 
buy extra meters. 
While the basis of Ruslan’s cost and benefit calculation was his personal situation, it was 
also interactive: his activist neighbor Danil played a role, but Ruslan’s observations of his other 
neighbors’ decisions and behaviors also helped him change his mind. Unlike Renovation 
opponents, Danil was personally more likable: Ruslan was appalled by the behavior of the 
opponents in his building who called Danil names and tried to make him look like an inadequate 
“marginal,” a noun designating someone from the bottom of society. Ruslan did not like it, and 
preferred to listen to Danil, who seemed reasonable and calm, provided him with information, 
and referred to his contacts with State Duma deputies. 
The social dimension of the personal cost-benefit analysis is also visible in the decision-
making process I called “pragmatic conformism.” The decision to vote “yes” on the program 
could be based on the expected retaliation – from neighbors or the government. Varya, a young 
homeowner in Losevo, was absolutely content with her housing, liked the neighborhood, and 
never wanted to move out. She voted “yes” regardless:  
Thing is, my building, my stairwell, I spoke to people… I kind of wanted to vote against 
or not vote, I wasn’t sure. But then I saw that all my stairwell is voting for demolitions. 
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And I didn’t. The whole building was voting yes, and I relaxed. (…) The logic was like 
so: if a person votes against, it would be all accounted for. Like, if they [the supporters] 
would be relocated first, they would have priority, and they would have to deal with us, 
negotiate with us… And while they negotiate – all the good flats would be taken. We 
don’t have a choice anyway – if we don’t move out now, they will move us out later. And 
that’s why [my mother] says: let’s vote yes. 
The decision-making process in both Ruslan’s and Varya’s cases was not purely 
individual: they both took into account other people’s behavior, words, and assumed 
motivations. The reevaluation of people’s housing strategies was one of the key goals of activists 
on both sides: people interacted with their neighbors to persuade them about the magnitude of 
the risks or the potential benefits.  
Conclusion 
By announcing Renovation, the city government created and maintained a situation of 
uncertainty: changing the rules, manipulating deadlines, making people wait for information and 
at the same time rushing them to make a decision. The decision-making process took longer for 
some people, who took time to articulate their housing preferences and strategies. Others, who 
already had more pronounced ideas of what housing and their relationship to the state should be 
(as homeowners, citizens, or tenants), and what the negotiation process should look like, made 
up their minds faster. Habitual housing strategies, including the implicit ideas about the 
government’s role in providing and maintaining housing, were one of the factors in the decision-
making processes. So were the intentional strategies, such as emotional and financial investment 
in the current housing and neighborhoods, apartment renovation plans, and active mortgages. 
Some of those strategies contradicted the announced policy, some aligned with it, others were 
articulated, adjusted, and revised in light of the new prospects. 
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The process of becoming an activist did not stop with joining one of the camps. The 
experience of taking part in collective action transformed or reinforced people’s beliefs. Joining 
the resistance because of the gut-level, intuitive rejection of the government involvement could 
develop into articulated and strong views on citizenship, the role of homeownership, and the 
functions of the state as the new activists interacted with each other and their counterparts. This 
confirms Munson’s observation that “beliefs about controversial issues are as often a product of 
mobilization as they are a motivation for getting involved in the first place” (Munson 2010:14). I 
will return to these transformations and their effects in Chapter 8, where I discuss the outcomes 
of the Renovation Summer. 
Renovation split Muscovites in two camps, from which the new collective players 
emerged at the level of each individual building, but also at the neighborhood and the city level. 
These new players flooded the available arenas of urban politics, created new ones, and reshaped 
the urban political field of Moscow. The next chapter focuses on these processes.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Moscow in Movement: Renovation and the Urban Political Field 
The Mayor and the Moscow Government prided themselves on organizing Renovation in 
an unprecedented democratic fashion. First, the machinery of public demand and approval 
described in the previous chapter made it look like the public had requested the program, and the 
reluctant government had listened, despite the many difficulties in such a large-scale relocation 
project. Second, the Mayor and his aides emphasized how unique their approach was in 
consulting citizens on a building-by-building basis. For the first time in Moscow’s history, 
citizens themselves could decide whether they wanted their home demolished. 
Muscovites were invited to express their opinion in two ways. One was participating in a 
“vote,” either online or offline in the governmental service centers, where residents of the 
buildings included in the initial lists published in May 2017 could approve or reject the 
suggestion to demolish them. Another way was organizing a building’s homeowner assembly, 
which also involved a vote of homeowners on whether to petition for inclusion or against it. To 
assist Muscovites in making a decision, the city organized a series of informational events. In the 
weeks preceding voting, public meetings took place in upravas (rayon or district 
administrations) and prefectures (okrug level administrations) to “inform” concerned Muscovites 
about the program. Upravas also set up dedicated “Renovation Cabinets:” offices where low-
level uprava employees would answer questions from anyone interested in the program based on 
the information the employees got from a booklet provided by the Mayor’s office. 
Rumors about which buildings would be included in the initial lists circulated long before 
their publication in May 2017; Muscovites were subjected to months of worry and uncertainty. 
Many felt outraged and frustrated by the role that the government assigned them: one of passive 
 122 
expectation and attention. The city administration did not expect Muscovites to actively interfere 
with the architecture of the program as such; there were not many arenas available for them to 
become involved with the program in a meaningful way and discuss the principles of the 
proposal, aside from inclusion of individual buildings.  
Despite the lack of an “invitation” to official city-level arenas where powerful players 
made decisions about the structure of the program, ordinary Muscovites entered the various 
arenas of the urban political field. In this chapter, I discuss the neighborhood- and city-level 
mobilizations, focusing mostly on anti-Renovation efforts. With few exceptions, the supporters 
of the program generally directed their activities at the building level, trying to organize and 
convince their neighbors to vote yes, without contesting the program itself.  
Muscovites often criticized the official arenas to which they had access for being false: at 
best, they were designed to “inform” residents of the affected areas about the program and let 
them submit complaints or requests – generally without expectation of a response. To 
compensate, Muscovites created their own online and offline networks of support, information 
exchange, and learning. Sometimes these resistance arenas emerged in the “cracks” between 
official arenas, such as waiting halls in governmental offices, or even in subversions of official 
arenas, for example, when activists disrupted and repurposed formal meetings with heads of 
upravas.  
By flooding the formal arenas, learning about the ways they are connected, and what is at 
stake, mobilized citizens explored Moscow’s urban political field and emerged as new collective 
players in it. They also added new arenas to this field: street protests, activist-led workshops, and 
digital and offline communities. 
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Connecting: digital arenas of solidarity 
An example of such arena-creating activity was the mushrooming of anti-Renovation 
social media groups in the spring of 2017. These were essential for anti-Renovation 
mobilization; for many, these groups were the first, low-risk arena of engagement with 
Renovation, where they could find information about the program, get to know like-minded 
people, and prepare to move on to offline forms of activism.  
Opponents and supporters of Renovation each had their own online forums, where they 
negotiated different versions of events, formed identities, and stimulated mobilizing or 
demobilizing emotions. This work was performed not only among like-minded people, but, 
importantly, across divides; adversaries constantly monitored each other’s social media and often 
engaged in online conversations. 
The first anti-Renovation groups on Facebook emerged soon after the meeting of 
President Putin with Moscow’s Mayor on February 21, 2017. “Muscovites against Renovation,” 
the largest opponents’ platform, was registered on February 23. The creator and first 
administrator of the group, Kari Guggenberger, was an “ordinary” resident of a five-story 
apartment building, not an activist, as she later emphasized in numerous interviews. She was 
shaken by the prospect of relocations and demolitions, and her “natural response” to her own 
“panic” was to create a group: 
I’m still trying to figure out for myself why my group made a hit (vystrelila). On 
February 21-23, many identical groups emerged, and they were all created by girls just 
like me. Perhaps it is because I went to public roundtables, tried to contact parties, get to 
know the municipal deputies. They did not give their contact information easily: people 
did not know who I was. I created this group for my personal needs: I just tried to figure 
 124 
out how to save my home. I think it is a natural response, when panic comes (Ruzmanova 
2017b). 
Creating a popular and efficient digital platform required some offline work, as 
Guggenberger suggested. The reverse was also true; for many people, joining online groups like 
this one was a first step to activism. People looked for information, for guidelines for their next 
steps, and for neighbors. As many interviewees told me, before Renovation was announced, they 
hardly knew the people in their building, and the new online platforms helped them find like-
minded neighbors in a way that was neither scary nor costly.   
Online arenas also kept the “proper,” mobilizing emotions going, which is an important 
task in itself. Online, people (who often felt isolated or surrounded by adversaries in their 
building) could arouse mobilizing emotions which prime people for action. For example, Rita, 
the Renovation opponent from Rakitino, was overwhelmed by her neighbors’ desire to get their 
building demolished and could only find emotional refuge in the neighborhood’s group of 
Renovation opponents. She told me when we met March 2018 that she did not know what else 
she could do after her building was put on the demolition list. She could only channel her 
discontent and establish her identity as a Renovation opponent by going on Facebook and 
posting that she was “against, against!” Renovation. Simply letting people know about her 
existence and sharing her opinion were important for her. 
Maintaining the “proper” emotions was only one of the online tasks; the main goal was 
connecting like-minded neighbors who otherwise were not acquainted, despite physical 
proximity. One of the early posts on “Muscovites against Renovation” was a poll “Which district 
are you from” and request to each user to add themselves to the online map of protesters. In the 
comments section to the post, people gave their addresses, asking whether anyone else lived 
 125 
nearby. Gradually, each district got its own anti-Renovation group, and some users of the city-
wide “Muscovites against Renovation” migrated to these district groups. They found them more 
focused and practical, and less “emotional” than the all-Moscow community, as some of my 
interlocutors told me.  
Neighborhood online communities had existed in almost every Moscow district before 
Renovation, as I mentioned in Chapter 3; sometimes, there were more than one per district 
(Davydov and Logunova 2018). They were not exclusively activist platforms: neighbors used 
them to post mundane local news, events, and other announcements. These communities are 
mostly organized as groups on social media platforms like Facebook and Vkontakte, with the 
neighborhood’s name in the title. In February and March of 2017, some of the users of such 
platforms began posting about Renovation, looking for more information and, potentially, allies. 
In some cases, group users who did not feel affected by Renovation were annoyed by the flood 
of Renovation-related posts and complained publicly or to admins. By April, most of the districts 
had launched their own Renovation-themes online communities. “Muscovites against 
Renovation” kept track of all district-based anti-Renovation groups and called their members to 
join them. 
Seeing this potentially influential arena emerge, the Mayor’s Office could not stay away. 
To promote Renovation, it sponsored the creation of groups and public pages on various 
platforms. The first post in the “Za snos” group on Vkontakte appeared on March 9, 2017, more 
than two weeks after the first anti-Renovation groups appeared. Groups with the same title “For 
the demolition of khrushchyovkas” (“Za snos khrushchyovok”) emerged on Facebook, Twitter 
and Vkontakte with mostly the same content. Unlike the anti-Renovation groups and pages, these 
were impersonal in tone and obviously centralized: the posts were published by administrators 
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without personal usernames, and ordinary users could only comment on these posts, not create 
posts of their own. In a way, these online rules reproduced the desirable to the Moscow 
government relationship between itself and the citizens: citizens could not initiate anything or 
take control of any political processes; they could only respond, approving or disapproving the 
moves of the power-holders. 
Although the pro-Renovation online groups mirrored the protest groups - both published 
voices of “ordinary Muscovites” who were desperate to move out of their dilapidated and 
uncomfortable housing - there is evidence of the orchestrated nature of the pro-Renovation 
online arenas. The journalist and author of the blog “Noodle Remover”23, Alexey Kovalev, 
investigated the top commenters and administrators of the “Za snos khrushchyovok” groups. He 
found that many of the “ordinary Muscovites” apparently complaining about the poor condition 
of their homes were young members of the United Russia Party and the Youth Parliament (their 
so-called “Dvizhok” project). These groups were financed from city resources allocated for 
“informational campaigns” supporting Renovation on social media (Kovalev 2017). The same 
network of young pro-government activists was previously used to simulate public support for 
other Mayor’s Office projects, as the opposition politician Leonid Volkov had found earlier 
(Volkov 2016). 
The fact that the pro-Renovation groups were created and supported by pro-government 
players doesn’t make them irrelevant. Many real people joined those groups, asked questions, 
participated in the forums and discussions, and provided each other with moral support. These 
discussions, often organized by district, had a similar tone to the anti-Renovation groups: people 
expressed their concerns about the lack of reliable information, complained about the sense of 
 
23 “Lapshesnimalochnaya” – the name comes from the expression “to hang noodles on someone’s ears,” 
meaning to lie, to deceive. 
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disorientation and insecurity, and asked the Moscow Government to move forward with 
Renovation as soon as possible. These feelings resulted from the uncertainty of the program’s 
development and conditions, but also arose because some supporters of Renovation feared that 
their opponent neighbors would win the vote, and their building would not be included in the 
program.  
Most people joined those groups to get regular updates on the program and its constantly 
changing conditions. In spring 2018, I spoke to Varya, quoted in chapter 5 as an example of the 
“pragmatic conformism” strategy. An independent professional and single mother in her late 20s, 
Varya voted for the inclusion of her building in Losevo even though she loved her home and 
neighborhood as they were. Before she made the decision, she was active on the forum of one of 
the “Za snos” groups. She was skeptical about the group: she told me that she was fully aware 
that the group was “paid for” (proplachennaya) by the city administration, but she stayed in it to 
get at least some information about what was to happen to her home: 
I was in this group, the paid-for group (proplachennaya), yes, only because they 
published the news faster than everywhere else. I was there to get at least some 
information. Because everyone wrote and said so many different things. Of course, it is 
better, when some kind of popular initiative gathers (sobirayetsya kakaya-to narodnaya 
initsiativa), through their comments there, people who were against or who were 
undecided… but I saw that there are the same people talking there. After a month of 
interaction, I realized that they obviously were on payroll; they were there all the time. 
And others were professional trolls. And the third [group] are those who have nothing 
else to do. When I saw it, I stopped going there, after I knew for sure that my building 
would be demolished. 
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Her skepticism about the program and the pro-Renovation group did not make her vote 
against Renovation: observing other people’s reasoning online along with the way voting 
developed in her building, she felt that Renovation was inevitable, and she had to work with the 
fact. Producing this feeling of inevitability was one of the reasons the pro-Renovation groups 
were created. 
The pro- and anti-Renovation groups were similar in what people sought there: emotional 
support and information about the program, though this information came from different sources 
and with a different tone in the two types of groups. While the pro-Renovation groups, 
centralized and paid for by the city budget, produced optimistic news and promising prospects, 
the anti-Renovation groups collected information on the “true reasons” for the program and the 
risks involved in it. The Moscow-wide “Muscovites against Renovation” was an important 
platform for exchanging knowledge and seeking expert advice: not just ordinary Muscovites but 
experienced activists, lawyers, and politicians joined the group. Ordinary Muscovites in the 
eligible buildings often lacked knowledge of the structures of the bureaucratic systems of 
Moscow politics, and about online groups.  
The two types of online forums also produced different emotions. The centralized and 
seemingly “orderly” pro-Renovation groups created a feeling of the inevitability of Renovation 
and emphasized the clean and comfortable future city that would emerge after the demolition of 
the outdated five-story buildings. Despite the efforts of Renovation opponents who sometimes 
snuck into the supporters’ discussions, the overall atmosphere of the supporter groups was 
anticipation mixed with anxiety caused by the opponents’ activities. The emotions were more 
diverse and complex on the anti-Renovation forums: feelings of collective empowerment, 
solidarity, and civic righteousness, often mixed with disappointment, fear, and apathy.   
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Pro- and anti-Renovation activism offline  
Renovation created different conditions for the supporters and opponents of the program. 
Moscow’s government explicitly favored and promoted Renovation, so supporters could sit back 
and wait for the government to include their building, feeling that they had a powerful ally. To 
my knowledge, while the resistance to Renovation developed and grew, supporters did not have 
a comparable grassroots movement.  
First, supporters did not have to demand the program: the Moscow government 
announced and actively pushed it, which made supporters complacent. They believed the 
government would implement what they had planned; no difficult organizing work would be 
necessary. Second, unlike opponents of Renovation, supporters had reasons to believe they were 
a majority and they would prevail in buildings that were able to vote (based on the media 
campaign, and on the public opinion data discussed in Chapter 5). During the voting, people 
could monitor the votes coming in for every individual building online. Eventually, in fact, the 
shares of votes in favor of Renovation per building ranged from 11 to 100 percent, with an 
average vote of over 80 percent in favor.  
One reason for supporters of Renovation to start organizing was the presence of anti-
Renovation activists in their building or block, disturbing their belief in general support for 
Renovation. However, most pro-Renovation activists only began organizing – and emerged as a 
collective player – when the list of buildings suggested for inclusion was published, and people 
who were hoping to be relocated did not find their addresses on it. In May 2017, several 
newspapers reported on a number of “assemblies” or “gatherings” (skhod) that had requested 
inclusion by people whose buildings had been left out of Renovation. The official state 
newspaper Rossiyskaya gazeta published an article with a subheading stating that “more than 35 
thousand Muscovites participated in rallies in support of Renovation.” In the body of the article, 
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they clarified that this large number is a cumulative turnout of “almost 500 people’s assemblies, 
many of which gathered without permission and spontaneously” (Meleshenko 2017). According 
to another newspaper, “assemblies” with turnouts ranging from 300 to 2000 people took place in 
several city districts; these assemblies were announced in the “For demolition” groups on social 
media, and even commercially advertised in other popular social media communities (Chernykh 
and Ivanov 2017). It is not clear who planned and provided financial support for these rallies and 
advertisements. It is possible that the Moscow government organized them as part of the public 
promotion campaign. This is not to say that the participants of these events were not earnest in 
their demands; many were, indeed, frustrated that their buildings were left out. However, these 
actions look more like an organized effort to oppose the city-wide organizing of the opponents of 
Renovation, which was taking place on the same weekend, rather than a strategic action to 
include the skipped buildings on the demolition lists. 
The anti-Renovation activists, on the contrary, almost immediately formed networks. In 
addition to social media, they came together at workshops, rallies, and informal meetings of 
neighborhood activists.  These efforts were necessary to build and demonstrate solidarity and 
numbers of those against Renovation; people met at rallies and continued organizing against 
Renovation afterwards. Charles Tilly (2008) called such manifestations of worth, unity, numbers, 
and commitment (“WUNC”) “WUNC displays:” the main instrument that social movements 
employ to persuade others to support them and to make authorities respect them. This is also part 
of their character work, strategic efforts to shape their reputation and public perception, to which 
I return later. 
The biggest anti-Renovation rally took place the same weekend as the pro-Renovation 
rallies described above. On May 14, 2017, more than 20,000 people came to the opposition rally 
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(the official police estimate was 5-7,000). Two municipal deputies and local activists, Yuliya 
Galyamina and Elena Rusakova, and two journalists and anti-Renovation activists, Tatyana 
Kosobokova and Ekaterina Vinogradova, were the official organizers of the event.  
At the rally, opposition politicians gave speeches (although police prevented Alexey 
Navalny from speaking, creating quite a media stir), the crowd booed at the attempts of a city 
administration employee to advocate for the program, but the events on stage were not the main 
product of the rally. Many of my respondents remembered this event as an inspiring and 
empowering display of solidarity, unity, and neighborhood identity; people arrived with their 
hand-made banners and posters, looked for people from their neighborhoods, and even dressed 
up. Many remembered the outfits of the Presnya district, a neighborhood with a working-class 
past: Presnya people arrived wearing red bandanas, with banners designed in the Soviet avant-
garde style, and marched in a neat column, resembling workers’ demonstrations of early Soviet 
times. 
Two women, Victoria, mobilized by Renovation, and Raisa, an experienced local activist 
from Sokolovo, both in their early 40s, met at the rally, and, in our interview, enjoyed 
remembering the day when their friendship and cooperation had begun. Raisa made a large 
“Sokolovo” banner, and everyone from the neighborhood approached her, putting a face on the 
name they already knew from their neighborhood’s Facebook page. Alisa from Oreshino walked 
with her neighborhood, too, and felt empowered by being among “intelligent people, true 
Muscovites:” 
The first [anti-]Renovation rally, the turnout was colossal, the activity was colossal. So 
many people in this city were united. And, specifically, cultured, intelligent people! 
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Native Muscovites! (…) It was such a bomb (vystrel). And it was calm, and beautiful. No 
provocations, no conflicts, no nothing!  
These empowering emotions helped Renovation opponents fight another important 
feeling that permeated social media, personal conversations, and the tacit concerns of many 
Muscovites: fatalism, or the expectation that the government would move forward with its 
program no matter what. This feeling is deeply embedded in many people’s interpretation of 
Moscow politics, and it is an element of their habitual life strategies. For example, Irina, in her 
60s, was among the minority who supported Renovation in a stalinka building in the Oreshino 
district. She accepted the result of the vote against Renovation by her building’s homeowner 
assembly, but she made an interesting remark to me based on her observation of Moscow 
politics. After she told me a long story of her residential mobility in the Moscow region that 
brought her to this kommunalka in Oreshino, and the changes that she had observed in the city 
and her neighborhood over the years, she concluded:  
All this has happened in Moscow before. I want to tell you, having lived a long life, I 
have noticed a trend: I don’t know about other places, but in Moscow, if there is a plan, 
sooner or later, it will be realized. 
This fatalism, based on the habitual belief that the government would push through with 
their plans despite people’s objections, shaped not only the supporters’ moods. Opponents of 
Renovation also often shared with me similar feelings; even those who managed to save their 
buildings from the program lived with fear and anxiety, thinking that this “victory” was only 
temporary. This emotion kept opponents alert and engaged. Supporters, too, even when they lost, 
hoped that things might still turn their way, showing the opposite side of fatalism: faith in 
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serendipity, expressed with the untranslatable Russian particle avos’ (used when one can’t 
control circumstances but still hopes they will turn out favorably). 
False participatory arenas  
One of the key problems that Muscovites faced in the Renovation controversy was the 
lack of channels for meaningful citizen participation in the official process. The program was 
designed on the principle that Muscovites were individuals with the right to “express their 
opinion” in the form of a quasi-vote on the fate of their individual buildings; otherwise, they 
were not expected to be active players in the process. The program itself was not supposed to be 
questioned by individual Muscovites; it had been passed by the State Duma, the national 
parliament.  
This process included three required readings of the Renovation bill by the Duma. Some 
concerned Muscovites and a few active local politicians tried to intervene in this procedure; they 
created adjacent arenas to discuss the bill, rallied outside the Duma building, and participated in 
the public hearings on the bill in the Duma. For example, on June 4, just two days before the 
second hearing on the bill, the opposition City Council representative Elena Shuvalova hosted a 
roundtable in the Moscow City Council, where activists along with lawyers and opposition 
politicians discussed legal, environmental, and financial aspects of Renovation.  
This roundtable brought together representatives of a wide coalition: municipal deputies, 
local activists, speakers from the “Muscovites against Renovation” Facebook group, architects 
and preservationists, environmental non-profits, and anti-corruption politicians. They spoke 
about the historic and architectural value of some of the included buildings and alternatives to 
demolition (renovation and upgrade of the buildings), the environmental risks of increasing 
population density and destruction of green spaces, and misguided priorities in the city budget.  
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Many non-profit organizations and activists reported that they had sent objections to the 
Renovation bill to the State Duma, demanding rejection of the bill. Participants also agreed on a 
course of action for the anti-Renovation movement. Yuliya Galyamina, the municipal deputy and 
co-organizer of the anti-Renovation rallies, concluded the round table, announcing that the 
“movement against the bill on Renovation would have several directions: legal, informational, 
and investigative. This work would be accompanied by street activities, the earliest of which 
would take place on June 6 and 9” (Kantor 2017). 
The dates announced by Galyamina coincided with two events at the Duma: the public 
hearing (June 6) and the second reading of the bill (June 9). The anti-Renovation activists tried to 
influence the Duma’s decision, but they had no allies there comparable to Shuvalova in the City 
Council. This arena was purged of all opposition and under the solid control of the government 
years before Renovation. 
On June 6, the Duma hosted a public hearing on the bill. According to the political 
scientist and commentator Ekaterina Shulman, who attended the hearing, this was an 
unprecedented event: about 600 people were there, including 300 residents of the five-story 
buildings. Local administrations (upravas) participated in the selection of participants and 
prevented potential troublemakers from getting in: activist reputations, in this case, were not a 
benefit. Shulman reported that many of the “protest citizens” were not allowed in (foermost, the 
organizers of the protest rally on May 14, including Galyamina), but this was still the most 
heated and lively hearing Shulman had ever seen (Shul’man 2017).  
The Mayor was there to respond to questions from deputies and “ordinary Muscovites”. 
Despite the emotional challenges of this meeting (the Mayor struggled visibly with public 
speaking in an environment that was more antagonistic than usual), the Duma and the Mayor’s 
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Office managed to maintain the framing of the program that they were pushing; they again 
presented Renovation as necessary for the common good. People’s complaints that their solid 
buildings were included in the demolition lists were dismissed as possible “technical mistakes” 
that people now could easily correct by voting against inclusion. The vote was an ongoing 
process, and anyone could monitor the votes in individual buildings online; the Mayor used this 
as an argument to defend the program: 
And we see today that 90% of the buildings are included rightfully, and the 
overwhelming majority of the citizens support this program. There are a few buildings, 
about a hundred, who are voting against… If 1/3 of residents vote against it, we will 
exclude you, and never touch you (Shtab Zashity Yuzhnoportovogo 2017). 
The Mayor displaced responsibility for building selection onto Muscovites instead of 
experts; they had to perform the work of evaluating their buildings and convincing their 
neighbors that these were good (or bad) living conditions, instead of a formal building quality 
evaluation by professionals. One of the audience members tried to point out the negative social 
consequences of such a displacement of responsibility: neighbors became enemies because of the 
program. Social cohesion, however, was not a priority of the Moscow government. 
The Mayor was only an invited guest in this Duma public hearing. The Chairman of the 
Duma Vyacheslav Volodin visibly liked his position of power; he disciplined “ordinary people” 
in the audience, and also enjoyed exercising some power over the Mayor. This did not lead to 
any meaningful disagreements between the Duma and the Moscow government; the Chairman 
pushed back against Renovation opponents and defended the Mayor:  
The Mayor is searching for a solution to the problem that soon would become difficult to 
solve, the housing problem. (…) and you are just saying that you don’t want to be in the 
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program! We hear you, but we also must hear those who think about the future. (…) You 
only think about yourself! 
The rejection of the bill at this stage was clearly out of the question: the second reading 
of the bill in the Duma was scheduled for June 9, three days after the public hearing. This was 
another act in the staging of public support for Renovation; the program again was framed as 
necessary and its opponents as selfish.  
The concept of a false arena describes settings that systematically advantage “one set of 
players; at the extreme such players can establish them purely as a strategic move, only 
pretending to provide access or advantages to others” (Jasper 2006b:168). Powerful players may 
create such arenas to “provide a feeling of participation” for potential opponents, without 
providing them real access to decision making. Another kind of false arena allows for 
participation after a decision is already made. In this case, the engagement of diverse players 
legitimates decisions by powerholders. Sometimes arenas may seem false to unskilled players, 
who “gain entry to arena that previously excluded them but cannot manage to influence its 
outcomes” because they lack “the skills or information they need to maneuver it well” (Jasper 
2006b:170). Even false arenas are rarely truly false: as I will show below, some gains could be 
made even in Moscow arenas that were designed to inform concerned citizens about decisions 
already made.  
This public hearing helped the Moscow government create an impression of public 
participation and dialog. For this purpose, they also created a new arena: the Working Group on 
Renovation. This happened at the end of the public hearing, when Chairman Volodin said:  
Those of you who expressed criticism, don’t leave right after the hearing. We will create 
that working group and will study it …. [He then pointed at several people who asked 
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questions and called out some of their names.] I want to ask that we sit down and start a 
dialog. It may not be easy, but the Mayor hears you, we are in dialog with him. All the 
innovations you liked in the bill, they are because we hear you. And we must hear each 
other and find a solution together. 
The Working Group quickly became controversial; many anti-Renovation activists saw 
this new arena as legitimation for the illegitimate program, and some participants in the Group 
were accused of collaborationism. For example, Nadezhda, a housing activist from Losevo, was 
convinced that the Working Group was a hoax. In 2019, two years after the creation of the 
Working Group, she told me that the deputies dropped the ball when the tensions and protests 
against Renovation quieted down: 
This [Group] was created to let this protest go down the drain (slit’ protest). You could 
see in their last session: it took place at least six months ago. He [the deputy Pyotr 
Tolstoy, head of the Group] doesn’t want to, can’t convene it anymore, obviously. It was 
their first working group where they invited people. 
The Working Group drew some attention of the Moscow-wide activist community, but 
ultimately it had little impact on the Renovation program. It had no time; following the second 
hearing on June 9, the bill was passed after the third hearing on June 14 with no serious 
revisions.  
How to use a false arena: Meetings in upravas 
Despite the lack of meaningful engagement of ordinary Muscovites in the design of the 
program, they were indeed “invited” to some arenas of urban politics and participated for the 
first time in interactions in the urban political field. Nadezhda pointed out in the quote above that 
the Working Group on Renovation was the first such group in the Duma with selected ordinary 
Muscovites as members. The unprecedented attention and presence of the general public at the 
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hearings in the State Duma formed another unusual situation in Moscow’s urban political field. 
Even though many activists criticized these arenas for being false – because the admitted public 
could not engage in decision-making as an equal participant – they still offered opportunities for 
potential gains. 
The “informational” meetings with heads of upravas were another set of arenas where no 
decisions were made, and no active input from the public was envisioned. This is not to say these 
meetings had no purpose: they had a stated goal of “informing the population” about the program 
and a more discreet goal of “pacifying” worried Muscovites.  
The meetings with heads of upravas in each of the Renovation-affected districts took 
place on April 19, 2017, the day before the first reading of the bill in the State Duma. These 
meetings were stressful and emotional, and yet formally inconsequential; little was at stake in 
these arenas. In these meetings, participants received forms where they could write down their 
thoughts about the program. Some of my respondents believed that these papers were later 
analyzed and considered when the list of buildings for voting was finalized, but I have no 
reliable information about their fate. 
Meetings with heads of upravas are a routine monthly event that upravas are required to 
host. Each month, these meetings have different items on the agenda: the ongoing 
“beautification” of the district’s public spaces, repair work on infrastructure, and other local 
matters. The few people who knew about such meetings before Renovation characterized them 
as “monthly concerts,” emphasizing that the upravas had a formal requirement to host them but 
no incentive to use them as an arena to engage with residents. Taissia, an experienced 
neighborhood activist from Oreshino, explained to me why attending such regular meetings 
didn’t make much sense: 
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The uprava meetings grew into a fiction; people don’t get any help there. (…) This is just 
an arena for talking. If you attended and asked a question, best case scenario, they would 
write it down. And it is at best the [same] level as writing a paper to the uprava. And 
sometimes you just voice your question, and it won’t even be registered, they won’t move 
forward with it. 
However, many experienced activists as well as concerned residents of eligible buildings 
showed up at the meetings on April 19, 2017. In some cases, they managed to turn the false 
arena into something else: a starting point for mobilization, a learning opportunity about the way 
urban politics in Moscow works, and a place to meet like-minded people. 
The meetings were difficult for uprava employees, who had to face riled-up Muscovites 
demanding concrete information about the prospects for their homes. Many of the local 
bureaucrats were not prepared to deal with the energized “population” in such numbers,  and the 
situation was even worse because they could not provide more information than people already 
had; their superiors from the Moscow government had provided the district (rayon) level 
executives with the same few facts and generous promises that were available on the official 
online platforms and printed materials. 
Along with these standard guidelines, the Mayor’s Office apparently provided the Heads 
of upravas with a script for the meetings and responses to possible questions and criticism. I 
analyzed video recordings of four meetings in the districts I studied (available on YouTube) and 
noticed the following similarities in the ways the Heads presented the program and tried to deal 
with citizens’ concerns. All of them emphasized the “informational” character of the meetings 
and tried to prevent discussion and debate. They stressed that the upravas were not the architects 
of the program, but only messengers delivering information from their superiors. They asked 
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their audience to trust the reliable information from official sources and not to fall for 
“provocations” and “speculations” from “activists” and “young people.” They repeated that 
“there is no program yet,” that the hearings on the bill had not yet begun, and that anyone who 
talked about the dangers of Renovation was trying to deceive people, because the rules of the 
program were not yet set (the meetings took place before the first reading of the bill in the 
Duma). Heads of upravas also repeated that everyone’s opinion “would be heard.” And finally, 
to discourage formation of collective identities and potential solidarities, the Heads demanded 
that people “speak only for themselves” (individuals) and not use “we” in their speeches as a 
way to represent group interests. 
In this excerpt from my notes from a meeting in Oreshino, the moderator and the Head of 
the uprava are struggling to contain citizens’ outrage and requests to be heard and not be treated 
as a passive “audience.”  
The Head of the uprava says that the purpose of this meeting is to “tell the concept” of 
the program. “What it will be – we don’t know. Only tomorrow the first hearing in the 
Duma will take place. What it would look like when it’s passed – I don’t know, and no 
one knows.” “Then what are we discussing?” – shouts a woman from the audience. 
Moderator: “We don’t ask you to discuss anything, we ask you to listen to the 
information! We are informing you!” (Meeting with the uprava in Oreshino, notes on the 
video recording, April 19, 2017) 
Despite the common scripts, the four meetings I studied took different turns. Some 
followed the script, others spun out of control and became indoor rallies. While most of the 
Heads tried to frame the meetings as “informational” sessions where the citizens first “listen to 
the information” and then “ask questions,” the participants sometimes managed to reframe them 
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as opportunities to talk to one another, get acquainted, share information, and join their efforts. 
In some districts, the meetings were “hijacked” by activists, who used this arena to recruit 
supporters from the pool of the urban politics newbies who were encountering the unhelpful 
bureaucrats for the first time, were frustrated by the absence of real conversations and answers, 
and sought another way to act.  
The reframing of each meeting depended on several factors: the rhetorical skills of the 
local bureaucrats, preparatory work by neighborhood activists, activists’ actions at the meetings, 
and the spatial organization of the event. 
The most controlled meeting of the four took place in Rakitino; the Head of the uprava 
skillfully disarmed the audience by saying: “I am ready to hear your suggestions and requests. I 
want to hear your opinion about this program. There will be no discussion; I have gathered you 
here today to listen to you. Agreed?” (Meeting with the uprava in Rakitino, notes on the video 
recording, April 19, 2017). 
With this statement, the Head identified the direction of interactions: members of the 
audience were to address him, and listen to him, in an orderly manner. He ignored all remarks 
from the room if they were not questions asked into the microphone, and he maintained a 
friendly, even fatherly, tone. The members of the audience patiently listened to his short 
presentation about the program (the other three Heads were constantly interrupted) and then took 
turns at the microphones with questions to the Head, who masterfully dismissed most of the 
concerns as unsubstantiated or irrelevant. The activists were present and asked questions, but 
could not break out of the “individual question – official response” structure of the meeting. The 
spatial organization of the meeting also helped the Head; the room was larger than in the other 
three districts, and the uprava people were seated on an elevated stage above the audience. 
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Space mattered in all four meetings. Three of the four meeting rooms were too small to 
accommodate everyone wanting to get in, stoking tension and outrage. The small size of the 
rooms also kept speakers and audience close, so that voices from the audience were difficult to 
ignore. The Losevo meeting took place in the smallest space of the four, with the officials sitting 
at a table at the same level as the residents; they were physically close to the audience and could 
not dominate the room. In Sokolovo, Rakitino and Oreshino the officials’ tables were installed 
on stages, separating the bureaucrats from the agitated people. 
In Oreshino and Losevo, the anti-Renovation activists used the relatively small size of the 
rooms as a spatial advantage to disrupt the unidirectional mode of the meetings. They kept 
speaking from their places, refused to be silent, and distributed their leaflets and contact 
information to other participants right in front of the exhausted bureaucrats. The experienced 
activists were more confident in disrupting the meetings; they knew there was no reason to play 
the game imposed by the officials, as these formal meetings had nothing at stake except 
discursive domination. In Oreshino, a local activist whom the uprava officials knew personally 
based on her community activism before Renovation, shifted the direction of interactions in the 
meeting from “vertical” to “horizontal.” Here is an excerpt from my notes describing this move, 
which made the activist the center of everyone’s attention: 
A woman takes her turn at the microphone. “Why don’t you talk about the bill?” she asks 
the officials. Then she turns to the audience and addresses them instead of the uprava 
officials: “Dear citizens, we must say that we are against!” The audience starts shouting, 
some in support, others disagreeing. The moderator tries to dismiss the activist: “You 
don’t even live in a five-story! What do you have to do with Renovation?” The activist 
keeps addressing the audience, talking about the content of the Renovation bill. There’s 
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some applause and booing at the same time. The activist leaves the microphone, but the 
audience continues shouting. The activist moves to the back of the room, still shouting, 
distributing leaflets, encouraging people to read the bill on the Duma website.  
Making oneself visible in these meetings, announcing one’s position and address, was a 
way to make contacts and “become active.” Inna, who did a lot of work to convince her whole 
block to opt out of Renovation, told me that, at the same meeting in Oreshino, she met another 
woman from the block, and recruited her to the coordinated anti-Renovation effort: 
There was a girl asking a question, and she said: I am from house number N! Wow! This 
was the building where I had no contacts at all. And I told her: I know someone from 
your block, I will introduce you! And that was it, they started interacting, and she became 
active. She organized a homeowner assembly! 
In Losevo, people from the audience eventually took over the microphone, and the 
uprava officials even stopped trying to reclaim their dominance. The meeting turned into an 
indoor rally; people at the microphone gave speeches addressing each other instead of “asking 
questions” of the officials.  
The Head of the uprava, unable to contain the spontaneous rally, sat back and listened 
while people spoke, booed, and applauded one another. After a supporter of Renovation gave a 
long speech and was reprimanded for “agitation” by other members of the audience, the Head of 
the uprava even tried to defend the “diversity of opinions,” coming back to the “script’s” 
suggestion to emphasize individual decision-making instead of collective strategizing: 
I heard just now, when Elena Sergeyevna was speaking, [someone commented] that “it is 
agitation.” It’s no agitation! You are observing different opinions tonight. People have a 
right to an opinion, against Renovation or in favor. Only actual residents of each specific 
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building can decide! And I ask you to resist the pressure of those people who use this 
situation for self-promotion! You make the decision, don’t let anyone convince you 
otherwise! (Meeting with the uprava in Losevo, notes on the video recording, April 19, 
2017) 
It may seem from the episodes described above that the anti-Renovation activists were 
the most vocal. But supporters were there too. They participated in the spontaneous rally in 
Losevo, booed the opponents in Oreshino, and were very nervous that their adversaries would 
spoil their hopes for new apartments. Like the opponents of Renovation, the supporters too 
created small cliques and groups in the room, conversing with one another. After the meetings 
were over, some of the pro- and anti-Renovation groups continued their conversations outside 
the meeting rooms. For some of them, these formally inconsequential meetings became 
important starting points for further individual and collective decisions; people met and went on 
to co-organize homeowners’ assemblies and collect signatures both for and against Renovation. 
Nevertheless, others felt discouraged and decided not to do anything at all.   
Agency between the cracks 
Even in the web of false arenas that the Moscow government created, Muscovites 
managed to squeeze in meaningful interactions and force their way into the urban political field. 
They had to play by the structure laid out in the program: Renovation could not be cancelled, and 
the ultimate decisions regarding demolition and relocation were to be made at the level of 
individual buildings. To achieve their goals for exclusion or inclusion people needed to convince 
their neighbors to vote with them, and, in some cases, to organize a homeowners’ assembly and 
register its decision officially with local and city officials. 
These processes required many visits to official institutions: to ask about the program and 
the decision-making process, to request necessary documents and instructions for the proper 
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legal organization of a homeowner assembly, and then to register the assembly’s decisions. Not 
surprisingly, people had many questions and issues along the way; most had no prior experience 
with the processes, and the bureaucrats generally did not help and sometimes even blocked their 
efforts. Both opponents and supporters of Renovation among my interviewees reported that local 
authorities were extremely unhelpful. 
But because people kept coming to the uprava offices, the “Renovation Cabinets,” and 
other offices, waiting for offices to open, and growing increasingly impatient and outraged at the 
inefficient system, these places became arenas for unplanned encounters and conversations.  
Outside the limitations and visibility of the formal arenas, officials might behave 
differently. For example, Elizaveta, a young anti-Renovation activist from Losevo, told me that 
regular visits to the uprava’s “Renovation Cabinet” once resulted in a conversation with the Head 
of the uprava. She and her partner activists went to the “Cabinet” for some question, but 
“caught” the Head on his way out and were able to have an informal conversation with him, in 
which he hinted at the long internal preparations behind the Renovation program. Outside his 
office, he acted and spoke to them differently: 
We met him, and she [an activist from the group] literally cornered him. He could not 
find excuses – that it’s not his office hours, - because it was on the street. And we say: 
what’s going on? You have decided overnight that these buildings are going to be 
emptied! And he says: this is unexpected for you, but there are people who knew about it 
all along. [And I realized] that anything could happen anytime. 
Elizaveta was ready to start recording the conversation on her phone; she had seen advice 
to record every conversation with officials in the anti-Renovation social media. However, he 
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warned her that if she started recording, he would not have a “human” (po-chelovecheski) 
conversation with them, meaning that he could not be honest and informal. 
But such informal encounters with officials were rare; more often my interviewees 
mentioned valuable meetings with other activists and informed residents in the “backstage 
arenas” of the official institutions, such as waiting rooms and areas in front of the offices, where 
they waited for their turn to speak to the bureaucrats or submit their paperwork. I call these 
arenas “backstage arenas” to emphasize the informal and spontaneous nature of interaction there. 
Even the officials may fall out of character in these spaces, and embrace different modes of 
interaction, like the head of uprava in the example above. However, the unplanned character and 
spontaneity of encounters in these arenas does not mean that players abandon their strategies. 
The purpose of Muscovites’ visits to official institutions was to ensure that their own buildings 
were excluded, but they helped each other, and also pursued the collective strategy of 
maximizing the number of buildings that exit the program. They did so out of solidarity and a 
shared desire to reestablish their civic dignity, to demonstrate that, as Alisa from Oreshino told 
me, “they shouldn’t think so poorly of us.” 
During the Renovation controversy, the district and city offices, upravas, prefectures, the 
Moscow Housing Inspection, and the Main Authority of Engineering Services (GUIS), were 
overwhelmed with visitors; some bureaucrats were flustered and refused to speak to anyone. The 
wait times could be hours: and during these waiting hours, people spoke to one another, 
transforming the corridors into spontaneous arenas of strategic interaction. 
Sometimes, people met useful professionals while waiting. For example, Denis from 
Oreshino met a lawyer in the office of Housing Inspection; the lawyer waited there with his 
clients and did not mind advising other people waiting to speak to officials about the same issue. 
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More often the useful contacts were with more experienced activists or people at more advanced 
stages of the process. Everybody was happy to help the relative newbies: Inna, from Oreshino, 
told me how she and her fellow activists offered help to people who “looked lost” in the uprava: 
We met two young guys there, they looked very lost, two hipsters. They came and said 
very quietly: “sorry, but please, where can we get the roster of homeowners?” And we 
were far in our process already, we were riled up, shouting, waving our documents! And 
they were like – “sorry, please…” And there were only a secretary and a lawyer [of the 
uprava] present, and they couldn’t tell them anything. So, I listened to this, [and it was] 
mostly silence, and I told them: “guys, what do you need this roster for?” – “We want to 
organize a homeowner assembly.” – “About Renovation?” – “Yes.” – “And what is your 
problem?” I asked in order to understand what they would need. […] Later we were in 
touch, I’ve sent them many different links about how to organize an assembly, so that 
they did everything correctly: what to do, where to go, what documents one needs, who 
to speak to, and who is useless. 
Inna was not an activist before Renovation, but she and her neighbors mobilized 
relatively early, and by the time many Muscovites began to grasp the need to organize 
homeowners’ assemblies , she had already explored the structures of Moscow local politics and 
could share her experience.  
Inna also benefited from hanging out in the uprava’s waiting halls: she met a neighbor 
from her building. They knew each other’s faces but had never spoken, and the lengthy waiting 
in the uprava gave them an opportunity to talk and agree to coordinate their efforts:  
I told him, well, what else can we do: we must gather. I know very few people in our 
building, and he knew practically everyone. (…) He also was very well connected. He dug 
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out lots of insider information, because he had many contacts – lawyers, and I don’t even 
know who else. He doesn’t say. And I don’t need to know – what matters is that he gets all 
this information. 
The spontaneous, unplanned encounters in the physical spaces let to meaningful 
connections, coordinated efforts, and exchange of information. Such chance connections 
benefited from a specific temporality of the encounters. In moments of crisis, some of the usual 
norms and rules of communication with strangers were relaxed. The influx of people concerned 
with Renovation in the offices happened over the course of a few weeks, and people felt united 
by the common threat. Public waiting rooms were a convenient arena for such useful encounters: 
people had time, but, also importantly, they could easily determine if the other people waiting 
were on their side – by listening to or striking up conversations. This allowed them to skip the 
awkward attempts to figure out neighbors’ positions in the building courtyard.  
However, the backstage arenas of the waiting rooms can work the same way even when 
there is no common issue for everybody waiting; other people and long lines are a potential arena 
for a strategic activist. Nadezhda, a housing activist from Losevo, had a life-changing encounter 
with an experienced activist in line on the “single office hours day:” a day when all city offices 
are open to the public. Nadezhda had tried to push the Moscow government to relocate the 
residents of her dorm-like building for a couple of years before Renovation. When Renovation 
was announced, she decided to use it as an opportunity to finally achieve this goal. Formally, she 
is a Renovation supporter, but her criticism of the existing housing system and activism in the 
housing sphere distinguish her from most Renovation supporters. She told me about the 
accidental meeting with a woman who became her activist “guru” in a waiting hall of the 
Moscow City Property Department: 
 149 
We met by accident. I went [to the Moscow City Property Department] on the “single 
office hours day” of the officials. […] And I jumped at everybody who I thought could 
tell me anything useful. I always had my materials with me, with my phone and address. 
There was a long line, and she spoke to someone, recommended something to them. I 
showed her my photographs [of the building]: she turned silent. […] And she said: young 
lady, I will help you. And she went into the office first, then I, and she said: now they 
saw that we left together. They know me. You’ll see that a reaction will follow. 
The two women stayed in touch afterwards, and Nadezhda learned a lot from her new 
teacher. Nadezhda is different from many other people mobilized by Renovation; she is a 
persistent and tireless activist, and she actively sought out potentially useful people in the 
waiting halls, strategically using these spaces as arenas. For others, it was more important to 
sense that they and others on the line shared a common cause in order to start talking to each 
other.  
Many Muscovites mastered these “cracks” and grey areas between the formal arenas, 
using them to establish strategic contacts and share information. Even if their main goal was to 
save their own building, they created and maintained networks of solidarity and support, and 
tried to help maximize the number of buildings that refuse to participate in the imposed 
relocation program. 
This collective participation and new solidarities were not something the government 
players wanted or welcomed. As I have shown above, at the meetings with heads of upravas, as 
well as at other similar events, officials pushed the requirement that Muscovites “speak only for 
themselves,” a popular tactic for dismissing collective claims. This was the dominant framework, 
or script, of the state player’s relationship with Muscovites during this program: they wanted to 
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avoid the formation of collective players and claims as much as possible, separating, isolating, 
and pitting individual neighbors against each other. These isolated individuals were expected to 
patiently wait for and consume the information about the program, make a decision individually, 
and express their opinion in the form of a “vote.” Initially, individual, almost solitary, voting was 
the only way to express the opinion. Later in the process, the Mayor allowed for homeowners’ 
assemblies  to include Renovation on their agendas. Assemblies, however, required too much 
interaction, deliberation, and collective action; unlike the innovative online voting platform “The 
Active Citizen.” 
Voting: an arena for individuals 
“Voting” was the innovation Sobyanin’s government was very proud of. Presented to the 
public as an unprecedented democratic move, voting took place online, at the “Active Citizen” 
website. Citizens not comfortable with digital technologies could go instead to the 
“multifunctional centers” (MFC) where they got their usual paperwork done (applied for 
passports, permissions, and other governmental services) and vote there. 
The voting had no legally binding power; it was a way of “collecting public opinion” and 
guidance about which buildings would be demolished. The rules for voting and the required 
share of residents agreeing to relocation changed over time; originally, the Mayor’s office 
announced that a simple majority would be enough to decide, but after a public outcry, they 
changed the rule to require two-thirds of the building’s homeowners and legal residents (social 
renters) to agree to demolition and relocation. Procedures for challenging the results of the vote 
weren’t elaborated. 
The online platform Active Citizen was not new; it had been launched in 2014 and was 
supposed to simplify (or, as some critics would say, simulate) citizen engagement in urban 
governance. Active Citizen is an electronic survey system where registered users can vote on a 
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range of urban issues, from which plants to place in the courtyards, to the introduction of video 
surveillance in kindergartens, to selection of territorial redevelopment projects (Semenova 2015). 
The system has received serious criticism from the beginning for suggesting that people vote on 
things outside their competence or for projects that were fundamentally illegal (Blog “Yoda” 
2015). Most importantly, journalists and opposition politicians criticized Active Citizen for its 
lack of transparency; critics argued that the results of the “voting” could be manipulated and 
rigged by the system’s architects (Rozhdestvenskiy 2015). Many opponents of Renovation 
repeated these suspicions, and it was a constant topic for outrage on social media. Opponents, 
especially those who lost their buildings to supporters of Renovation, had the strongest 
reservations.  
Voting at the MFCs was not fully accepted either. Aleksandra, a Renovation opponent in 
Rakitino, whose building was eventually included in the program, went to vote at an MFC 
because she did not trust Active Citizen. She saw flaws there, too: 
It was clear that all this voting was a big lie. Sort of like: calm down, your opinion matters. 
The other five-story [in our block] was about to vote against. But in the MFC, when you 
arrived to vote, they would tell you, those who are first in line for demolition, they would 
get very good conditions, good apartments. And if you vote against, you would be 
demolished last. (…) They did not say it to me, just took my paperwork, but I heard them 
saying it to grannies. I think they were all trained what to say to whom. (…) And then, you 
come to the MFC, and there is Sobyanin there on TV, promoting Renovation. Doesn’t 
matter what you came there for – you see the portrait, you see Renovation [ads]. It was a 
very strong, massive attack. 
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The Moscow government controlled the online system and could exercise some pressure 
on “voters” offline, too. Since it was not an actual election, no rules about fair campaigning 
applied. It was also impossible to check or challenge the results of the vote. By moving the 
decision-making to this new arena, the Mayor’s office removed all legal requirements and 
procedures that they would have had to follow in old-school arenas of citizen participation in 
urban governance, such as public hearings, referenda, or homeowners’ assemblies . 
Another aspect of the voting process that it differed from the old-school arenas was the 
focus on individual decision-making. People could vote online or in the MFCs without ever 
speaking to their neighbors or having to discuss anything with them. Those were, of course, 
rarely isolated decisions; even those Muscovites who avoided speaking to their neighbors usually 
followed discussions on social media. However, the voting itself did not have any space for 
discussions and emotions, like the face-to-face public hearings and meetings. The introduction of 
voting and its rushed character look like a strategy by the program’s architects to discourage 
meaningful discussions and informed decision-making. 
The online voting system posed a “digital dilemma,” for both the government and the 
citizens.  
For the government, the advantages clearly outweighed the shortcomings, but the latter 
were not nonexistent. The system encouraged individual participation, discouraged discussions, 
and limited the interactions of city officials with outraged or confused citizens. It also helped 
avoid the formal requirements of the real “voting” and other civic engagement procedures 
(public hearings): there were no legal tools available to citizens to challenge the results of the 
procedure, no costly preparations and strict procedures to adhere to. On the other hand, using the 
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system raised serious questions about its legitimacy and compatibility with other civic 
engagement procedures, which are more established and regulated. 
For the citizens, there were some clear advantages too. Not everyone found the emotional 
and often exhausting interactions with neighbors attractive or necessary. Even the anti-
Renovation activist Alla from Sokolovo, who successfully organized her neighbors to vote 
against inclusion, told me that she wouldn’t mind moving personal homeowners’ assemblies  to 
an online platform in order to avoid fighting and yelling at meetings about controversial issues. 
Online participation is also less costly: it is easier for shy people, it requires less time, and so on. 
Renovation was an emotional and life-changing subject, which forced even shy or busy people 
into the realm of civic activism. However, routine issues, for example building maintenance, 
don’t often have a similar effect. Electronic forms of engagement might increase participation 
because of the lower cost for the participants. Despite the advantages, moving all civic 
engagement online has serious limitations: in addition to legitimacy and transparency concerns, 
online arenas don’t create a space for meaningful conversations on a subject, especially across 
position lines. They also make the spontaneous encounters, as the meetings in the waiting rooms 
I described above, impossible. 
Conclusion 
Renovation pulled many Muscovites into the urban political field. They entered it by 
attending (and subverting) official arenas, such as public hearings and meetings in upravas, and 
by creating their own arenas – social media groups, workshops, and street rallies. The opponents 
of Renovation interfered in the urban political field more visibly than the supporters. The 
supporters’ strategies mostly aligned with the government’s plans, and they only had to mobilize 
if their building was left out of the initial demolition lists or opponents in the building threatened 
its inclusion.  
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The Mayor’s Office lauded themselves on creating an unprecedentedly democratic 
procedure for the public approval of the relocation project: for the first time, potential relocatees 
could vote to decide the fate of their building. However, the program did not assume any more 
meaningful participation of the residents in affected building than that; they were expected to be 
at best the audience in the official arenas, such as meetings in upravas and hearings on the 
Renovation bill in the State Duma. Officials actively discouraged collective identities and the 
formation of collective players, by emphasizing that the decisions can only be made by 
individuals, and each resident of a five-story building can only speak for herself. 
Concerned anti-Renovation activists rescripted this relationship of citizens and the 
government, and organized collectively to become a player even in the seemingly false formal 
arenas, where no decisions about the program’s design could be made, or where they were 
allowed in too late for this (public hearings on the bill in the State Duma). They created new 
(social media platforms, activist meetings) or transformed existing arenas (hijacking the meeting 
in uprava, using wait time for cooperation), eventually transforming, even if temporarily, the 
configuration of the urban political field in Moscow. 
One key feature of the Renovation-related mobilization was that even private, everyday 
spaces became arenas of the urban political field. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate how 
homes, courtyards, and playgrounds were politicized during Renovation Summer, revealing a 




Five-story amphitheaters: the politicization of courtyards and homes 
Anti-Renovation Muscovites were not wanted or expected players in city politics; they 
were not allowed to challenge the design of the program or discuss its effects on either the city or 
their neighborhoods. All decisions were supposed to be made by citizens individually, after 
calculating the gains or losses to their own housing situation. They could then register their 
opinion in the form of a vote online or in the polling stations in the one-window service centers 
in their neighborhood. 
It proved hard to confine the decision-making to individuals. Individuals and families in 
every apartment building considered for demolition were physically united by the building’s 
walls and foundations. They shared a fate, whether they wanted to or not. In the first drafts of the 
bill, decisions could be made by a simple majority of votes, but, after much public outcry, the 
necessary share of votes in favor of inclusion was increased to two-thirds. Even with this 
amendment, this decision-making model perplexed and outraged some Muscovites, both 
supporters and opponents of the program: how, they asked, could strangers be allowed to decide 
the fate of someone else’s property and future?  
And they were, indeed, perfect strangers in most cases: people did not know their 
neighbors, nor really cared for them, enjoying their cozy private homes and mostly ignoring 
anyone or anything outside their apartments. In some buildings, old-timers knew each other: 
some older residents, especially in the cooperative buildings, might have worked or built the 
coop together; younger people who grew up in these buildings were childhood friends. Many 
old-timers, however, were not well-connected to their neighbors. There were also many 
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“newcomers,” who had purchased or rented apartments and never established familiar relations 
with their neighbors. This changed when Renovation was announced. 
When building residents split over Renovation, the indoor and surrounding public places 
turned into arenas of bitter conflicts between neighbors trying to convince others to support their 
point of view. At this level, both opponents and supporters of Renovation were equally visible, 
unlike in the city- and neighborhood arenas, where the more organized anti-Renovation 
movement dominated. While city-level and neighborhood activism might look suspicious to 
some, especially politically alienated residents, building-level activism looked more legitimate: it 
was in people’s “personal interest,” after all. 
Muscovites had several instruments for influencing the fate of their buildings in addition 
to the suggested and not legally binding voting. These alternative instruments required some 
collective action, discussion, and solidarity building, unlike an isolated act of casting a vote. 
Some neighbors collected signatures to petition the authorities, but the main additional tool was 
the organization of a homeowners’ assembly. The preparations for an assembly took place in the 
apartments of organizers, on staircases, and in courtyards. The assemblies themselves were set 
up in courtyards and nearby playgrounds. Contention and strategic interaction took over the 
buildings’ common areas and the adjacent public places, which were usually not used for such 
public-spirited performances (Eliasoph 1998). 
Apartment buildings and the adjacent public places became arenas of political action, 
conflict, agitation, and contestation.24 Worried about the outcome of the vote, residents went out 
of their apartments to speak to and get to know their neighbors. Politics permeated these dormant 
 
24 Not all: in many apartment buildings, residents accepted the model suggested by the program, and cast 
their individual votes without much interaction with neighbors. This was often the case in buildings 
where no active anti-Renovation residents made themselves known. Such buildings voted 
overwhelmingly to support Renovation. 
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public spaces for several months and left a long-term impact on the relationships among 
inhabitants. 
Spaces of encounter  
The layout of the socialist five-story blocks allows people to meet and be seen. There are 
some planning differences in the districts constructed in different decades, but most of the 
affected blocks follow a few common principles. Blocks (kvartal), or microrayons, are 
surrounded by larger streets and roads, which protect the quiet residential ecosystems on the 
inside: smaller driveways and pedestrian paths cut through them, buildings are positioned in a 
neat order to ensure every apartment gets equal access to daylight and greenery, which is 
plentiful in the courtyards between buildings.25 Each microrayon is also supposed to have its own 
social infrastructure: schools, kindergartens, shops, playgrounds and sport facilities, as shown in 
Figure 8. Today, the internal driveways and sometimes even the small lawns in the courtyards 
are packed with cars; people prefer to park their cars so that they can observe them from their 
windows. 
The entrances to the five-stories are usually all located on one side of the building, facing 
the courtyard rather than busy external streets and roads. The pedestrian walkway is often 
separated from the building by a strip of bushes, trees, and small gardens. It is the only way 
everyone from the building enters their homes. Buildings are of different length and can have as 
many as eight entrances, and some residents must walk past at least half of the building to get to 
their entrance. On a warm day, people walking this path can observe residents working in small 
 
25 The socialist planning approach saw individual apartments and even buildings as part of a balanced 
system, a microrayon; the everyday practices in these residential ecosystems, however, did not always 
comply with the initial plan (Bogatikova 2013). 
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gardens squeezed between the walkway and the building or sitting on the benches installed in 
front of each entrance.  
                                                        
Figure 8. Block layout example: blocks # 41 and 42 in North Izmaylovo. Left: district planning 
variant (Volodin et al. 1960:77). White rectangles (1, 2, 3, 4) represent apartment buildings, 
different “series.” Other numbered rectangles are elements of social infrastructure (not all of 
them were actually built): 5 – boiler house; 6 – day care; 7 – kindergarten; 8 – school; 9 – 
administrative block; 10 – shop; 11 – movie theater; 12 – swimming pool; 13 – electrical 
substation. Right: The plan of the existing blocks. All painted rectangles are buildings included 
in Renovation. Base map: OpenStreetMap. 
These walkways and adjacent courtyards are also visible to people looking out of the 
windows and balconies facing this side of the building. In the summer, windows are often open, 
which makes observation – and communication – even easier. During the period of controversy, 
this spatial form allowed people to keep track of their neighbors’ activities and gatherings, 
officials’ visits, and the presence of agitators from the opposing side in their courtyard. 
Ekaterina, an anti-Renovation activist from Rakitino, described this spatial organization as an 
“amphitheater”: people from the buildings surrounding a courtyard looked out of their windows 
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and observed it like a stage or an arena. All these spaces became convenient arenas for 
conversations when the anxiety of Renovation pushed people out of their private bubbles onto 
the streets.  
 
Figure 9. Organization of a courtyard in front of a five-story building. Photo by Darya 
Khlevnyuk. 
People rarely knew many neighbors in their building, and when they had to go out and 
talk to these strangers, the first candidates were people who used the public places the most: who 
hung out on the benches, worked in their small gardens, or took care of stray animals. For 
instance, Mikhail and Tatyana, supporters of Renovation from Rakitino, told me: “Our neighbors 
are not very sociable. We only know one woman from the first floor, she is the building’s elder 
(starshaya po domu), and her daughter: they walk their dogs, they take care of their little garden. 
And we know another old lady from the first floor, she feeds the cats.” The people had a reason 
to hang out outside and be seen, unlike other, more private residents. They “owned” the block, 
felt most comfortable and entitled to use its public areas for their gatherings or gardening efforts. 
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Zukin, Kasinitz and Chen (2015:24) write about “symbolic” or “moral” ownership of public 
space, which “derives from patterns of sociability that are learned and reinforce in everyday 
actions, and become symbols of inclusion. Together, actions and symbols create a sense that 
certain groups “own” the street – although their sense of inclusion often signifies the exclusion 
of others.” By attending to their little gardens or animals, by being outside residents of the 
Moscow apartment blocks make their moral ownership visible to others. As the first people to be 
contacted by their shocked neighbors, these residents had a chance to influence the new dynamic 
in their buildings. 
Dog-owners and other people with a legitimate reason to routinely go outside were the 
first “glue” that worried residents used to establish new neighborly contacts. Dasha from 
Oreshino told me she didn’t know her neighbors, because she and her husband Ivan had just 
recently moved into their stalinka, and the first people she reached out to were dog-owners: “I 
started with my floor, the apartment across the hall from mine (…). This woman is a dog owner 
(sobachnitsa), and clearly, this is who you have to start with: if she is a dog owner, that means 
she goes for walks in the courtyard. And they should be talking about all of this, of course.” 
The opinions of these visible local characters were important, as they could frame the 
mood in their building by vocally supporting or opposing Renovation. For example, Rita had a 
tough experience with her visible neighbors: 
There is this “skeleton” (kostyak) of old-timers here, they are always in sight: they hang 
out on the benches in the summertime. I approached them, and they, of course, did not 
accept me. They yelled very loudly, “we are in favor, in favor!” I was so shocked, I 
thought they would be against [the Renovation]. Because they have those little flower 
gardens in front of the building, they are old-timers. When I arrived here, I noticed them 
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right away. And they are in favor of Renovation. And they yelled and screamed: go away 
with your propaganda! 
This encounter was unpleasant, and Rita, a shy and self-identified “passive” person took 
it to heart. However, she kept asking people on the street, and eventually found like-minded 
neighbors: “I found them by accident. I went out and saw a woman going toward our building. I 
asked her: are you against or in favor of Renovation? She says: I’m against it! She, her daughter, 
and two or three more people. But that was it.” There were not enough “active people,” she told 
me, and her building was eventually included in the demolition lists after the majority voted in 
favor. 
Isolation, connection, and arena control 
People have different feelings about to talking to strangers, but when Renovation hit, the 
force of the emotional shock drove many opponents of Renovation out of their homes and into 
the courtyards. Even shy people, like Rita, found themselves outside talking to scary strangers. 
Approaching strangers, even in the familiar environment near one’s home, was an act of bravery, 
as Raisa from Sokolovo explained to me: 
I’ve been walking with my child, and I see – a granny is [sitting there] sad, near the 
neighboring building. And I knew nobody at that moment yet. I approached her and 
started talking to her. And this is not a common step in our society. In Moscow, in Saint 
Petersburg, this is an act of bravery! And I started speaking with her: what do you think 
about Renovation? Do you like the idea of demolitions? And she says: my god, I don’t 
want the demolition so much! And such a desperation in her voice. I understood that she 
felt doomed. She thought that she was the only person who didn’t want demolitions, and 
everybody else wanted it. 
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Without connections to neighbors, many people believed they were in a minority. Leonid 
and Masha from Sokolovo, a young couple whose neighbors tried to petition for inclusion in the 
program, felt the same way before they made an effort to get to know their neighbors:  
Masha: I felt a complete apathy at first – what to do? I had an impression that everyone 
wants it, and it’s just us [who are against]. 
Leonid: That we are alone in the building, and everyone wants it.  
Masha: But then, when we got ourselves together and went out to get to know 
neighbors… We knew almost no one, spoke to no one, maybe [some people] on our 
floor. But we started talking to people, and we found that there were people who are also 
against. And some, we even managed to convince! 
This isolation of residents gave the advantage to the most vocal and connected neighbors. 
A few visible and recognizable people in each building could create this atmosphere of doom, 
making less connected residents feel that Renovation was predetermined and inevitable (or out of 
reach, if the vocal neighbors were against it).  
Old-timers had an advantage: they knew people in their buildings and blocks, they felt 
more entitled to make decisions about their building, and it was easier for them to dominate the 
discourses in their blocks and create initiative groups to hold a homeowner assembly. Their 
opinion about Renovation, therefore, really mattered. Newcomers, however, could achieve a 
similar status: for example, Vera, through her tireless activities to save her building and help 
others do the same, made her face known to local authorities, neighbors, and Facebook users. 
She and her husband grew from “private” newcomer residents into well-known local personas: 
We knew some neighbors in our building, we didn’t know others, but we got to know 
each other in the process. I think, now we know everybody in our building and several 
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neighboring buildings. At some point, my husband could not take our dog out anymore, 
because this walk would extend to, like, 40 minutes, because he met everybody from our 
building, and from the neighboring buildings, and they would all ask questions.  
“Newcomers” or less connected old-timers had to work to break their isolation and create 
new neighborly networks. They could start by identifying gatekeepers to local public places, dog 
walkers and gardeners, or simply by systematically knocking on their neighbors’ doors and 
finding (or convincing) allies. 
This is not to say that all the old-timers were better connected and had an automatic 
advantage. Many people born and raised in their buildings also had to do a lot of work. Lana, a 
young resident of Losevo, grew up in her block, yet still had a hard time when she tried to speak 
to her neighbors. She told me she was an “apolitical” artist before Renovation and was deeply 
shocked when she found her solid stalinka on the published lists of buildings suggested for 
demolition. She “ran” to her neighbors, knocked on their doors, and was so scared that she 
“probably did not make a good impression.” She was even more shocked when the few 
neighbors who agreed to open the door and talked to her said that they were looking forward to 
moving out. 
I remember that time very well, when I went outside. I began to take walks in the 
neighborhood, in general. I started to go outside: and there, I saw people like me, lost, 
who went out of their buildings and tried to catch sight of someone who was in a similar 
situation. This is how I met guys from our block. 
Lana’s walks around the block changed her: she successfully organized her neighbors to 
vote against the inclusion in the program, held a homeowner assembly with the same result, and 
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became a neighborhood activist and even a candidate in the municipal elections only four months 
after her transformative shock. 
Activists “walking on their blocks” were essential for linking isolated individuals, and 
they were not only transformed themselves, they transformed the social fabric of their districts. 
The “granny” from the quote above was lucky that Raisa approached her: they spoke, and Raisa 
learned that the old lady only spoke to a couple of neighbors she knew, and they all wanted to 
move out, making her feel inadequate. Raisa made her realize that there were “other people in 
this block,” gave her leaflets and her phone number to stay in touch. “Even a couple of months 
later, I received phone calls,” Raisa told me. “They held on to the leaflets with my phone 
number, these grannies. It was so touching!” Similarly, Leonid and Masha created their own 
network of Renovation opponents and managed to take over the discourse in their building, 
previously dominated by Renovation supporters.  
The public spaces surrounding the buildings turned into arenas for the expansion of these 
networks and for the agitation on both sides. It was crucial for each side to keep these spaces 
under control, to “police” the arenas. 
Opponents of Renovation controlled the presence of those who they thought were agents 
of the authorities advocating for the program: representatives of upravas, mobile polling stations 
that were spotted in several neighborhoods (buses with employees of multifunctional centers 
drove around to reach out to those who could not visit the centers in person), and even 
“sociologists” or pollsters they did not trust. When they spotted someone suspicious roaming 
around the courtyards or knocking on doors, the opponents would alert their networks: call 
people, post descriptions in the local social media groups, and run out to scare off or disrupt the 
activities of the perceived perpetrators. 
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Supporters of the program did the same. Worried about the outcome of the vote, they 
would try to prevent agitation against the program. Alena and her husband Victor, enthusiastic 
supporters of Renovation from Losevo, told me how they spotted the neighborhood anti-
Renovation activist in their courtyard, got dressed, ran out to the meeting, and confronted him.  
This [guy] and a woman from the building across the courtyard from ours, they decided 
to have a meeting and agitate people to vote against Renovation. They said, let’s quit 
now, the bills are not elaborate enough. And then we could petition for inclusion, if we 
wanted to. (…) And my husband and I, we went out at that moment when all these 
discussions were taking place. Anna: Was it in the courtyard? Alena: Yes, in the 
courtyard. And I said: what are you saying!  
 Their intervention challenged the Renovation opponents: people took out their phones to 
check official websites and confirm, whether the activists were telling them the truth. Eventually, 
Alena’s block voted in favor, unlike the block where the activist lived. 
Ekaterina was the object of similar policing. Her neighbors quickly learned that she was 
the main anti-Renovation organizer in their building and tried to limit her “agitation.” She told 
me that she was under her neighbors’ oversight whenever they spotted her walking in the 
courtyard: 
When I stopped to talk to a neighbor – there was someone else, wedging in from the 
balcony! Our buildings are small, five-stories, everybody is watching, like in an 
amphitheater, what’s going on. And they add something, they comment, and a crosstalk 
begins. I didn’t feel comfortable at home, over the summer. It was unpleasant to even 
walk in my beloved courtyard. 
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The intrusion of politics into the peaceful public spaces in these residential areas was 
unpleasant to many; by the design of the program, people were pitted against one another, and 
instead of challenging the authorities, they had to challenge their neighbors, and do it in familiar 
spaces. What happened in these arenas was crucial to the decisions recorded in the ballots of the 
“voting” and the homeowners’ assemblies. 
 
Figure 10. Viktoria Lomasko, from the series of sketches about Renovation. “One of the first 
assemblies initiated by the residents, who want their building to be included in the Renovation 
program.” Woman on the left says: “All Moscow is already signing, and there is still no law for 
us?” The man with the signature collection form on the right says: “Let’s vote after the bill is 
passed!” The assembly is taking place in the small entry hall of a five-story apartment building. 




From petitions to assemblies 
The public spaces, courtyards and driveways adjacent to apartment buildings became 
arenas for agitation and conversations where information circulated, networks of support were 
created, and foundations for individual decision-making were laid. Gains in these arenas shaped 
what happened in the arenas where formal decisions were made and recorded, including 
homeowners’ assemblies, signed petitions to avoid or demand inclusion, voting online or at the 
multifunctional centers. 
Petitions against inclusion were the earliest form of resistance to Renovation. Several of 
my interlocutors started the process of resisting Renovation as early as March and April 2017, 
before the lists of addresses considered for demolition and invitations to vote were even 
published. Like participating in the meetings in the upravas, described in the previous chapter, 
many worried Muscovites took preventive action. They went out to engage their neighbors as 
soon as they heard about the possibility of such a program.  
These early interventions often worked, as opponents managed to frame the program as 
risky and to persuade their neighbors before the massive wave of pro-Renovation propaganda hit 
the media. These anti-Renovation residents did not have to fight the interpretation of the program 
and its rules promoted by the Mayor’s Office a few weeks later. Timing and early mobilization 
were crucial. 
For example, Zhanna and Dasha, two women in their early 40s, live in two different 
stalinkas in the same block in Oreshino. Dasha and her husband Ivan mobilized right after they 
heard about Renovation and attended the first meeting with the head of the uprava in April. They 
talked to their neighbors and quickly collected their neighbors’ signatures under a petition for the 
government not to consider their building for demolition. They were lucky, Dasha told me, that 
among their neighbors there were no active supporters yet: “We collected those signatures so 
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quickly, literally on the next day, we collected them and said – we don’t need that shit!” They 
submitted their petition to the uprava, and their building was not included in the demolition lists 
when they were published in early May.  
Zhanna, on the other hand, learned about the program a little later, just before the 
demolition/voting lists were published, and she did not collect signatures preventively. She found 
her building on the list, and, also with the help of her husband, tried to organize a homeowner 
assembly and to convince her neighbors to vote against inclusion. It was much more difficult by 
that point: the uprava delayed the issue of the necessary documents (the roster of homeowners in 
the building), and by the time she got all she needed, it was too late: “They gave it to us, but we 
missed the right moment. They had already started their wave of propaganda.”  
Scholars of social movements have observed the importance of timing for movements’ 
success, identifying an “early gains/ later losses” pattern (Jasper and Poulsen 1993; Voss 1993). 
Movements often make gains early in the process, before there is strong resistance or 
countermobilization to their cause. However, these early successes can increase a movement’s 
visibility and perceived threat by opponents, which can lead to countermobilization and more 
resistance to the movement in the future. It can also lead to more learning and experience among 
the adversaries, the issue I return to below. 
In this case, the city administration missed or allowed for these early mobilizations but 
increased their resistance later. The effectiveness of “early petitions” is indirect evidence of the 
process the Moscow government followed to decide which buildings to include; petitions 
showed them which buildings would be against demolitions, and, perhaps to increase the 
impression of overwhelming support for the program, they excluded such buildings from the 
voting lists, even if they were in the same block and almost identical to those included, like 
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Zhanna’s and Dasha’s buildings. While this practice of pre-selection may appear reasonable, it 
was not formalized, transparent, or even announced until after it was over.  
After the publication of the demolition lists, some people were frustrated to find their 
addresses there, others were disappointed not to be included. Apart from the voting procedure, 
described in the previous chapter, everyone had the opportunity to organize a homeowner 
assembly, the formal tool of homeowners’ self-governance.  
This procedure is regulated by the Housing Code and must follow a strict order to be 
valid: announcements about the date and agenda of assembly should be posted and distributed to 
homeowners at least ten days in advance. The organizers must have proof that they indeed 
informed everyone: either personal signatures from the residents, or a stamp from the post office 
that the information was mailed to the recipient. To know whom to inform and whose votes to 
collect at the assembly, the organizers need an official roster of homeowners, available either at 
the upravas (who often refused to give these documents to assembly organizers, citing privacy 
issues) or for a fee from legal consulting firms. At least half the homeowners in the building 
must participate for the assembly’s decisions to be valid. It is possible to have a mixed assembly 
form, with some people voting in person, at the common meeting, and others in absentia: they 
can fill in the ballots and return them to the organizers after the in-person meeting. The 
organizers keep track of the ballots and calculate the results, carefully recording the ID numbers 
of the ownership certificates and the share of the floor area for each voter (at homeowner 
assemblies, the share determines the “weight” of a vote). These bureaucratic details became a 
contested issue of their own: the adversaries often tried to undermine assembly decisions they 
didn’t like, claiming the rules were violated, in some cases leading to long fights and even 
lawsuits, not to mention animosity. 
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The tedious preparation for the assembly, calculation of the voting outcome, and 
submission of the documents to the designated offices was the task of the assembly organizers. It 
was a learning curve for most of them; few people were familiar not to mention comfortable with 
the procedure. Some hired lawyers to help them with the paperwork, others studied the 
regulations on their own. The most emotionally demanding part of the process was the actual in-
person meeting, or “Day X,” as Denis ironically called it. On assembly day, people got together 
in the courtyards or playgrounds near their building. They set up tables and chairs to adjust the 
open space for long discussions and paperwork. In many cases, the assemblies turned into real 
debates, with speeches against or in favor of the program, people changing their minds and 
rewriting ballots. In some cases, people got emotional and started fighting, verbally and 
physically, and in some cases, police were called to intervene. 
Assemblies turned into fights more often toward the end of the decision-making season; 
especially, after the July 1st deadline. In Chapter 4, I noted how the meddling with deadlines by 
the city administration and the constantly changing rules increased the uncertainty and frustration 
for the participating Muscovites. The change of the deadline for homeowners’ assemblies was 
one such move that polarized the conflict even more. 
Initially, Muscovites could hold homeowners’ assemblies to request inclusion in the 
program until July 15th. But the passing of the legislation in the Duma changed the deadline 
abruptly, making all the assemblies scheduled for after July 1st useless and illegal. This fiddling 
with the deadlines created an additional tension between the neighbors and disappointed many 
supporters of Renovation who did not make it on time. Artur felt “betrayed” by the government: 
he tried to hold a homeowner assembly to request inclusion of his home in Sokolovo twice, to no 
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avail. First, he and his partners failed to comply with the bureaucratic procedure, and the second 
time, his perfectly legal assembly scheduled in early July was voided by the change of deadline.  
Timing mattered not only for the petitions but for the homeowners’ assemblies  as well, 
and not just because of the shifting deadline. Gradually, participants in the controversy on both 
sides learned more about the formalities of the homeowners’ assemblies and various tactics 
available to them. It was another example of the importance of the early gains, or intervention 
early in the process, mentioned above.  
Over time, for example, people learned the importance of a quorum and withdrew from 
participation in the assemblies that were likely to vote against them. Earlier in the process, it 
seemed important to participate in assemblies to make one’s vote count; however, people 
realized (and taught each other) that sometimes it is wiser to stand back, thus solving the “being 
there dilemma” (Jasper 2006b). By being absent, they could cripple the arena, voiding its 
decisions. At least half of the homeowners and social renters in the building had to participate in 
the assembly for its decisions to be legitimate; to be excluded from the program, at least one 
third of those votes had to be against inclusion. Supporters could orchestrate a boycott of the 
assembly, voiding its decisions. Withdrawal from an arena was a consequential strategic move. 
The technical side of the assembly, however tedious, was not the biggest concern for 
organizers. They had to make sure people voted the way they wanted them to vote, and that 
required preparation and conversation with neighbors. At the assembly, these interactive 
processes continued, and required additional skills of public speaking and persuasion. The 
persuasion work had to be performed in the “public register” of conversations, unfamiliar to 
many of the ordinary Muscovites. 
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Learning the public talk  
Researchers of Russian civil society and politics have observed that, while there is a well-
established tradition and language of addressing authorities in the form of complaints and 
requests (Bessonova 2019; Bogdanova 2014) — in a vertical chain of communications – the 
language and rules for horizontal democratic decision-making and public-spirited talk have no 
such tradition. The skills of speaking to adversaries and large audiences, in the “public register,” 
are almost absent in contemporary Russia due to the suppression of such situations throughout 
the 20th century, which resulted in a “public numbness” (Vakhtin and Firsov 2017). 
Renovation created a situation where people had to talk to each other and enter the 
unfamiliar “public register.” Some of them had useful skills from their professional lives, others 
had to learn public speaking strategies by doing them. But first, people needed to enter the public 
domain, go out and knock on their neighbors’ doors, organize informal meetings to discuss 
Renovation or formal homeowners’ assemblies .  
Not everybody was ready to perform these “acts of bravery,” as Raisa called talking to 
strangers. They could turn to mediated options: for example, distributing leaflets and other 
materials about the risks and promises of Renovation. However, anti-Renovation materials 
posted in public view often disappeared, removed by janitors, who are employees of the local 
administration. The safest option was to put the materials in people’s mailboxes, but to access 
the lobby areas where the mailboxes are located, activists needed access codes to each entry 
hall’s intercoms, or had to know people in each of the stairwells. In some local groups, people 
kept spreadsheets of codes for the distributors to use, a valuable and secret resource given only to 
trusted allies. 
Another way to have an impersonal conversation was to exchange handwritten or printed 
messages posted on entrance doors, in public view. Sometimes these messages turned into 
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interactive and passive-aggressive boards, with calls for adversaries to cease their subversive 
activities in the building (social media are full of examples, one is shown on Figure 11). Both 
sides tried to outperform their adversaries in posting their own and taking down the other sides’ 
announcements.  
Figure 11. An interactive “board:” the original handwritten message calling neighbors to vote for 
Renovation is covered with responses by Renovation opponents: “People! Don’t be stupid! Shut 
down the TV! Read [underlined] the text of the bill, there is HELL!” They also added “illegal” to 
the word “vote” in the original message, and a letter “X” to the word “Renovation,” turning it 
into the nickname often used by Renovation opponents, “khrenovatsiya,” which can be 
translated approximately as “bullshitization.” Source: https://daily.afisha.ru/infoporn/5637-ne-
budte-ravnodushnymi-da-hren-vam-kak-v-podezdah-agitiruyut-za-renovaciyu/ 
Leaflets were less effective than personal contact. Even in the supposedly digitalized and 
mediated world of today, offline spaces of encounter were crucial for people to overcome their 
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isolation. The main tool of persuasion was personal conversations, something most people 
dreaded and were not very good at. Some were too shy, others too emotional or antagonizing.  
In personal conversations, everything mattered, especially the conversation starters, as 
many of my interlocutors learned from their own failed experience. Many began with the 
question “Are you against or in favor of Renovation?” As Rita learned, this question could 
produce an aggressive response, if the interlocutors suspected the person asking was of a 
different opinion than theirs. Lana also learned it the hard way: when she “ran” to talk to her 
neighbors the first time, she told me, she was so scared that she “didn’t make a good impression. 
Because I started with ‘are you against or are you in favor.’ And I heard that the majority were in 
favor.” Later, she learned that starting a conversation with this question was divisive. She 
learned to start conversations differently. 
Almost every successful anti-Renovation activist told me that they started their 
conversations with neighbors with a series of questions: “Have you heard about Renovation? 
What do you think about it? Why so?” It was important, they told me, not to alienate people right 
away. After hearing them out, one might start expressing concerns in a mild, non-antagonizing 
way. 
Agitation on both sides required this ability to tone down one’s own views and find a 
language of common interest and shared fate. It was important to talk to people to learn about 
their situations to make the bridging of positions possible. Activists knocked on neighbors’ doors 
in an attempt to figure out who the people living next door were, what were their aspirations and 
expectations. Inna, an anti-Renovation activist in a stalinka in Oreshino, told me that learning the 
opinions without antagonizing people was their first step: “Twice a week, we would make a 
round and knock on apartment doors. Because first, we needed to understand [the opinions], we 
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conducted kind of an opinion poll. And we told people: our building is included in this program, 
what do you think about it? What do you plan to do? What do you think about our initiative to 
have a homeowner assembly?” 
To help the opponents of Renovation navigate their staircases successfully and safely, the 
Facebook group “Muscovites against Renovation” created two web documents. First was the 
comprehensive guide to talking to “zasnosy”. This document provided general guidelines (how 
to act, which topics to focus on and which to avoid) prepared by a “professional psychologist” 
who also happened to be an anti-Renovation activist. Another file, open for additions and edits, 
listed concrete responses to possible questions in a spreadsheet format. 
The general guidelines suggested a classification of adversaries and identified groups that 
were worthy of “investment” of time and effort, and directed the activists to avoid unnecessary 
confrontations, personal attack, and excessive emotionality. The guide suggested they remember 
that neighbors were basically in the same boat, despite their differences: “From the very 
beginning: try to avoid confrontation, don’t take a conflicting position. Think that you have 
overlapping interests, to live in good conditions. You just see them differently.” It also carefully 
suggested avoiding divisiveness based on the “newcomers” vs “old-timers” narrative:   
Use speech constructs such as “we,” “us,” “ours,” things that unite. Even if you have the 
prejudice, don’t mention non-Muscovites, foreigners (inorodtsy), people of different faith 
(inovertsy) and other ponayekhali26, if you don’t want to alienate people who were not 
lucky enough to be born in pervoprestol’naya [“the oldest capital,” Moscow’s old 
nickname]. This is a common problem, it unites everybody. 
 
26 An umbrella concept for newcomers, derived from the verb ponaekhat’ – to arrive, but with a 
derogatory note. 
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This pragmatic recommendation refers to a set of popular social divides which made the 
neighbors’ interactions so difficult: different ethnicities (and their proxy, religion), social and 
economic status, and length of residency in the capital. These distinctions were quickly aligned 
in the popular perception with political positions and positions on Renovation, and finding a 
common ground required some strategic work. 
Boundaries and divides: online and offline 
The divide between newcomers and old-timers was the ready-made scheme that people 
could use to explain differences in their neighbors’ attitudes and entitlement.27 People used it to 
explain who had the right to speak, who possessed knowledge and expertise to estimate the 
“real” value of the apartment buildings, and even who should make decisions. Ekaterina, who 
had a mortgage on the apartment she bought five years ago, felt that her right to decide the future 
of her building was diminished by the older residents: 
Ekaterina: I was alone, and also someone who only came 5 years ago, bought the 
apartment… 
Anna: Was this an issue? 
Ekaterina: yes, for many people: we have suffered all our life here, and you came. It is 
funny, how people compete. I am a Muscovite, I was born here and lived here. I told 
them: look, I am a Muscovite, too, how does this give you a right to dispose of my 
apartment instead of me? If a person comes from a different city – does he have fewer 
rights to his property in this neighborhood? Why does it matter? 
 
27 Kasinitz and Hillyard (1995) demonstrate how the old-timer status can be strategically mobilized in 
their discussion of old-timers in Red Hook, a New York neighborhood, who used nostalgia to claim 
legitimacy in interactions with public authorities and to assert their status as a group to represent the 
neighborhood and have a say in decisions about its future, as opposed to poor Black and Puerto Rican 
residents. 
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Anna: is this some kind of right of the first? 
Ekaterina: yes! And you all came here (ponaekhali)!  
The length of residency aligned with property statuses: in the quote above, Ekaterina 
refers to property rights as the ultimately important factor, stressing that ownership makes 
everyone equal, regardless of how long they have lived in a building. As a mortgage holder, she 
felt particularly vulnerable; mortgage holders were sometimes perceived as inferior, flawed 
homeowners. For example, Figure 12 shows a sketch by an artist Victoria Lomasko, which she 
drew at her friend’s homeowner assembly. The journalist Elena Kostyuchenko, Lomasko’s 
friend, is at the center of the sketch, surrounded by neighbors. One of them, a young woman in a 
pink track suit says: “You are a mortgage holder! You have only lived here for three years, you 
have no right to speak!” Being a mortgage holder implies that a person is a newcomer, and their 
formal property right is inferior to the rights of the old-timers. 
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Figure 12. Viktoria Lomasko, from the series of sketches about Renovation. “Assembly of 
residents in the building of the “Novaya Gazeta” journalist Elena Kostyuchenko.” Elena 
Kostychenko is portrayed at the center of the sketch. Neighbor on the left: “We hope we get 
good apartments.” Woman in a pink tracksuit on the right: “You are a mortgage holder! You 
have only lived here three years, you have no right to speak!”. June 11, 2017. Reproduced with 
the artist’s permission. URL: 
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1437270986321567&set=a.1437125943002738&typ
e=3&theater  
Some old-timers referred to a different aspect of property: the subjective value of these 
apartments and buildings, deeply interwoven with their lives and life prospects. Some felt deeply 
connected to their neighborhoods and to homes that they did not want to lose, and they 
substantiated their right to stay put with this relationship of belonging and the subjective value of 
their apartments, rather than their market value. Other old-timers felt that they had invested their 
“suffering” in their apartments and living in what they interpreted as bad conditions for a long 
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time. They believed they knew more than the newcomers about the true value of these buildings 
and, therefore, were more entitled to decide what happens to them. 
Galina, an initiator of a pro-Renovation homeowners’ assembly in her building in 
Sokolovo, thought that the newcomers couldn’t estimate the real quality of the building, unlike 
the old residents such as herself: 
There are so many newcomers. They come from faraway regions, from villages. They 
maybe saved money all their life for this apartment, and they can’t part with this shack 
(khalupa). It is useless trying to explain it to them! One girl, 25 years old, I talked to her 
this summer. She came from some faraway region.  I understand that for her Moscow – is 
the top. And she bought a first-floor corner apartment. And she says: I’m so happy, I 
have large windows, so much fresh air! [And I say]: You might as well live in a tent! 
While participants in the Renovation controversy perpetuated the impression that the 
“old-timer vs newcomer” dichotomy neatly described the divide between the supporters and 
opponents, this was not the case. The contrast was a convenient rhetorical tool that allowed 
speakers to claim legitimacy and privileges. People on both sides claimed that they were the 
“native Muscovites,” the true old-timers, while the other side was mostly comprised of 
newcomers seeking only personal gain and not appreciating Moscow’s legacy and culture. 
This division was a result of strategic character work (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2020). 
While trying to explain who voted against or for the program, many Muscovites and media 
commentators turned to familiar tropes, characters to blame. On both sides of the controversy, 
people referred to the same characters to explain their adversaries’ views: they were young or 
old, they were newcomers to the city, or they were “marginal”: this label described someone who 
is poor, addicted to alcohol, and generally not well off. Supporters and opponents of Renovation 
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both took their cultural materials from the margins of the social hierarchy to explain the 
behaviors of their neighbors that they could not understand and saw as malevolent.  
Character work mobilized solidarities and support within the two camps. It worked 
especially well in social media: claiming the status of good citizens and true Muscovites allowed 
people to feel superior, united, and hopeful. Here we see Tilly’s WUNC displays (Tilly 2008) 
once again (manifestations of collective worth, unity, numbers, and commitment); presenting 
themselves as morally worthy, strong, and committed, anti-Renovation activists tried to make the 
authorities respect them. They also wanted to look like heroes in the eyes of potential supporters 
and undecided bystanders. Jasper et al. (Jasper, Young, and Zuern 2018) argue that balancing the 
dimensions of WUNC requires some tricky strategic work by the movement, choosing the right 
amount of strength, for example, to recruit the necessary support, while retaining moral purity. 
Displaying the right qualities is not only necessary to impress other players: unity, morality, and 
commitment may be just as important for group-building, for the formation of players. 
Despite its importance for the establishment of the movement, character work sometimes 
interfered with building-level cooperation. It created prejudice: seeing someone as poor, or not 
well educated, or a newcomer, might have hindered activists’ ability and willingness to speak to 
these people as equals, who are in the same boat and share the same troubles and Renovation-
related aspirations. This is what the “guide” I mentioned above also warned against, though in a 
rather tongue-in-cheek manner: yes, they may be uneducated newcomers, it implied, but it 
doesn’t mean you can’t convince them to vote your way and support your point of view at the 
homeowner assembly. 
The alignment of perceived social boundaries with positions regarding Renovation was 
detrimental to long-term relationships among neighbors, as I will show in the next chapter, but it 
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was also harmful for activists’ efforts at the building level. The dilemma – choosing within-camp 
solidarity based on a sense of social superiority or bridging social divides to achieve a goal – was 
exacerbated by the social media discourses, which in turn made the divisions stronger in offline 
arenas as well. As Kirill, a resident of Rakitino in his 40s, said, 
I think that Muscovites against Renovation, this group, it got fried (nakrylas’), went 
down because they started making these barriers: zasnosy, and not zasnosy, normal 
people. Everybody else is zasnosy. You put yourself in their place first, and then put 
these labels on them. And the labels are like – well, they are the thugs that just sit at 
home, eat pelmeni, drink beer and hope that they will now be relocated into palaces 
(khoromy). This is a standard label, when they put it on people, all gets derailed.  
The complementary online and offline arenas followed different tactics of dealing with 
difference: online arenas were mostly seen as platforms to increase within-camp solidarities, 
while in the offline arenas the presence of adversaries or people without a clear affiliation 
encouraged pragmatic activists to exercise more caution. It was a dangerous illusion, however, 
that the online anti-Renovation and pro-Renovation groups were isolated and dedicated only to 
within-group interaction. As Denis from Oreshino, an old-timer and Renovation opponent, 
learned, the supporters of Renovation monitored the anti-Renovation group on Facebook, where 
he made a misstep: he mentioned that everyone supporting Renovation was ponayekhavshiye 
(newcomers). His neighbors read about it, and it almost disrupted the homeowner assembly in 
his building: 
When this day X [the day of the homeowner assembly] came, we all came together in the 
courtyard. People came, and it was a very difficult conversation. People had complaints 
about me, what I wrote in our Oreshino Facebook group several times. I tried to be polite 
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– I am always polite; I didn’t use tough language. But they interpreted it in this specific 
way. Like I called them “bydlo” [white trash] and “ponayekhavshiye” [newcomers]. I 
didn’t write it, of course! I used the word “ponayekhavshiye,” but in quotation marks, in 
a broad sense of this word: not the people who live here for a long time and who value 
this neighborhood, but people who are newcomers in a negative sense. There are people, 
who live here for three years, and this is mobility, and nothing is wrong with that. It is a 
lifestyle. But it means that they don’t really care about the place where they currently 
live. They can choose. That is what I meant, that they have this different attitude. Anna: 
But people were insulted? Denis: Yes, they were insulted. One old lady, as it turned out, 
read this Facebook group. But I have known her for a long time, so we managed to sort it 
out. I could explain that I meant no offense. 
For activists on both sides, it was important to overcome the labels and boundaries to 
convince and work with their neighbors for a common goal. Some people were more open to it 
than others. Elizaveta, in her 20s, became an activist against Renovation in both her building and 
her parents’ building and was surprised when her stereotypes were challenged: 
I thought these would be the most active and thinking people, those who saved money, 
they bought this apartment, or at least renovated it. That they would, on the one hand, 
think and understand, and on the other hand, they would be concerned about their 
material assets. I thought: some grandma, she would not care – an old house, or a new 
house, they relocate her – and she’s ok. Or an alcoholic – of course, he’d be happy to 
move to a clean apartment. Or the poor, or the uneducated, maybe. And it was all the 
other way around! 
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Elizaveta lists several criteria that were important not only for character work, but for the 
building-level dynamic during the Renovation controversy. These perceived social distinctions 
were enacted by neighbors at their face-to-face meetings, from spontaneous conversations in the 
courtyards to homeowners’ assemblies. 
Homeowners’ assemblies: face-to-face reenactments of social distinctions 
These familiar characters were convenient tropes which helped people on both sides 
mobilize necessary emotions to create and maintain group solidarities, justify their goals, and 
legitimate their claims. In many face-to-face situations, however, a different mechanism worked: 
now that the socially diverse population of the five-story blocks could finally meet in person and 
inspect each other, they could reenact and observe their social differences in real-life situations. 
Perceived “education” and associated cultural skills had the most striking effect on these 
exchanges.  
Educated and resourceful members of the middle class were better prepared to deal with 
the state bureaucracy and to read the tedious regulations and laws to prepare, for example, for a 
homeowner assembly. Education and skills of working with information were more important 
than money: money could help hire a lawyer to help with paperwork, but it could not help with 
convincing neighbors or with searching for arguments in favor or against Renovation. People 
familiar with paperwork and able to present information had an advantage; and there were such 
people on both sides of the controversy.  
They were savvier in looking for information, speaking in public, finding adequate words 
to persuade people, and even designing the leaflets and other printed materials. Viktor, whose 
occupation involved both artistic and rhetorical skills, told me that these helped him design 
convincing, official looking posters where he described various Renovation-related risks, which 
scared many potential supporters of the program in his building. At the homeowner assembly, he 
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said, it also helped that he knew how to speak in public and convey arguments: “I am an 
experienced public speaker; my occupation includes conveying information. […] Like I said, I 
prepared the factual part, and my neighbors the legal part. I prepared a very convincing and well 
substantiated presentation. I provided them with all the arguments. And the people who arrived 
at the assembly undecided, they made a decision [against participation].” 
Seeing this, people with fewer cultural skills were less confident and felt surpassed by 
such performances of good speech and overall savviness. Marianna, who owned apartments in 
two different stalinkas in Oreshino, reconstructed for me the dialogs she had had with her 
neighbors at the homeowner assembly in one of these buildings. A professional writer, she was 
conscious of the means of expression she and her interlocutors used at the assembly, and framed 
them during the interview as a class thing:  
Marianna: You can’t [show] weakness. When you are being yelled at, you can’t respond 
in the same way. That was a rough effort for me. I don’t mean any disdain for people of a 
different social status. It’s just the way they communicate. This is a norm in their 
environment. I’m not saying it is good or bad, there are just such norms. And they try to 
force those norms in conversations, and it is really important to keep up with your own 
norms. You put up like a little shield, and the person understands a little bit that they 
shouldn’t speak like this. 
Anna: They understand? 
Marianna: Yes. There was this old man, he did nothing bad to me, he just railed against 
me, that we were all sold out bitches. And I replied calmly: why are you insulting me? 
Did I do anything bad? And he goes: you are all! Stop. Me, in particular? And I see that 
he backs off. And one woman, who was also pro demolition, she says: we are simple 
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people, why do you speak to us like this? We are simple. Don’t talk to us like this. We 
don’t know no laws… 
Anna: Like this – like what? 
Marianna: [In a way] that they don’t understand!  
Marianna observed that correct and long phrases, along with complicated words 
intimidated less educated neighbors in the homeowner assembly conversations. She was a 
professional writer and knew how to pick words. It is possible that she exaggerated her effect on 
the less educated neighbors, but she and her partners, all women of a similar age and social 
status, managed to ensure that the whole block of buildings included in Renovation voted out of 
the program, and confirmed this decision in a series of homeowners’ assemblies  in each 
building. 
Some people on the receiving side of such speeches and actions reported to me a feeling 
of being suppressed and overwhelmed. Artur from Sokolovo, a cab driver, father of a family with 
three kids, tried to organize a homeowner assembly to include his stalinka in Renovation. He had 
to do it twice, because he and his partners failed to comply with all the formalities the first time. 
They even managed to scrape together some money to hire a lawyer to help them with the 
process and organize a second assembly. In addition to the technical side of organizing an 
assembly, he had troubles with the strong opposition in the building. It included Leonid and 
Masha, a young educated couple. They did their best to inform other residents about the risks of 
Renovation, designed and printed convincing leaflets, persuaded the “swing-voters” to vote 
against the inclusion. Artur sighed, disappointed by his loss, and told me that his opponents were 
“stronger:” “They came both times and started a fight, both in the first and the second assembly. 
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They came, they yelled and screamed that this is all a lie. […] These opponents, they are very 
strong. I must give them what’s due. They were stronger than us.” 
It was easier for couples to be stronger; partners supported each other and divided the 
tasks. For people who were alone in their activism it was harder, though not impossible. 
Ekaterina, mentioned above, specifically mentioned that she “was alone” to explain why 
becoming an activist was tough for her. Rita also mentioned her loneliness as an explanation for 
her “passivity.”  
The majority of activists on both sides of the controversy were women. Marianna, quoted 
above, reflected on this and told me that “it was a women’s battle” – home is a female domain. 
Among my interview participants, and in line with Marianna’s observation, the majority were 
women. Women seemed more appropriate defenders of home. Some male interviewees told me, 
women just felt more comfortable talking to neighbors because they were more “sociable.” 
Although my female interviewees never mentioned that socializing with strangers was easier for 
them, they often accepted the division of labor with their male partners. 
However, in some situations gender was a hindrance. Media producer Viktor, whom I 
quoted above, benefitted from his respected occupation, his rhetorical and “people” skills, but it 
was also convenient that he was a man. People paid attention to what he had to say: he was a 
legitimate public speaker. In contrast to this, Vera, the anti-Renovation activist from Rakitino, 
learned that her gender could be a hindrance. She compared her and her husband’s experience of 
talking to the same person, who eventually changed his mind about Renovation and sided with 
the opponents: 
When I called him [to invite him to the homeowner assembly], he took it, like… he said 
that he would vote but he would vote in favor, because all my arguments [were weak]. 
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Maybe, he is just prejudiced against women. He went on like: “Who are you, what are 
you saying, I have lived longer, I am an engineer” of some kind, when I told him that it 
would be possible to just repair our building. He said: “it is impossible, and what you are 
doing is bullshit.” But then he spoke to my husband, and maybe he also read something. 
[…] Later, when he came to me to sign the papers, he was already telling me how bad 
this program was and how he didn’t want to participate. 
Many people changed their minds: 15 thousand people out of the 241 thousand who cast 
their vote changed their mind once, 960 people voted three times, 13 people tried five times, and 
two people even changed their vote seven times (Semenova and Chernyshev 2017); since it was 
not actual voting, people could change their mind and revote as often as they liked. Based on my 
conversations with Muscovites, I can assume that most of those who changed their minds did not 
do it in isolation: people spoke to neighbors, family members, and followed online discussions to 
decide how to vote.  
Housing strategies and activists’ tactics 
In Chapter 5, I noted that some people developed their positions immediately after they 
heard about Renovation while others took their time to come up with a position or changed their 
minds in the process. What was it that changed over time and that the activists on both sides 
could influence? After activists learned how to speak in the “public register,” avoided divisive 
speech, and did their best to find a common ground with their social different neighbors, what 
could they say?  
The decision to support or reject the program was not the direct result of someone’s 
social and economic status, migration history or housing biography, though these characteristics 
and positions on Renovation sometimes blended to reinforce the opposing sides’ solidarities or 
antagonism against each other. People decided whether to support or oppose the program based 
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on their estimation of the perceived risks and benefits of accepting the game suggested by the 
Moscow government. Their estimation of these risks and benefits, of course, was influenced by 
their housing biographies, their individual or family histories of the relationships with the state, 
available resources for housing improvement, and the amount of resources they had already 
invested in the existing housing. All these elements shaped the individual’s or the family’s 
housing strategies. 
But activists could intervene in these strategies by changing the estimation of the housing 
quality and the risks and costs of participation in the program. They could increase or diminish 
the significance of the risk involved, the value of the existing versus the “would-be” promised 
apartment. People could change their minds if they adjusted these factors in their strategic 
thinking.  
Every activist I spoke to, on both sides of the controversy, had stories to tell about how 
they convinced people, or how their adversaries “fooled” people. There was plenty of room for 
speculation, since the program’s rules were unclear for such a long time. Opponents 
disseminated the perception that the program was risky, because the government was not to be 
trusted, and supporters maintained that it was a good and free way to improve housing 
conditions.  
Leonid and Masha emphasized the risk of being relocated to a remote area within the 
formal boundary of Sokolovo. It was a valid concern: while the new legislation guaranteed that 
the new buildings would be in the same administrative district (okrug), the districts are quite 
large, and their parts differ in social life, physical infrastructure, and proximity to subway 
stations. Leonid, Masha, and their opponent Artur told me the same story of a person who 
changed his mind under Leonid’s influence at the homeowner assembly. The argument that 
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worked was the fear that the government would trick people out of their good neighborhoods and 
relocate them to remote areas. Leonid was proud of his achievement: 
I convinced him, I told him what this program is all about. And he is a simple man, he is 
55 or 60, he is rather tough. And the Russian mentality is all about long thinking and 
rapid action. I told him: they lied to you. And he went to take his ballot back. […] He 
says, I want it back. They were like: we’ll just cross you out. He goes no, I want it back, 
because it is my personal data. And they didn’t want to give it to him, but he grabbed it, 
and he tore it apart. It demoralized them really. They did not expect me to show up and 
tell people [the truth]. 
Artur told me that this neighbor had voted already, stepped away and was “caught” by 
Leonid. After the conversation with him, the neighbor returned and asked for his ballot, saying “I 
don’t want to move to Moscow Region!” Artur was genuinely puzzled, but also admitted that the 
argument was effective: he did not believe that the government would fool people like this, but 
also understood why many people would expect that. 
Effective strategies involved the brokerage of expectations, hopes, and emotions attached 
to housing and the state. Activists on both sides tried to emphasize some of them and downplay 
others, and many did it very skillfully, based on a careful study of what each particular neighbor 
was cautious of and what kind of housing future they aspired to. In chapter 3, I introduced 
Ruslan, who changed his opinion on Renovation from ardent rejection to support, and his 
neighbor Danil. Here I will show in more detail how Danil reframed and “sold” Renovation to 
his neighbors.  
Danil: Renovation broker 
When I met Danil in his office in Rakitino, just across the street from his home, in March 
2018, he was proud that his efforts to include his solid five-story stalinka in Renovation had 
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succeeded. I was not surprised to learn that he lived in a communal apartment. Many residents of 
communal apartments saw Renovation as their best shot at getting their own flats in Moscow. 
Danil’s situation was a classic example of Moscow’s crisis of affordable housing: he moved for 
work from a town in central Russia, where he sold his three-room apartment, only to afford 
nothing more than a room in a kommunalka in Moscow. He was open about his motivation: 
“Why was I in favor? This is very simple, because the kommunalka owners are the strongest 
supporters. I had my cold calculation. Therefore, I developed all this activity and dedicated so 
much time to it. I’ve spent a whole month doing just that.” 
Danil told me that their “building elder,” a woman in her 60s, was against Renovation, 
and when the uprava informed her that the building could petition for inclusion, she concealed 
this information from other residents. When Danil learned about this, he used this against the 
Renovation opponents in the building: their practices were shady and not to be trusted.  
There were people who had doubts, who didn’t know what it was all about. I persuaded 
them, I advertised to them, printed materials and brought them, showed them the 
[official] booklets. One of them I even took out to the exhibit at VDNKh. […] He was 
like: “I’m against Renovation, because I would like to expand.” And I told him: Here, it 
says in the bill that you can pay extra and ask for more square space, and the extra 
payment is market price, it will be beneficial (vygodno). 
This person Danil took out to the exhibit of the model apartments was Ruslan, who told 
me that this visit really influenced him: he saw the full-size models of apartments, browsed the 
rooms, and began to imagine living there. “I really liked it! And I want to tell you… I went, I 
observed all the apartments. There were many visitors, and people complained about the height 
of the ceilings, and they increased it from 2.65 meters to 2.75. They improved the quality of the 
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finishing. I understood that it was a showroom, but it is all written in the bill that this is what it 
would be like in the new buildings.” 
Danil strategically intervened in Ruslan’s vision of the future and his housing strategy. 
He made this future real and visible, and linked the beautiful promised apartments Ruslan saw in 
the booklets and at the exhibit to the guarantees signed in the bill. Danil also helped Ruslan see 
how the program aligned with his personal family planning: a father of a young child, he wanted 
to expand his housing for his growing family. Beating Ruslan’s mistrust of the political system 
was the key to success: Danil managed to present himself as knowledgeable and well connected, 
hinting at his involvement with municipal deputies and the local branch of a certain political 
party. Danil had to fight for Ruslan’s vote, and it was his direct victory over the opponents.  
He was ardently against Renovation, and his main explanation was that he doesn’t trust 
this system at all. He is a deep oppositionist, like Navalny and all that stuff. He was very 
mistrustful, he was like “I vote against with both hands.” But then I told him about the 
legal side, what is this bill, how it goes through the State Duma, that it is about to be 
passed. And then it was passed, and he still had his doubts. He brought me his ballot 
twice. And then the third time he brought the ballot with a vote “in favor.” And she [the 
anti-Renovation activist] did not even know he changed his mind. Because she also 
worked him. She walked around the building, also agitating. We had a war of interests. 
She presented her arguments, I presented mine. 
Danil correctly identified Ruslan’s housing needs and the main problem he had with 
Renovation: lack of trust in the system. When I spoke with Ruslan, he was very critical about 
many aspects of Russian government and public institutions, including health care, the sphere he 
worked in. He knew first-hand about the many flaws of public policies. Danil, however, 
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managed to shift Ruslan’s analysis from general political flaws to the particular, individual gains 
it would still be possible to make after signing up for Renovation. Ruslan emphasized that 
Renovation was in his personal interest, and he decided to “take that risk,” even though he still 
saw imperfections in the bill and the policy: 
Ruslan: I had doubts about the housing quality in the new buildings. And it wasn’t clear, 
where exactly these new buildings would be. But then I decided to take this risk and 
overcome my fears. 
Anna: So, you still see it as a risk, there are not enough guarantees? 
Ruslan: I relied on the law, signed by the Presidents. This is quite a serious document, 
right? Still, there are some inconsistencies. 
Danil was successful with Ruslan and other neighbors because he learned what their 
aspirations and needs were. His first step was his own “public opinion poll” to estimate how 
much sense it made to even start the process. When he felt that there was a chance to collect the 
necessary two-thirds of the votes, he organized the homeowner assembly. As an active member 
of the community via his work, Danil knew people in the neighborhood: local journalists and 
municipal deputies, whom he invited to his assembly. He also mentioned his social connections 
when he persuaded his neighbors: it made him look like he knew more about the program than 
ordinary people, and his “guarantees” were more certain. 
Danil became a “Renovation broker:” he linked the program to his neighbors’ personal 
needs by actively showing them the great future the program would bring, and by addressing 
their fears, sometimes using his personal connections as an argument and a guarantee of the 
program’s promises. He managed to convince an initial opponent to vote for the demolition, 
which is an impressive success. It was not a rare thing, especially with the so-called “undecided” 
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people. Activists could shift their opinions either way, first studying each neighbor’s situation, 
and “brokering” their ideas about the promises and risks of Renovation to them. 
Conclusion 
The main acts of the Renovation controversy played out in familiar spaces, in the 
courtyards, playgrounds, building entrances and staircases. Politics swept through these everyday 
spaces, turning them into political arenas and exposing the continuity between the ordinary and 
the political. People carried their baggage of housing strategies, social distinctions, relationships 
with each other and with authorities into theses arenas, where they negotiated the fate of their 
residential buildings and whole blocks. Concerned Muscovites had to perform “acts of bravery,” 
learning to talk to strangers and organize collective action to save their homes from slated 
demolition, to keep them on or off the initial lists, or to petition for them to be added to the lists. 
These people overcame the habitual political avoidance and rejection of collective action. For 
many of them participation in the Renovation-related discussions and interactions also meant that 
they needed to articulate their ideas of good housing, appropriate relationships with the 
authorities, the responsibilities of homeowners, and other elements of housing strategies, which 
before had been implicit and habitual. Now that they joined the arenas of the urban political field 
as players, they needed to clarify their intentional strategies, to act, cooperate, and convince 
others. 
On August 1, 2017 the program and the list of the included buildings was finalized, with 
some exceptions: in some buildings, residents challenged the decisions of the homeowners’ 
assemblies  in courts, and it took months to reach a final decision. These final decisions, 
however, were not the only result of the rapid mobilization triggered by the announcement of the 
program. The peace of the courtyards, neighborhoods, and the whole city was shaken and 
relationships between people transformed. 
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The transformation of familiar spaces into political arenas resulted from this articulation 
and politicization of the ordinary and habitual. However, there was also a reverse effect: the 
ordinary and the habitual were also transformed, as a result of the heated debates, meetings, and 
new relationships between neighbors. The consequences of the Renovation season were more 
than just a “yes” or “no” outcome of the vote. The next chapter addresses these other impacts, 
including electoral achievements, the reinforcement of local activist communities, and increased 





Make or break: gains and losses of mobilization 
The support and information networks in each district aided activists in individual 
buildings, and the cooperation of people within the blocks helped whole microrayons of adjacent 
buildings to opt out of the program. Mobilized residents of many buildings that were left out also 
managed to include their homes in the demolition lists, despite the government’s apparent lack of 
interest in them. 
 The clusters of buildings exiting the program surrounded by the sea of buildings voting in 
favor of inclusion show how players can assert their agency even when the “structure,” or the 
arenas, seem to be designed against them. Chapters 6 and 7 showed how players could intervene 
in the existing arenas and create new ones and sometimes win within seemingly unfavorable 
environments despite the odds.  
In this chapter, I discuss the gains and losses of Renovation Summer for both individual 
and collective players: local activist groups and communities of concerned neighbors. The majority 
of those who mobilized in response to the program suffered some personal costs to health, well-
being, and work, but they also learned new skills and built new relationships. These individual 
gains added up to collective gains: house councils and increased attention to building maintenance 
in some buildings, new or enhanced neighborhood activist groups, and the formation of 
communities of vigilant citizens monitoring the actions of local and city authorities. These new 
players emerged in Moscow’s urban political field and refused to leave.  
Over the months following Renovation Summer, mobilized Muscovites transferred their 
newfound civic skills and enthusiasm into electoral arenas: they ran for office, became electoral 
observers, and voted in district and city elections, placing independent candidates on municipal 
councils and in Moscow City Council. These independent deputies, in time, proved useful in the 
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next round of Renovation-related arenas, public hearings on the redevelopment projects in 2019. 
The Renovation-related mobilization strengthened civic life in the districts, a key to later electoral 
successes and future mobilizations. However, losses can also accumulate, discouraging individual 
players from participation, and preventing them from claiming their place in the urban political 
field. In this chapter, I demonstrate how these achievements were interrelated and accumulated 
gradually. 
At the moment of writing, three years since the announcement of Renovation, I can only 
observe relatively short-term consequences of Renovation summer. Whether the observed changes 
are temporary or resilient is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, I can trace the linkages 
between the micro-level processes and the macro-level outcomes in detail. In this chapter, I mostly 
examine the experiences of anti-Renovation activists, with a few exceptions. Their mobilization 
was more systematic and spilled across buildings and districts, leading to the creation of new social 
networks, which I rarely observed with Renovation’s supporters. I also mostly leave out the 
experiences of people who were frustrated, suppressed, or simply returned to their private life after 
the fate of their building was sealed. Those who mobilized against Renovation were a minority, 
and those who remained active are only a small share of this minority. However, even this 
minority’s presence in the public domain had significant consequences. 
District level voting outcomes: the social geography of resistance 
The initial expectations of Moscow’s government were mostly correct: the overwhelming 
majority of the buildings considered for inclusion in Renovation supported the program. Moreover, 
several hundred buildings not initially included in the voting lists organized homeowners’ 
assemblies  and requested inclusion. Overall, 5144 buildings were included, 1081 of them upon 
their own request, while 483 buildings from the original list opted out of the program after voting 
and/or organizing an assembly. Thus the final list was 598 buildings longer than the initial list. 
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The outcome of the vote meant that some districts would be completely razed to the ground, 
such as Kuzminki, in the South-East of Moscow. Other districts managed to intervene in the 
government’s plans and disrupted the demolition patterns with islands of buildings opting out of 
the program. Figure 13 demonstrates that different districts were affected by and resisted the 
program to a different extent. The map on the left demonstrates the percentage of buildings 
included in the voting lists that voted against the inclusion, per district. It shows that districts were 
different in the level of opposition to the program. The map on the right shows that different 
districts were affected by Renovation to a different extent: the number of buildings per district 
included in the voting lists ranges between single digits and hundreds.  
 
Figure 13. Resistance to the program in different Moscow districts: percent of the buildings 
included in the voting lists that voted against the inclusion (left) and the number of affected 
buildings per neighborhood (right). 
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The pattern does not fit the geography of prestige and political opposition in the city neatly, 
though many Muscovites believed that responses to Renovation and the ability to resist the 
unwelcome policy could be related to the social and demographic characteristics of the districts. 
The data don’t immediately confirm the hypothesis that the more prestigious districts in the West 
would be more successful in opting out of Renovation than the less prestigious East of Moscow, 
as outlined earlier in Chapter 2. However, the most “oppositional” areas were excluded from the 
consideration initially (Gagarinsky and Akademicheskiy districts), and some had few or no eligible 
five-story buildings, like the newer districts in the southern and south-eastern parts of Old Moscow 
(within the pre-2011 circular boundaries). 
An alternative explanation for the differences in the levels of compliance across districts is 
the average quality of the housing stock. Some areas mostly consist of relatively good 
khrushchevki and stalinki and their residents are less willing to move out, while others contain 
poorer quality series of khrushchevki with residents more likely to favor demolition. 
Some residents of these buildings purchased their apartments to live in and invested in 
renovating them; others had no resources to buy better housing and bought their flats with the hope 
that, at some point, they might be included in state-sponsored relocation programs. Some may have 
inherited these apartments from their relatives and never had a chance to choose their housing 
options; others lived with the anticipation of relocation their whole lives. On an individual level, 
housing strategies and aspirations shaped support or opposition for the program. 
While it is possible to explain most individual decisions on the basis of people’s housing 
strategies, this explanation is not sufficient for different outcomes in similar buildings, or for 
different voting outcomes in districts with similar configurations of housing quality. In earlier 
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chapters, I showed that even people in solid stalinki could vote in favor of demolitions or petition 
for inclusion, while residents of simpler khrushchevki often mobilized against the program. 
This situation vividly shows the role of activists. The mobilization of committed opponents 
or supporters of Renovation in the building could make a difference; they could influence their 
neighbors’ perception of risks and gains, and make them recalculate their strategies, as I showed 
in Chapter 7. District-level differences can be explained by the availability of experienced activists, 
networks of citizens, and knowledge about the mechanisms of urban politics among them. Some 
districts had longer histories of urban activism than others with more or less consolidated groups 
ready to support new protesters. 
The four districts I studied had different activist histories. All of them had at least one or 
two previous development projects (mostly destruction of green zones or construction of 
highways) that sparked resistance and led to the formation of local activist groups. However, they 
differed in the size and impact of those groups. In Losevo, where opposition to Renovation was 
strongest, the activist group was large and diverse. This led to some competition among the 
members, but during the Renovation crisis, most of them mobilized and used their knowledge and 
skills to support their neighbors. The situation was similar in Oreshino: an experienced and 
consolidated group of local activists helped their neighbors to organize and connect to authorities. 
Like Losevo, Oreshino did relatively well in getting buildings excluded from the program. 
Sokolovo and Rakitino, on the other hand, did not benefit as fully from their activist groups. 
In Sokolovo, the initial local activist group was small, although it grew and changed when new 
mobilized Renovation opponents joined it. However, after the program was announced, they had 
to build their resistance almost from scratch. In Rakitino, the situation was similar: despite a 
scandalous construction project that locals had fought against only a couple of years before, the 
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group could not immediately overcome their past quarrels, and a new activist group grew out of 
the resistance to Renovation. 
Sokolovo was the only district where I can speculate that the local bureaucrats were also 
less persistent in forcing Renovation on their rayon. Some interviewees from this district, 
Renovation supporters, described to me the lack of support in local government offices. It is the 
only evidence I have about district-level differences among government players. I can speculate 
that this lack of enthusiasm among Sokolovo officials at least did not hurt the anti-Renovation 
activists, unlike in Rakitino, where officials actively promoted Renovation. 
Three years later, however, there are similar developments in all four districts: the activist 
groups grew and extended the scope of their activities to new problems. Renovation triggered 
changes in the civic life of almost all the districts affected by it. But first, it affected the individuals, 
their well-being, plans, and health.  
Individual gains and losses: frustration, insecurity, and disappointment 
To understand the gradual transformation of the urban political field, it makes sense to 
explore the intermediary gains and losses (Jasper et al. forthcoming) that players make in the 
interactive arenas, and which may eventually accumulate (or not) to macro-level outcomes. It is 
also possible to identify gains and losses for individuals; these gains and losses can be 
consequential for these individuals’ future ability and wish to stay involved in the political 
interactions. 
Participation in Renovation activism was costly to individuals. Both supporters and 
opponents suffered monetary and psychological losses. They spent money on organizing 
assemblies (printing the form, mailing the required notification letters, sometimes paying lawyers) 
and agitating, many lost energy and trust in their neighbors and the authorities. Among the few 
gains that people made in the arenas of Renovation are new skills and knowledge, and new 
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friendships with neighbors and other activists. Regardless of the outcome of the vote, most of the 
people who mobilized and tried to organize their neighbors felt like they learned something, met 
new people, and found some new empowerment. Artur, the Renovation supporter who eventually 
failed to include his building in Renovation, told me that he started using the “My City” app on 
his phone regularly to file complaints to city offices, and even felt he learned something new thanks 
to his turbulent pro-Renovation activism. He had learned how to organize a homeowner assembly 
and knew all his neighbors. Most of these gains can also count as important foundations for future 
collective efforts, to which I will return in the next section. At the individual level, even those who 
succeeded in their buildings complained about the significant costs involved. 
People on both sides of the controversy were disappointed by authorities’ actions. 
Opponents of Renovation were shocked by how rapidly and aggressively the program was imposed 
on them and how little help and protection they received from local and city authorities. Not all of 
the opponents were experienced oppositionists. Some had expectations that the government was 
there to protect them, like Lidiya, a woman in her 60s, whose decent khruschevka was included in 
the demolition lists. When I sat in Lidiya’s cozy kitchen, drinking tea and eating pancakes with 
jam, she wanted me to look outside, saying how she loved the tree in front of her window, and 
how all this would soon be gone. I could feel her pain and desperation: she felt crushed by the 
outcome of the vote in her building, but also by what she learned about the political system:  
I will tell you, this wheel really rolled over me! Because before I thought that I could go to 
the deputies. It never affected me. There were no occasions when I had to fight for 
anything; things just went on and on. They worked out. I understood that if some laws were 
violated, all I needed to do is point it out, take a letter to the deputy. And they’d be like: 
“oh, what are you saying, we will investigate and fix this!” I thought that the Head of 
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uprava is a person who is supposed to protect citizens’ rights and not just rake in money, 
billions. And during these three months that we [were immersed] in this topic, so much 
negative is revealed to me! The authorities, the deputies, all that aligns with lies on the TV 
and from this Khusnullin. […] When all this got revealed, all this mayhem [bespredel], it 
did not give me any health or joy about the future. It put me in a depression. […] I realized 
one thing: if I needed to protect myself, I would not be able to do it. Not in the courts, not 
by sending requests anywhere, I can’t do anything. I can’t protect myself in this country, 
no matter the question. 
 Lidiya was not ready to take more radical action, pointing out her age and lack of energy 
for such tasks. She was looking forward to moving out of town to take care of her little garden, to 
avoid seeing what would happen to her beloved home.  
Many of my interviewees on both sides who lost their fights were understandably bitter: 
some were terrified of losing their homes, others were shaken by losing all hope for moving into 
better housing. People told me about their deteriorating health because of the constant stress during 
the controversy, and the disappointment they felt regarding the government, their neighbors, and 
collective action. Even opponents who managed to save their buildings from Renovation did not 
feel safe and could not fully enjoy their victories: many thought the government might still change 
the rules and come for their homes.  
The residents of the buildings that voted out but were surrounded by buildings included in 
the program felt especially insecure. The “superblock” model of urban development promised by 
Renovation required all the existing buildings in a block to be razed to provide room for the new 
construction. Even if left alone, people thought, they would still be living in a construction site. 
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Nina, in her 40s, an opponent of Renovation and a resident of a nine-story panel building in 
Oreshino, told me: 
I think that this final list doesn’t guarantee anything. If everything around you is 
demolished, and it’s just you alone [not included in the program], there are no guarantees. 
It’s very likely that you would be demolished, too. They would find an excuse. Because it 
looks odd: they would start demolitions of everything, and they would leave us alone? I’m 
pretty sure it’s easier to demolish our building as well. Indiscriminately [pod odnu 
grebyonku].   
Viktor, another victorious opponent of Renovation, told me that he felt that his home, “his 
fortress,” was “built on sand:” “At any time a person with a shovel can arrive, dig this sand, and 
all my fortress will slide to hell. I’ve been shown this very clearly. That’s why I don’t feel safe. I 
don’t feel like a winner.” 
Apart from emotional losses, many activists who invested all their time and energy in their 
fight for several months suffered material losses: people even took time off work and lost income. 
For some, this wasn’t over even several months later. Moreover, this was true for both sides. For 
example, in Sokolovo, ardent adversaries Victoria and Galina still had to attend the court hearings 
of their case, which made it difficult for both to catch up with their work when I spoke to them in 
early 2018. Galina, a pro-Renovation activist and the organizer of a homeowner assembly that 
Victoria and her partners challenged in court, told me: 
I had two different businesses, but because of these assholes [Renovation opponents] I had 
to abandon them all. We are in arrears, and my mother and I, we live off her pension. That’s 
it. Only now I began to [return to work] bit by bit, began moving in this direction. I was 
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the only one to spend money [on organizing the assembly], no one else spent a single 
kopeck [ni kopeyki]. It’s vexing. 
In addition to her monetary losses, Galina, an enthusiastic supporter of Vladimir Putin’s 
political regime, has faced a lack of support in the offices of Sokolovo bureaucrats where she 
sought help. She was outraged when one of the officials said to her face, as she reported to me: “I 
am against Renovation! I just recently bought an apartment in an old building, and I just can’t 
stand the likes of you!” She was bitterly disappointed in many of the bureaucrats and filed multiple 
complaints against them. She concluded that the existing political system could not protect her. 
Contrary to the popular idea that the bureaucrats helped the supporters of Renovation, some 
supporters felt as lost and betrayed as many opponents. Artur organized an assembly twice to 
petition for inclusion of his stalinka and tried to get help in the uprava, the Mayor’s Office, and 
the Headquarters on Renovation. His second homeowner assembly was scheduled for early July, 
but the Moscow government changed the deadline abruptly, voiding all assemblies scheduled after 
July 1. Artur called all the offices and received instructions to proceed with the assembly. At the 
assembly, the opponents fomented a scandal, threatening him that moving forward with the 
meeting after July 1 was a violation that might have criminal consequences. Artur thought, the 
officials were to blame for putting him in such a position and for giving him wrong advice and no 
support: 
Artur: I was even ready to [go to court], but no one supported me.  
Anna: Who did you want to file a lawsuit against?  
Artur: Against the uprava, against the government. Because they betrayed us. They said: 
guys, go ahead and vote! We voted, and then they said: you are too late. What is all this? 
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A cat and mouse game! And I fell out with neighbors, lost time, lost money, because we 
had to pay the lawyer. 
 Artur realized that the authorities were useless. Neither the uprava nor the deputies 
followed through on their promises (to help with paperwork, to attend and speak at the assembly). 
He was especially bitter at the local administration and the municipal deputies: as retaliation he 
decided not to vote in the municipal elections in September. 
Collective gains: “civil society of sorts” 
Anti- and pro-Renovation mobilization followed different patterns. Moreover, the 
mobilization against Renovation resulted in some collective gains for the broader civil society, as 
well as new networks and organizations to make further use of those gains in the future. For 
example, people created house councils, joined a local activist community, and became more 
vigilant about the actions of local authorities. These infrastructures in turn contributed to gains in 
the municipal elections of September 2017 and Moscow City Council elections in 2019. 
Buildings are the first level where we see collective gains from the Renovation    
controversy. Many received increased attention from their inhabitants after Renovation was 
settled, and in some house councils emerged. 
I spoke to Diana, in her late 40s, a homeowner in a decent brick khrushchevka in Losevo, 
in March 2018. We had to conduct our interview in the morning: later, she told me, she would be 
busy overseeing Zhlishchnik, the maintenance company, while they conducted some work in the 
courtyard. She was proud that her building was out of the program: she and her neighbors 
mobilized early, petitioned the authorities not to include them in Renovation before the lists of 
buildings suggested for demolition were published, and also conducted a homeowner assembly, 
just to be safe. The majority voted against inclusion.  
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When they came up with the idea to hold a homeowner assembly, Diana and her partners 
tried to find out who the “building elders” were, to get their help and expertise for this task; they 
embarked on a program of social research. 
We learned that we don’t have anyone. So, we had to [prishlos’] create a house council, 
three-four people. We needed someone [to be on this council], and no one is eager to do 
these things. That’s why we elected ourselves in this structure. We asked everybody. I 
mean, not everybody, but we asked some people, and if they asked, “why you?” – I said: 
“Please, you do it” But, as usual, no one wants it. Because it is tedious. But we had 
elections, we voted. In the meantime, we, well, we did not become friends, but at least we 
learned who we live with. Therefore, it was a useful process.  
 Like many Muscovites, Diana and her neighbors initially assumed that there existed some 
(invisible to them) social infrastructure for home maintenance and overall responsibility. 
Renovation revealed that there wasn’t. Trying to initiate the assembly, Diana discovered a void: 
nobody was responsible for their building, there was no liaison with the uprava, and if they wanted 
to get things done, they needed to fill this void themselves.  
 Some of my interviewees exploited this new knowledge after the main phase of 
Renovation-related mobilization was over. They learned that they could take control over routine 
maintenance of their buildings and capital repairs by creating a house council and holding regular 
homeowners’ assemblies  to address these issues and other housing maintenance tasks. The 
maintenance companies welcomed this: they needed the residents to participate, sign their papers, 
and give them permission to perform their work. Now, with the active housing councils and alert 
residents, Diana told me, “they are also happy that we’re there.” 
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 Diana saw her investment of time in building maintenance as a way to make sure that the 
building stayed in good condition but also to prevent future encroachment: “We have good 
infrastructure here, and the park; it is a very good place to live. Therefore, we chose the tactic of 
slowly fixing the building, and that’s what we are doing now.” Like other anti-Renovation 
activists, she did not feel safe, even after winning in her building. But the new experience and the 
new house council and connections with other activists in the district reassured her: 
No one can feel safe, not just here [in this country], but not a single person who has any 
relationships with any state, really, can feel safe. But this paper [the decision against 
inclusion in Renovation] gives our security some weight. Before they come to demolish us 
with a [demolition excavator], we will hit them right in the head with this paper, of course. 
Other respondents also observed that their neighbors became more vigilant; at least they 
“paid attention to the announcement board” in their building, according to Inna, an anti-Renovation 
activist from Oreshino. No one felt safe, but people learned that they would be more protected if 
they stayed informed about local issues and administrative actions. Even those who lost their fight 
at the building level began to pay more attention to what was going on in and around their homes. 
Having navigated the local administrative structures because of Renovation, they now knew which 
offices were responsible for which tasks, and how to make them do their job.  
Many interviewees told me that, if Renovation Summer had any positive aspects, it was 
the new connections and ties among people locally. Alena and Ivan, a couple from Oreshino, told 
me that they felt safer because of the “civil society of sorts” that now existed in their neighborhood: 
they knew people’s faces, had each other’s phone numbers, and stayed connected on social media. 
One way that people maintained these relationships were groups on Facebook and 
WhatsApp chats, which were gradually repurposed to serve as a general network for people who 
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wanted to take control over their living environments. According to Denis, a homeowner in a 
khrushchevka in Oreshino in his fifties: 
People, especially us, this [anti-Renovation] group, we did not know each other, we got to 
know each other, and we are very friendly now. Now we discuss other topics. Life goes on 
in this WhatsApp group. First, everybody has their finger up to feel whether this wind is 
blowing again. But then there are other discussions – snow removal, and there is this scandal 
with [a big infrastructure project in Oreshino].  
Even having lost the fight for their building, some activists felt empowered by their new 
skills, social connections, and experiences, and stayed in the political domain. Long-term local 
activists observed an increase in people’s interest in neighborhood issues and confidence in their 
collective efficacy. For example, Raisa in Sokolovo acknowledged that not everybody who 
mobilized in response to Renovation remained in the loop. However, she still felt an increase in 
public interest in local activism: 
I have been in activism for several years, and I received no feedback, no response, it was a 
difficult feeling. And here, this breakthrough happened! Some people say: come on, what 
are those, you only dug out a few people, it’s little. But it is all relative! It is not little. It was 
a very serious process; it dug into [people] very deeply. Of course, many people remained 
in activism! They feel they are part of something, that they have done something! They 
contributed their part, made an input. And next time when [I try to do something] they 
respond! And it is very important, because step by step, the civic activity awakens. Slowly, 
very slowly, but how else! This is the only way! 
Raisa was optimistic: her reputation saw a boost on Sokolovo’s social media platforms, 
people got to know her because of Renovation, and responded to her calls for action more 
 209 
willingly, whether she asked for their help in organizing a community center or supporting 
neighbors fighting against evictions.  
Apart from Renovation, Sokolovo had several “hot spots” that needed activists’ attention, 
and the local networks boosted by Renovation-related activism in 2017 redirected their attention 
to these issues. In 2019 I spoke to Bella, a resident of a five-story in Sokolovo that was not included 
in the demolition lists but suffered from a nearby construction site. She was active on the Sokolovo 
social media. She told me that some of the residents were frustrated and “felt like they couldn’t do 
anything,” and that the developers and local administrations tried to drive a wedge between the 
elected municipal deputies, local activists, and some residents. Still, the activist life of the 
neighborhood was going on: 
But we decided, the main group that goes on fighting, that even if we can’t really win this 
fight, and they won’t stop building what they’re building… what, should we leave [them] to 
just rake in the money and have their way? No! We will at least get on their nerves. 
Renovation pushed people into activism, and when it was settled, they remained in the public 
sphere. In all four districts, some anti-Renovation activists remained vigilant and kept track of 
local politics and the actions of the upravas long after the Renovation Summer. Of course, not 
everyone did; most people returned to their private lives, exhausted, disappointed, or not interested 
in collective action anymore.  
Empowered versus discouraged: activist trajectories of Alla and Viktor  
Activists who achieved their immediate goals at the building level had different emotional 
experiences and followed different trajectories after this fight was over. Some felt encouraged and 
expanded the scope of their activities; others felt suppressed and limited their activism. In this 
section, I compare the experiences of Alla and Viktor. 
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Alla, a freelancer in her late 20s from Sokolovo, saved her stalinka from demolition, and 
felt transformed by this experience. Within a few months she moved from being apolitical to 
becoming a local activist and a candidate in municipal elections. She had many plans to improve 
life in the neighborhood. Viktor, an owner of an apartment in a good khruschevka in Oreshino, 
followed a reverse path: before Renovation, he was the only active resident in his building, in 
touch with the uprava regarding routine building maintenance. After Renovation, he felt 
discouraged and bitter at his neighbors, who also stopped supporting him in building maintenance 
tasks. Alla and Viktor both succeeded in saving their buildings from demolition, but the way they 
did it and their experiences during the controversy affected their willingness and capacity to stay 
engaged afterward. 
Alla smiled proudly when she told me that her apolitical life completely changed when the 
risk emerged of losing a freshly renovated flat in a pretty stalinka in Sokolovo. She grew up in the 
neighborhood but had never heard about local activists fighting against undesirable changes in 
Sokolovo: a highway extension and destruction of local green zones. She learned about these issues 
only when she immersed herself in the Renovation-related mobilization and got to know more 
experienced local activists. She described the turning point to me, the moment when she realized 
she had to defend her dignity and self-respect, against all the odds: 
Alla: It was like if they said: don’t get jumpy, it is going to be like [they] had decided! 
Anna: Who said? 
Alla: Everybody! My environment, people. The government had decided; what [can] you 
[do]? And I thought: I won’t be able to respect myself. Well, even if it is not going to work 
out, alright: I did everything I could. This is what I had decided. And then – rallies here, 
rallies there. My Instagram turned from a pinky-fluffy one into something completely 
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different. And one thing led to another. I began to feel that many of my friends don’t 
understand me. 
Alla ran for municipal deputy in September 2017, a month after the Renovation list was 
officially finalized. She did not win but that did not turn her away; she was eager to stay active, 
both in her building and in the neighborhood. She had a new house council in her building, new 
activist and public-spirited friends, and many plans to improve her home and neighborhood: “It all 
just moved along, I have a ton of connections now. I have more political friends now than regular 
friends. […] I joined the Yabloko party. Although I was very far from it [initially]. I panicked. But 
here, people help, there is the Headquarters for the Protection of Muscovites, I joined it, too.”  
The more Alla learned about the injustices, corruption, and power-holders’ disrespect for 
ordinary Muscovites, the more outraged and determined she grew to change things. A year after 
the announcement of Renovation, she reported that a bad period had finally changed to a good one; 
she began to see positive changes and successes by activists: “At first, we were like blind kittens, 
didn’t know anybody. Every piece of information was priceless. Now we know each other, and it 
is so much easier. We can do things faster and more efficiently. I feel that we are a certain force.” 
 Alla’s transformation was positive: she learned new things, met new people, and found that 
she could influence her life and the life of the neighborhood she cared for in new ways. These 
feelings and new ambitions cannot be attributed only to the fact that she succeeded in saving her 
building. Some of the people who succeeded in the short-term and saved their buildings were upset 
and had difficult relations with neighbors later. 
Viktor had some positive feelings about his Renovation experience: he was proud that he 
managed to convince his neighbors to vote against inclusion, both in the “voting” procedure and 
in the homeowner assembly. Like Alla, he told me that Renovation had changed his life, but in a 
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different way. Viktor used his authority and skills to persuade his neighbors; a media professional, 
he had good graphic design skills and even produced official-looking leaflets and posters exposing 
the risks of Renovation. He managed to convince some of the neighbors to vote against inclusion 
by giving a persuasive speech at the homeowner assembly and distributing the materials. As I 
mentioned in Chapter 3, the rules, promises, and guaranteed conditions of relocations were 
changing rapidly, and the situation changed after Viktor’s assembly. His neighbors concluded that 
it was his intention to mislead them: “All the blame for exiting the program of Renovation was put 
on me, because I was the homeowner assembly’s presider and I also agitated actively for leaving 
the program. Therefore, if before this I could come to an understanding with my neighbors, now 
they scowl at me.”  
Viktor’s neighbors wanted to punish him and wouldn’t cooperate even in routine building 
maintenance issues. Usually, he was the one to contact the local administration and maintenance 
companies to fix things, but some problems required his neighbors' signatures and consent, which 
after Renovation they refused to provide: 
If I come and tell them: “Let’s install a boom barrier [to prevent strangers from parking 
their cars in the courtyard], Moscow is ready to install it for us,” – “Screw it!” Simply 
because it’s me. I’ve been fighting for a year and a half for the repair of the walkway. […] 
At first, the residents supported me: “Yes, yes, good idea, let’s do it.” But after we went 
through all this procedure with Renovation, I began to address them: “Let’s write a joint 
letter and sign it.” I didn’t manage to do it before the homeowner assembly. And now, 
when I start addressing them again, [they say]: “No, it’s not necessary!” 
Everyone suffers from the spontaneous parking lot in their courtyard, but his neighbors are 
willing to penalize themselves in order to punish Viktor for his perceived betrayal. Viktor also felt 
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bitter at his neighbors because of how they acted before and during the homeowner assembly. 
Some people told him in person they would support him, and did not, or even worse, discreetly 
agitated against him. 
I had a neighbor; we were on great terms — a great guy […]. When we had the assembly, 
he arrived. He’s a homeowner, and he’s no fool. He came and asked: “who’s in charge?” 
– “I’m in charge.” – “What’s your position?” – “That we don’t want it.” He said: “Got it!” 
And while I spoke, he approached everyone; he had lived in this building for who knows 
how long, and he told them: “guys, if you register for this assembly, they will have a 
quorum. And if you do, there would still be a majority against Renovation. Your only move 
is not to register.” 
Viktor was offended by his neighbors’ behavior, and later reconsidered his plan to run in 
the municipal elections: “I have not changed my mind completely, but I realized that if I commit 
to being a deputy, I would have to work not only for myself, but for the people. But I don’t want 
to work for the people from my building.” 
Alla chose a different rhetorical strategy. Unlike Viktor, she did not express her opinion 
right away in conversations with neighbors. She asked questions, expressed doubts, and let the 
neighbors decide for themselves, though based on her masterful prompts. They could not blame 
her later for lying. 
From the beginning, I did not express a clear position, because you never know. I did not 
want to provoke a conflict. I said: here, that’s what is planned in our [district], and I would 
like you to peruse this program. It is one thing, what they say on the TV, but here are some 
excerpts. They were posted in our [social media] groups. And I said: look at them from 
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your perspective, how is that? Do you like it or not? This is not Luzhkov’s program. And 
then I listed [all the arguments]. 
 Alla, of course, still had some fights with especially ardent pro-Renovation neighbors, but 
in the end, she maintained working relations with almost everybody. She told me that, several 
months after the emotional controversy, even these adversaries came around: “Those people who 
didn’t want to speak with me… Now we are preparing for a new homeowner assembly to address 
the capital repairs. And they took the documents from me, at least. At first, they wouldn’t even 
open their doors.” 
 Alla and Viktor, both of whom managed to save their buildings from demolition, ended up 
in very different places when it was over. Alla, who initially did not know or care much about 
politics and building matters beyond her apartment walls, plunged enthusiastically into the world 
of local activism and politics. Viktor, originally an active and responsible resident, experienced 
new obstacles in his routine building-related actions, and felt discouraged from running for an 
elected position. The difference lies in the different persuasion strategies and roles the two activists 
chose with their neighbors: Viktor’s assertive position of authority and Alla’s more subtle, 
horizontal persuasion were both effective in the short term but bore different fruits in the long run. 
Alla’s empowerment also came from a new feeling of belonging and support: she joined 
the networks of local and city level activists, where essential resources such as information 
circulated. This feeling of belonging to a new community was a positive outcome for many of my 
anti-Renovation interlocutors, regardless of the result in their individual buildings. Even those who 
lost their fight for their building reported that they still felt empowered because they now knew so 
many more like-minded people. They felt that these new networks would matter in the long-term. 
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A light in the window: electoral gains 
Despite differences in their levels of frustration and professed readiness to contribute to the 
public good, Alla and Viktor both got involved in the municipal electoral campaigns in their 
districts. Alla ran for office, and as a candidate was overseeing the actions of the local electoral 
committees. Viktor canceled his initial plans to run, but he supported his friends who ran for office 
and became an observer during the elections.  
The municipal elections in 2017 took place on September 7th, a month after Renovation 
was finalized and signed into law. Everyone I spoke to said they were exhausted by their anti- or 
pro-Renovation campaigns, and not all of them were ready to embark on another campaign right 
away. Still, many felt pushed to continue their fight against the injustices and corruption of urban 
politics: some newly mobilized activists had learned about the importance of local elected officials 
because of Renovation. Some ran for office themselves, others participated as electoral observers, 
and many donated money to independent candidates. It was the first time for the majority of these 
people when they personally knew the candidates in their district or even the first time they had 
paid attention to municipal council elections at all. 
Moscow municipal elections, typically low turnout affairs, first got into the spotlight in 
2014, when seventy independent deputies (out of more 1500) were elected to municipal councils 
(Gorokhovskaia 2018),28 a consequence of the Bolotnaya Square protests and national 
mobilization against electoral fraud and the political regime that had shaken the country in 2012. 
The municipal council victories of 2014 sparked hope that change was possible: activists turned 
to local politics, and over time they built strong reputations and networks in their neighborhoods. 
 
28 The turnout in municipal elections fluctuates around 15 percent, compared to over 20 percent in 
Moscow City Council elections and over 60 percent in State Duma elections. 
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They used their official status to exercise more control over local issues, but also exposed some of 
the mechanics of municipal politics to interested Muscovites. 
The independent deputies were much more successful in the next cycle of Moscow 
municipal elections in September 2017: almost 300 were elected and challenged the overwhelming 
dominance of the United Russia in the municipal councils. In addition to new deputies, new voters 
and electoral observers (poll watchers) entered the electoral arenas because of Renovation. 
Observers were important in a regime prone to electoral fraud. The experience of being an 
observer, often for the first time, exposed these people to larger problems in the political system. 
Renovation crystallized many Muscovites’ discontent with city politics, pulling voters and 
observers to polling stations. Diana, who became an electoral observer, told me that she never went 
to municipal elections, and only voted when they were combined with higher-level elections that 
she was usually more interested in:  
But here, you know, the thing is that no one was interested in it before. But with this topic 
[Renovation], they managed to get people’s attention. [Candidates] were running around 
in the courtyards, they held meetings, under the streetlights. And people got to know who 
these people [municipal deputies] are and what they do. Because they are responsible for 
the district money. And that’s where [we] shuddered: because we realized that they could 
run it like their own business at the district level. That [they could steal the budget money] 
by [installing] seesaws and such; it was very concrete, unlike [stealing] at the national level. 
Renovation laid bare district-level governance structures and spending practices. As Diana 
said, people realized what they were losing out if they weren’t present in these arenas, so they 
turned up at the elections to support “their” people, someone they knew and could control. Nina 
described this new feeling: 
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Nina: Of course, I went and voted. First of all, because I knew most of these people! 
Anna: From the [Facebook] group? 
Nina: Yes. And it was so awesome! I understood who I was voting for. When I arrived at 
the polling station, they were all sitting there, and I [approached to] give them moral 
support. I voted for all of them! But they lost. 
Most of these mobilized voters were opponents of Renovation and opponents of the 
government’s policies. However, some Renovation supporters also ran for office, and others went 
to support them. For example, Danil decided to run. His decision was not related to Renovation, 
but with his desire to have more access to the district’s resources for his business. Ruslan, too, 
went to the polling station to vote for Danil, because he knew him personally. 
Moscow’s municipal elections were in the national spotlight again, and independent 
candidates ran for municipal councils in almost every district. The Renovation program was not 
the only reason for the electoral successes in September 2017: opposition politician Dmitry 
Gudkov had made plans for these elections earlier, but he managed to capitalize on the energy of 
the anti-Renovation movement. The Gudkov campaign recruited candidates among local activists 
and even active users of the anti-Renovation social media. Dmitriy, a businessman in his 20s from 
Losevo, told me that Gudkov’s team monitored Losevo’s social media and reached out to those 
users who “fit the profile:” 
I figured that they didn’t have enough people in some districts, and they searched for 
[people] with, maybe, higher education, with opposition views, this way. And I think they 
just called everybody because they ran out of time to register candidates.  
Gudkov’s “headquarters” helped candidates print and distribute their materials, but not 
everybody was happy with the quality of their help, and even with their involvement. Some local 
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activists had enough of a reputation and resources to run without Gudkov’s support and were 
annoyed by his attempts to absorb all the independent campaigning and ride the wave of anti-
Renovation discontent. This caused some tension between candidates backed by Gudkov and those 
running independently. After the elections, this split persisted in some of the municipal councils 
where representatives of both groups were elected. 
Lana, a young anti-Renovation activist and political newbie, won a seat on the Losevo 
municipal council and found it challenging to navigate the minefield of long and complicated 
relationships among other new independent deputies with activist backgrounds. They brought their 
past scores to the new arena of council discussions: 
We had our own internal squabbles. We created factions, and we all were at each other’s 
throats by the time I understood what was going on. I came from a different domain; it was 
all so unusual to me, this format of communication, that people all just talk against each 
other, that they have their own scores. (…) It was very difficult for me to blend into this 
story. 
Municipal elections were a political trial for many people: for candidates, for voters, and 
for opposition politicians trying to consolidate the efforts of different forces in the capital. Some 
people were frustrated by this episode, and could not grasp why independent candidates were 
fighting each other instead of the corrupt political machine.  
When some of their candidates were elected, supporters of the independent deputies were 
first euphoric because of these surprise successes. When the councils started working, some 
frustrations were inevitable. In essence, the independents did not always act as a united front, they 
were too few to exert decision-making power in some districts, or it was beyond their authority to 
solve some problems that people expected them to fix. 
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At first, some energized voters attended the council meetings to support their newly elected 
deputies, and they saw how the political machine of approval worked at this level. The municipal 
council sessions are usually open to residents of the district, but only after the emotional elections 
of 2017 did significan numbers of Muscovites actually start going. Marianna told me that she was 
very excited when a couple of independent deputies were elected on the Oreshino municipal 
council, but she soon learned that they were powerless in such small numbers, and the fact of being 
present in this arena did not have many consequences: 
There is this old majority, they have been there for ages, they blocked [their] every 
initiative, even the most proper one, because it came from the independent deputies. 
Everybody just raised their hands with stone faces. The audience was outraged! What’s so 
bad about these people suggesting some good initiatives that are good for our district? They 
blocked everything. It was an organizational meeting, and they were electing the 
committees. And these newly elected deputies were not included in any committee. Except 
for [the unimportant ones]. It was apparent sabotage. It was very unpleasant.  
The deputies felt discouraged, too, by being dismissed by the old guard. Quite a few lost 
interest in their new positions after a while. But many new deputies persisted, especially in districts 
where they won many or most seats. Voters also felt frustrated when they found out that the 
municipal deputies have no power to solve all the existing problems. 
The election of independent municipal deputies opened a door into Moscow’s political 
machine, and even if problems could not be solved immediately, new knowledge about the tools 
Muscovites have to address them began circulating. People also learned what the different political 
bodies of the city were for. More experienced activists were more appreciative of the municipal 
deputies than some “lay” voters, because they knew better what to expect from them and what to 
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use them for. Taissia, an experienced local activist from Oreshino, told me that even the few 
deputies they managed to put on the council mattered a lot for the civil society of the district: 
They are the light in the window. As I’ve said earlier, people don’t believe that they can 
do something.  And when they meet those people who devote their private time to the 
public good, this is very inspiring. And more people start donating their own private time. 
When they see that, yes, there is someone! There are some especially charged people now, 
who yell: there is a snow pile, where are our deputies, when are they coming to remove it? 
They don’t even understand the jurisdiction, nothing. I’m kidding, but these people are not 
there to just raise their hand [in agreement] at the council meetings; they write requests and 
try to influence something. I think it is a huge achievement, and it inspires people to do 
something, or even just [makes them] lose this disappointment in everything, this negative 
[attitude] and this readiness to throw in the towel, the [feeling] that we can’t influence 
anything. 
 Local activists were the most enthusiastic among my informants; they finally saw an 
increase in their neighbors’ interest in local politics and building maintenance, and the gains made 
in both the anti-Renovation movement and municipal elections were symbolically and strategically 
important. The less experienced Muscovites were not always prepared to keep going when their 
aspirations were not realized immediately, as when the elected municipal deputies could not solve 
many problems.  
 Renovation-related gains were also evident during the next electoral test for the new local 
activist infrastructures two years later, on September 8, 2019, in nationwide regional elections 
(several governors, city councils, regional parliaments, and municipal deputies). This election 
differed from previous electoral campaigns in Putin’s Russia because of Smart Voting: an idea and 
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technology developed by the Anti-Corruption Foundation, a non-profit headed by Aleksey 
Navalny. Smart Voting had one goal: to topple as many United Russia candidates as possible, at 
all levels of elections. Instead of picking an ideologically “correct” candidate, it suggested a single 
candidate in each district for opposition voters to support based on the candidate’s likelihood of 
winning, calculated by an algorithm based on previous election and polling data. 
The system worked best in elections to Moscow’s City Council (Mosgorduma). The 
Council had previously been dominated by the representatives of United Russia, with only a few 
exceptions (most notably, the Communist party representative Elena Shuvalova, who helped 
Muscovites organize against Renovation in 2017). The 2019 elections changed the status quo: 
United Russia candidates won only 25 districts out of 45. United Russia kept a majority, but 
compared to the 38 seats they had controlled in the previous City Council, this result looked like 
a loss. Smart Voting was one of the contributing factors: national anti-Kremlin politics converged 
with Moscow’s local politics at the polling stations on September 8. 
The majority of the independent candidates, however, were blocked from participation.29 
In response, street protests erupted in Moscow; they were violently repressed. While these 
measures helped to kick some of the most popular independent candidates (Yuliya Galyamina, 
Ilya Yashin, and Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation associates Lyubov Sobol and Vladimir 
Milov) out of the race, other candidates secured the support of a registered political party (mostly 
the Communist Party and “Yabloko”) and got on the ballot. They went on with the campaign, and 
the situation was still risky for the status quo.  
 
29 If they have no party affiliation, candidates are required to collect signatures of 5,000 potential voters in 
their districts to register to run. Independent candidates organized impressive campaigns and collected the 
signatures but the Electoral Committee nevertheless refused to register them on the grounds that too many 
signatures were “fake.” 
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Local activists, some of whom started as activists during Renovation, were present among 
the candidates. Many who did not run themselves engaged in support campaigns, attended rallies, 
collected signatures to support independent candidates’ registration, and became electoral 
observers. Muscovites’ increased attention to local issues, including housing and Renovation-
related conflicts, helped elect several municipal deputies and urban activists to the City Council, 
among them Sergey Mitrokhin, a controversial but persistent veteran of the liberal movement and 
active defender of housing rights, and Daria Besedina, a graduate of the Moscow School of 
Architecture and an urban biking activist. 
Public Hearings 2019: activist communities push back 
The Renovation program itself was affected by the electoral activities it triggered and the 
new local activist groups it inspired. Together with the gains in municipal elections in 2017, the 
new gains in the Moscow City Council played a role in the next round of the anti-Renovation fight 
later in 2019. In the late fall and winter of 2019, public hearings on zoning regulations took place 
in many districts affected by Renovation. Changes to the Land Use and Development Rules 
[Pravila zemlepolzovaniya i zastroyki], the main zoning document of the city, and to the territorial 
planning rules of particular blocks (micro-districts, or mikrorayony), were necessary to break 
ground for the new residential buildings for relocations.  
 The activist communities that stayed strong in some of the affected districts and the 
independent deputies (in municipal and city councils) were present in these arenas, raising their 
concerns, filing requests, and organizing around the public hearings.  
 The mobilization of the Rakitino community around the hearings in their district illustrates 
the resilience of the anti-Renovation networks from two years earlier. Most of the activists who 
had been visible in 2017 were still active and mobilized residents of the district to attend the 
hearings. They carefully studied the suggested changes and produced comprehensive analyses of 
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their flaws. They asked their neighbors to call and submit petitions to local and city 
administrations, demanding the withdrawal of the proposed plans, to attend the meetings, and fill 
in the public hearing forms rejecting the changes to the zoning regulations. On Facebook and 
WhatsApp, activists coordinated the tactics and actions for the hearings, sharing instructions on 
how to prepare leaflets and petitions, and where to send them. In the WhatsApp chat, I learned that 
the activists also asked the independent deputies to pressure the city government to reject the 
proposed planning changes.  
On the day of the hearing, people flooded the local administration. They had to wait in line 
to present their document proving registration in the district (only legal residents of the district 
with proof of address were allowed inside) and to receive a planning proposal booklet and 
“suggestion forms.” The booklet contained shiny renderings of the proposed residential blocks. In 
the “suggestion forms,” the attendees could list their objections (or approval) to the proposed 
changes in the zoning law and planning strategies for their districts.  
People arrived at the meeting in a combative mood. I could not participate in the meeting 
because I was not a legal resident of the district, but I could feel the energy by watching the 
numerous live streams and chatting live with people inside the room. Those who managed to get 
in saved seats for those arriving late, encouraging them on the live chats to make it to the meeting. 
The activists also tried to identify and expose on social media the potential “undercover mob” 
hired by the city government to occupy the room and prevent “real” residents from entering. Before 
the hearings, anti-Renovation social media published screenshots of announcements from 
messengers and job search portals, offering “jobs” as hearing participants. In some of the group 
chats on popular messengers people published photographs of the “extras” (“massovka”), a 
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popular term used to describe such hired impostors, along with their “managers,” who gave the 
“extras” directions and pointed at particular seats. 
Social media were full of messages of outrage and empowerment. Residents arrived ready 
to fight and expose the lies of bureaucrats, supported each other’s speeches and questions, and 
texted on the live chats if they heard something they strongly liked or disliked. Deputies were also 
present and spoke at the public hearing, evoking a wave of approval in the room and on social 
media: “There, so good that we elected him!” – a friend texted me from the event. 
After the meeting and the next morning, the social media were ecstatic: they were pleased 
with their own performance. They thought that they had demonstrated an overwhelming rejection 
of the proposed changes. 
At the public hearings, participants turned in “ballots” on which they registered their 
support or opposition to the proposal, or wrote in their concrete suggestions and recommendations 
about how it should be modified. Public hearings, however, are nonbinding: the “rejection” was 
only a recommendation, not a veto. Despite this, it was an important arena where the activist 
community, independent deputies, and ordinary residents of Rakitino came together, organized, 
and reinforced their solidarity and motivation. It had been more than two years since Renovation 
summer when the majority of these people first started to organize. The movement seemed to be 
in abeyance throughout this time, but the activist network was still in touch with each other; they 
kept track of the developments of the program and were ready to mobilize again around the public 
hearings. This time they also benefited from what they had achieved in the meantime: their legal 
knowledge, a unified local group, and the new independent deputies. 
There was another addition to the anti-Renovation forces in Rakitino. As the project 
developed, some of the supporters of Renovation grew skeptical of it. Observing the first 
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relocations, some of them realized that the program was not as lucrative as they had hoped and 
that it would transform their neighborhoods in unpleasant ways. I was surprised to see Danil, the 
fervent Renovation broker, among the indignant opponents of the proposal for Rakitino. He joined 
the anti-Renovation group on Facebook and even posted some articles criticizing the suggested 
project.  
Conclusion: Gains and losses of Renovation 
Despite many individual losses (of time, energy, and money), some mobilized Muscovites 
made collective gains that are still shaping the city’s political life three years after Renovation 
summer. The new activist networks, friendships, and channels of constant communication, 
especially social media, helped create an active, vigilant public in some of the districts. Staying 
connected, these people felt more empowered, even after losing their individual fights for their 
buildings. 
Moreover, Renovation-related mobilization exposed Moscow’s political machine to public 
scrutiny. People learned the responsibilities of different city authorities and their rights as citizens 
to control them. The new role of electoral observer that many mobilized Muscovites tried out for 
the first time in the municipal elections 2017 were crucial to the electoral successes of independent 
candidates in both 2017 and 2019 at the Moscow City Council elections. Their investment paid off 
when these deputies supported their position during the 2019 public hearings. 
At the building level, the gains of mobilization (the creation of house councils or the 
emergence of active residents paying attention to building maintenance) were counterbalanced by 
losses in some buildings, where neighbors’ relations were ruined and cooperation made impossible 
by polarization. Even in such buildings, however, anti-Renovation residents had a way to remain 
constructive by participating in district-based activist efforts: joining local activist initiatives, 
campaigning for independent candidates, or simply staying on local social media to feel connected. 
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Supporters of Renovation did not have such a way out when their building was excluded from the 
program upon their opponents’ request. They were mostly left to themselves, alone with their 
frustration.  
A micro-level analysis shows that people’s experiences before and during the controversy 
were key to their willingness to deploy their newfound agency. Their own strategic decisions and 
decisions of their neighbors, along with the emotional dynamic of their interactions, affected 
people’s actions afterward, whether they ran for office, participated in local activism, or retreated. 
Feelings affected their capacity and willingness to insert themselves in the local political 
structures. 
Nevertheless, these micro-level processes added up to changes in broader structures at the 
macro level: in the composition of elected bodies, citizen access to information about the 
mechanics of urban politics, and new social ties and communities at the local and city levels. 
Personal experiences and emotions, especially the frustration or outrage that some people felt after 
being exposed to Renovation, led them into new arenas, for example the polling stations of the 
municipal elections, where they could shift outcomes both by casting a vote and by trying to 
control the arena as electoral observers. One result was the election of independent municipal 
deputies, which, in turn, changed the configuration of forces in the councils and increased the 
transparency of the practices in the Moscow’s urban political field. The independent deputies 
revealed the role and capabilities of the councils, and allowed citizens to use them.  
Another macro-level outcome was the creation or, in some cases, reinforcement of 
communities and networks, which could be a platform for collective players to engage in urban 
politics. Simply by staying in touch with each other and routinely exchanging news on topics of 
newfound interest (neighborhood construction projects, transportation failures, or the felling of 
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trees), neighbors maintained their activist networks that could be quickly mobilized to show up in 
a public arena, for instance at Renovation hearings. Feelings, routine interactions, and experiences 
are fertile ground for the creation of players and arenas of political action. 
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CHAPTER 9  
Conclusion 
Why did Muscovites act as they did during Renovation Summer? Most residents of 
affected buildings enjoyed their privacy and had no ambition to enter the arenas of public 
politics. The announcement of the demolition plans interfered with people’s planning of their 
private lives and pulled even doggedly apolitical Muscovites into the controversy. It made them 
revisit and formulate their ideas about housing, citizens’ relationships with the state, the meaning 
of homeownership, and other elements of their life strategies. This articulation was necessary for 
them to devise their own courses of action and persuade others. In public discussions and 
interactions with others – activists, neighbors, officials – Muscovites not only elaborated on their 
pre-existing views but modified them, sometimes significantly. Many people were forever 
transformed by these new experiences, newfound friendships and networks, and new knowledge 
about their own neighbors and Moscow’s politics. Moscow’s politics, too, went through some 
changes: as a result of the Renovation-related mobilization, new players emerged in its streets, 
house councils, and municipal and city council elections. 
Until now, I have not explicitly addressed the question of case selection: why Moscow 
and why Russia? I don’t like to either exoticize or normalize Russia, something scholars of this 
country often do to convince their readers that their research is worthy of attention. While one of 
the reasons for the selection of this case was the timing of the Renovation controversy, which 
fortunately coincided with my Ph.D. pursuits, and my Russian origin, there are meaningful 
advantages of studying politics microsociologically using Moscow as a field site. 
Like any other city, Moscow has its specificities that make it stand out: it is the capital of 
an authoritarian country with a turbulent political past and a questionable present. It is definitely 
“special,” and it seems logical to consider its “political context” when studying urban activism. 
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One of the claims I made in the dissertation is also specific to the post-socialist urban context, or 
rather, Moscow’s context: some people’s housing strategies, as well as contemporary urban 
policies, have roots in the socialist-era housing distribution system. 
On the other hand, Moscow is also “ordinary.” It has residents with their own ideas of 
what is right and wrong, ready to announce their disagreement with the city’s policies. It has a 
“growth coalition” of city authorities and developers trying to maximize the economic profit the 
city and its land can generate. It formally has a spectrum of participatory, democratic arenas 
available to citizens willing to engage in urban politics. For example, elected municipal councils: 
something that cities like New York, who justly pride themselves on their participatory civic 
infrastructures, don’t always have (community boards in New York, similar structures to 
municipal councils in Moscow, are not elected bodies.) When we get down to the micro-level, 
we see the same kinds of motivations, strategies, and interactions in these different contexts. 
Still, they add up differently, depending on existing arenas, the distribution of resources, and the 
dominant relations among players.  
With all its specificity and ordinariness, Moscow is a good place to show the strengths of 
microsociology in studying political interactions.  
Muscovites’ competing housing strategies 
Throughout this study, I argued that political processes grow from people’s personal 
strategies, their habitual and intentional ways of organizing action to achieve various life goals. 
In Moscow, people appreciate their privacy and urban anonymity. Moscow, like many post-
socialist cities, is an example of a city that embraced private life after generations of forced 
political and social participation. People barricaded themselves in their homes, be it cottages in 
gated communities or tiny flats in five-story socialist apartment buildings, and focused on their 
personal, private tasks and achievements. This makes for advantageous circumstances to study 
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how politics grows from these emphatically personal lives and life strategies. And it often does, 
despite the popular perception, even among Muscovites and Russians, that cooperation and 
collective action rarely occur and even more rarely succeed in achieving their goals. 
Politics, even local politics, and neighborhood issues were rarely a factor in Muscovites’ 
habitual life strategies. However, many of them accepted the idea of citizens’ autonomy and 
homeownership, which Renovation violated. The program dictated a different relationship 
between the state and its citizens than many of the outraged Muscovites accepted. With 
Renovation, the state played the role of provider and good-doer, and in exchange, it expected 
compliance and gratefulness. Some citizens, however, demanded negotiations: as property 
owners, they thought that it was their decision to relocate or not, and agree or reject the 
conditions for these relocations.  
The alternative life and housing strategies centered more on the resources of the state. 
Adherents of the state-oriented strategies conceded that the state might dispose of people’s lives 
and housing to pursue some kind of “common good.” This is not to say that all supporters of 
Renovation were public-spirited. Although they often blamed opponents for “only thinking about 
themselves,” implying that their selfish actions (protecting one’s private property) undermined 
the collective good, many supporters admitted that they, too, followed personal interests. They 
tried to seize an opportunity to achieve their housing goals, taking advantage of state policy. This 
compliance doesn’t necessarily come with more trust in the state: rather, it echoes the habitual 
tool of trying to game the system and get “a tuft of hair from a mangy mare” (Russian proverb, s 
parshivoy ovtsy hot’ shersti klok). 
From personal strategies to political projects 
Political mobilization to support or oppose Renovation grew from these private, not 
always articulated ideas about citizenship, homeownership, and the responsibilities of the state. 
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An important outcome of the mobilization, in turn, is the articulation and reinforcement, or 
transformation of habitual and intentional housing strategies of some Muscovites.  
Many of Renovation’s opponents mobilized to protect their autonomy as citizens, their 
personal dignity, and their right to make decisions about their own lives and property. Before 
Renovation, most of these people were enjoying their autonomy privately; their life strategies did 
not include collective action tools or political aspirations. The announcement of the program 
changed this and exposed the link between private life strategies and political developments. To 
participate in the urban political field, people had to articulate their habitual views of property 
and housing strategy, and their relationship to the state players and policies. They did this in 
dialog with others, in a variety of arenas that they created or took over: in familiar spaces 
suddenly turned political, in the “cracks” between formal and often inaccessible official arenas, 
and in formerly abandoned arenas, such as municipal elections. 
Some people learned important lessons about the gaps in their understanding of the urban 
political reality they lived in. Those who had implicit, habitual expectations that there should be 
some authorities or responsible bodies that would protect property rights, or take care of their 
apartment building condition, had to adjust their views as they explored the field of urban 
politics. Some were crushed by what they learned and retreated even more into their private 
lives, becoming more apathetic and refusing to take any action at all, seeing it as meaningless. 
Others found confirmation that they should only rely on themselves and continue to pursue their 
strategies individually, without interacting with the authorities or neighbors, whose aspirations 
appeared to be so different from their own.  
Yet, some mobilized to fill these voids and created new networks and organizations of 
neighbors and new arenas to stay connected to each other. These new communities and new 
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arenas transformed Moscow’s urban political field: house councils, new municipal deputies, and 
active networks of vigilant neighbors are now present to observe and expose the practices of the 
political machine. 
Implications for further research 
At this time, there is no way to guess how sustainable and far-reaching these changes in 
the configuration of the field are. I have observed the development of the field for three years 
and could see how some people who were active and enthusiastic returned to their normal lives, 
while others stayed active, meticulously monitored the Renovation news and updated others, 
voted, observed and ran as candidates at elections, showed up at the public hearings almost three 
years after the program was announced. How long will these reverberations survive? What are 
the mechanisms that keep some of them going, and what are the mechanisms that silence them? 
These questions require longer research, and pursuing them can give a more definitive answer to 
the big question of social movement research and political sociology: how is political change 
possible? 
The protestors against Renovation were a minority. The majority accepted the 
relocations, and in some buildings, there weren’t any signs of mobilization, with almost 100 
percent of the residents voting in favor. Not much has changed in these buildings, unlike the 
buildings and neighborhoods were activists stirred up the sleepy peace. An active minority was 
enough to generate the shifts that I have described in this thesis. What are the implications for 
urban politics, and politics in general, of such “loud minorities” (Gillion 2020) in more and less 
democratic countries? Extended research on activist biographies, further transformations in the 
affected arenas, and the transfer of gains and losses made in these arenas into higher-level fields 
is needed to establish the trajectories and the scope of political change launched on the urban 
micro-level. 
 233 
Another theme that needs further exploration is the diversity of personal strategies and 
resulting political projects in communities united by some kind of commons. Debates on the 
fragmentation of civil society in urban settings are emerging (Blokland et al. 2015), but there is 
still a tendency among researchers to see urban conflicts as battles between “good” protesters 
and “bad” authorities and corporations. In diverse urban societies, however, competing visions of 
cities, neighborhoods, and even individual buildings coexist and sometimes clash. It makes sense 
to further explore competing life strategies, including housing strategies, as a foundation for 
competing political projects in diverse cities.  
In this thesis, I have said little about the decision-making processes of the powerholders 
and their personal and political strategies during Renovation. Unfortunately, the current political 
environment in Russia and Moscow doesn’t allow for much transparency of the authorities. I had 
no direct access to the establishment or city officials, who, I suspect, followed their own habitual 
and intentional strategies of action during the Renovation Summer. Some of them, like Heads of 
upravas, were habitually paternalistic at the public meetings with the concerned residents and 
were afraid of losing the graces of their bosses in the Mayor’s Office. Others, like the Mayor, 
were surprised and confused that not all Muscovites met his “gift” of “free” apartments in 
modern high-rises with gratitude. These officials, too, socialized into certain cultures of action, 
pursued their personal goals alongside political aspirations.  
I am writing this in the middle of the CoVid-19 pandemic, which shook the routines and 
everyday life in most big cities in the world. In the face of the infection, societies, politicians, 
and ordinary urbanites can choose different courses of action, which eventually will either open 
new opportunities for growth or lead to shutdown and stagnation. The political crises and shocks, 
as unnerving as they are, can also become “portals,” to paraphrase Arundhati Roy’s (2020) 
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powerful account of the pandemic, to positive social and political changes. But whether a crisis 
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